Essays in development and organizations by Xu, Guo
The London School of Economics
and Political Science
Essays in Development and Organizations
Guo Xu
A thesis submitted to the Department of Economics of the London School of
Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. London, April 2017.
Declaration
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is
permitted, provided that full acknowledgment is made. This thesis may not be
reproduced without the prior written consent of the author.
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the
rights of any third party.
I declare that this thesis consists of approximately 40,000 words.
I certify that chapter 2 of this thesis was co-authored with Marianne Bertrand,
Robin Burgess and Arunish Chawla. I contributed 33% of the work.
1
Abstract
This thesis contains three essays on development and organizations.
Chapter 1 asks how much discretion should be given to politicians in the
allocation of public positions. The discretionary allocation of positions by pa-
tronage remains widespread both in developing and developed countries; how
patronage affects organizational performance, however, remains understudied.
Using historical personnel and public finance data from the administration of
the British Empire, I study how a civil service reform affected the allocation
and performance of governors who are socially connected to their superior.
Chapter 2 focuses on the role of career incentives in explaining performance
differences among modern Indian bureaucrats. While rigid progression rules
- such as seniority-based promotions and age-based retirement - prevent
favoritism by shielding bureaucrats from political interference, these rigidities
may also disincentivize: high performers cannot be fast-tracked, and low
performers must be retained. We combine administrative data from the Indian
Administrative Service (IAS) with survey data on the perceived effectiveness
of civil servants to study how the combination of rigid entry, progression and
retirement rules acts to disincentivize modern day civil servants.
Chapter 3 moves beyond public organizations to study the role of collective
reputation in a private organization. Using data from an online labour market
where the country of residence is the salient group characteristic, I document a
mechanism through which collective reputation perpetuates group inequality.
Using an instrumental variables strategy, I identify reputational externalities
between an employer’s first hire and the propensity to contract more workers
from the same country. I provide empirical evidence that collective reputation
serves as a coordination device, enabling workers to positively sort with
employers.
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Chapter 1
The Costs of Patronage: Evidence
from the British Empire
I study how patronage affects the promotion and performance of senior bureaucrats
within a global organization: the British Empire. I combine newly digitized personnel
and public finance data from the colonial administration 1854-1966 to study the inner
workings of a bureaucracy that controlled close to a fifth of the earth’s land mass at
its peak. Exploiting the ministerial turnover in London as a source of within-governor
variation in social connections, I find that governors are more likely to be promoted
to higher salaried colonies when connected to their superior during the period of
patronage. At the same time, they provide more tax exemptions, generate less revenue,
invest less and are less likely to be recognized for their service. The promotion and
performance gaps disappear after the abolition of patronage appointments. Exploiting
a fixed allocation rule to predict the appointment of connected governors unrelated to
colony characteristics, colonies administered for longer periods by connected governors
during the period of patronage exhibit lower fiscal capacity today. Exposure to
connected governors after the removal of patronage has no long-run impact.
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1.1 Introduction
State capacity is fundamental to development and growth. Bureaucrats are
a key element of state capacity: they embody the human capital of the state
and are critical for the delivery of public services and the implementation of
policies. Understanding how to select and allocate bureaucrats is central for
improving organizational performance.
Throughout history, patronage has been the dominant method for the
appointment to public office (Grindle, 2012).1 From chiefdoms to royal courts,
patronage played a key role in the allocation of positions. Discretionary
appointments of bureaucrats remain widespread even in developed countries
today. In the U.S. alone, more than 8,000 senior federal positions are still
allocated “at the pleasure of the President”.2 Discretionary appointments are
also pervasive outside the public sector. The appointment of CEOs or board
members based on family ties and social networks, for example, is common
practice (Bertrand, 2009).
In theory, the impact of patronage on organizational performance is
ambiguous. Discretion over appointments can improve selection if principals
hold private information over appointees or if loyalty limits agency problems.
Patronage, however, can also be detrimental for organizational performance
if principals exercise discretion to bias the allocation of positions in favor of
socially connected subordinates (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Prendergast and
Topel, 1996). Despite the importance of patronage in shaping the allocation
of bureaucrats, empirical evidence on how patronage affects peformance has
remained scarce.
This paper studies how patronage affected the allocation and performance
of socially connected senior bureaucrats within a public organization that
spanned the globe: the Colonial Office of the British Empire. At its peak,
1“Patronage” refers to the discretionary appointment of individuals to governmental or
political positions (Webster’s II New College Dictionary 1995). The term is derived from the
Latin word “patronus”, the protector or advocate. Only in recent decades has there been a
shift towards a negative connotation (Lyttle and Orgel, 1981).
2This count is derived from the list published after each Presidential election in the “United
States Government Policy and Supporting Positions”, commonly known as the “Plum Book”
(GAO-13-299R, March 1 2013).
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the Colonial Office administered close to a fifth of the world’s land mass
through its colonial governors. These governors were leaders of the colonies
and appointed at the discretion of their political minister, the Secretary of State
for the Colonies. I digitized over 3,000 volumes of historical personnel and
public finance reports to construct a unique individual-level dataset covering
the universe of 456 colonial governors across 70 colonies from the birth of the
Colonial Office in 1854 to its dissolution in 1966. This is the first time these
historical sources have been assembled into a single dataset.
My setting provides two sources of variation to identify the impact of
patronage. First, the turnover of Secretaries of State induced by the electoral
cycle in London generated shocks in social connections among serving
governors. These within-governor shocks enable me to examine how changes
in connections affected the allocation and performance of the same governor,
thus holding constant time-invariant unobserved characteristics. Second, the
long study period captures variation in the extent of discretion the Secretary
of State could exercise in allocating governorships. In the early period (1854-
1929), governors were exclusively appointed at the discretion of the Secretary
of State. After 1930, the Warren Fisher Reform placed the appointment of
governors under the oversight of an independent civil service appointment
board. Hailed as the “Magna Carta of the Colonial Office”, this civil service
reform limited the extent to which discretionary appointments could be made
(Kirk-Greene, 2000; Banton, 2008). Combining both sources of variation allows
me to study the impact of social connections on promotions and performance
before and after the removal of patronage.
To measure social connections, I leverage genealogical and biographical
data to construct predetermined proxies of connectedness between the gov-
ernors and Secretaries of State that is defined by shared ancestry, membership
of groups like the aristocracy or the attendance of the same elite school or
university. To measure performance, I exploit the fact that governors were
sufficiently important to control policies that could credibly affect measurable
aggregate outcomes. As the “man on the spot”, governors wielded substantial
executive and legislative power. Under the revenue imperative - whereby
colonies had to “pay their way” by raising funds for public service provision
15
- revenue generation was a central measure of performance and state capacity
(Jeffries, 1938; Besley and Persson, 2009). Building on the literature on leaders
and CEOs, the focus on colonial governors allows me to map top bureaucrats
to aggregate economic outcomes (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Jones and Olken,
2005).
Guided by a model of career concerns and job allocation, my empirical
analysis yields four sets of results. First, exploiting within-governor variation
in connections to the Secretary of State induced by the ministerial turnover in
London, I find that the same governor receives 10% higher salaries during the
period of patronage. As wages are fixed across positions, this increase is driven
by the promotion to higher salaried governorships. These governorships are
also in larger colonies that lie closer to London, suggesting that the salary
difference reflects the assignment to more desirable jobs. The preferential
promotion of connected governors disappears after the removal of patronage
in the Warren Fisher reform 1930.
Second, exploiting governor-colony variation in connections to the Sec-
retary of State, the same governor generates 4% less annual revenue in the
same position when connected during the period of patronage. This decline
is driven by lower customs revenue and coincides with lower investments. I
use hand-coded data on colonial tax laws to show that connected governors
provide more trade tax exemptions. Text mining of newspapers and UK
parliamentary debates provides evidence consistent with lower performance.
Governors when connected are more likely to be associated with higher levels
of reported social unrest, more likely to be mentioned with negative sentiments
in the UK parliamentary debates and less likely to receive public awards. All
performance differences disappear after the abolition of patronage.
Third, favoring connected governors induces the Secretary of State to screen
less on ability and misallocate talent. The removal of patronage increases the
match quality, as measured by a stronger positive association between colony
and governor fixed effects. To provide causal evidence for selection effects, I
exploit the six year rotation rule to instrument for connected appointments and
estimate the effect of connections across positions. Consistent with capturing
a selection effect beyond the incentive effect, one additional year under a
16
connected appointment decreases revenue growth over the appointment by
13% points. Again, this negative performance difference is attenuated after the
abolition of patronage.
In the last part of the paper, I relate cross-sectional variation in the exposure
of colonies to connected governors in the colonial period to differences in fiscal
capacity today. I exploit the same six year rotation rule to instrument the
cumulative number of connected appointments. I find that one additional year
under a connected governor in the patronage period (1854-1929) decreases the
tax to GDP ratio in 2010 by 0.7% points. Exposure to connected governors after
the abolition of patronage, however, has no negative effect. Consistent with the
interpretation that connected governors adversely affected fiscal capacity, the
decline in tax/GDP is driven by a lower share of trade taxes and associated
with a longer time needed to comply with tax and trade regulations, more
complex modern trade tax structures and a higher degree of misreporting in
the modern customs system. As colonies under connected governors received
more trade tax exemptions, these long-run effects are suggestive of policy
persistence.
The study of the organization of the state is rapidly expanding as state
capacity is increasingly seen as a key driver of economic performance (Besley
and Persson, 2009; Finan et al., 2015). My paper contributes to this growing
literature by studying a global bureaucracy - the British Empire - and
particularly how the method of appointment of their leaders can affect colony-
level performance. Combining the unique dataset with theory allows me to
study how patronage and performance are linked. My paper differs from
the existing literature as I focus on civil service leaders that have bearing
on macroeconomic fiscal outcomes (Ashraf et al., 2014; Dal Bo et al., 2013;
Deserranno, 2016).3 In contrast to Jia et al. (2015) and Iyer and Mani (2012),
the abolition of patronage also enables me to study the impact of social
connections under two different allocation regimes.4 Finally, my long-run
3More broadly, I also add to the growing literature on the incentives and selection of public
servants (Khan et al., 2015; Vanden-Eynde et al., 2016; Persson and Zhuravskaya, 2016; Rasul
and Rogger, 2016; Dal Bo et al., 2016).
4In contrast to the role of connections in firms (Fisman, 2001; Bandiera et al., 2009,
2010; Kramarz and Thesmar, 2013; Burks et al., 2015), less is known about connections in
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results contribute to further unbundling institutions by tracing out a specific
institutional channel through which patronage shaped contemporary state
capacity (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Besley
and Persson, 2010; Rauch and Evans, 2000). The identification of long-run
effects hinges critically on the organizational features of the Colonial Office
before and after the removal of patronage, thus tightly linking the personnel-
level with aggregate long-run outcomes. Taken together, my results underpin
a long tradition of intellectual thought that views the transition away from a
patronage-based system of administration to a rule-based civil service as the
emergence of the modern state (Northcote and Trevelyan, 1854; Weber, 1922).5
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces
the historical background, the data and the measurement of social connections.
Section 1.3 discusses a conceptual framework that guides the empirical
analysis. The results are presented in four blocks. Section 1.4 presents
evidence on how social connections affect the allocation of governors. Section
1.5 and 1.6 present evidence on the performance of governors within and
across appointments. Section 1.7 discusses the long-run estimates. Section
1.8 concludes.
public organizations. These organizations, characterized by low exit rates and the absence of
performance pay, differ from firms in substantive ways (Dewatripont et al., 1999).
5The transition from discretionary appointments to a rule-based system of appointment
is seen as the birth of the modern state: from the introduction of the Chinese imperial
examinations in the 1st Century to the British Northcote-Trevelyan reform and the US
Pendleton Act in the 19th, the removal has been a cornerstone of many civil service reforms
(World Bank, 1997, 2008).
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1.2 Empirical context and data
1.2.1 Background and natural experiment
The organization under study is the British Colonial Office. The Colonial Office
was founded 18546 and tasked with administering overseas possessions.7
At the peak of British colonialism, this bureaucracy spanned the globe,
covering nearly a fifth of the world’s land mass (Figure 1.1). Studying
how the appointment of colonial leaders shaped the performance of this
global bureaucracy is central to understanding modern differences in economic
performance.
Two institutional settings of the Colonial Office provide variation that
enable me to study the impact of patronage on the allocation and performance
of socially connected bureaucrats. The first source of variation is the ministerial
turnover. The Colonial Office was headed by the Secretary of State for the
Colonies. A political position, the Secretary of State was appointed by the
monarch on advice of the Prime Minister. Changes in the Secretary of State
are driven by two margins: Cabinet reshuffles at the discretion of the Prime
Minister, and changes of Prime Ministers through elections. The average
duration of a Secretary of State appointment between 1854-1966 is around 3
years. The temporal changes in Secretaries of State with varying connectedness
to the serving governors is the first source of variation I exploit.
The second source of variation is the change in the appointment regime.
The Secretary of State enjoyed discretion over the appointment of governors
who were tasked with administering their assigned colonies between 1854-
1930:8 throughout the paper, I refer to this period of discretionary appointment
6From 1800-1853, the Colonial Office was merged with the War and Colonial Department.
In 1907, the Dominions Division was created to oversee the relations with the self-governing
territories of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland and the Irish Free
State. In 1966, the Colonial Office merged with the Foreign Office.
7British possessions in modern day India, Bangladesh, Burma and Pakistan were
administered from the India Office. My analysis excludes these colonies as they are not under
the control of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
8The title of the administrator of a colony is typically the governor, or governor,
commander-in-chief, captain-general, governor-in-chief or governor-general. For expositional
simplicity, I refer to all those as governor.
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as patronage. Governorships were explicitly held to be “proper objects for
the exercise of patronage by the Secretary of State for the Colonies” and this
practice lasted well into the 20th Century (Jeffries, 1938). While patronage
appointments were progressively eliminated from the domestic Crown Civil
Services and de jure replaced by competitive examinations following the
seminal Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854, the “principle of patronage
steadfastly continued until 1930” for senior appointments (Kirk-Greene, 2000).
Only after 1930 were patronage appointments of governors replaced by a
formal system of open recruitment. Named after the civil servant Warren
Fisher, the abolition of patronage appointments for governors has been hailed
as the “Magna Carta of the Colonial Service“.
In this principal agent setting, the relationship between a colony and
London was centered around the Secretary of State and the subordinate
governor. As an appointed representative of the Crown for a fixed period of
6 years, a governor would directly report to the Secretary of State. With their
duties codified in the Colonial Rules and Regulations, governors were bureaucrats
in the classic sense. Their powers were formally delineated under the “general
powers of an officer appointed to conduct colonial government”.9 At the
same time, however, they effectively acted, as famously noted by governor
Frederick Lugard, as the “man on the spot”. Despite the subordinate position,
governors enjoyed substantial discretion in their administration of the colonies.
Governors, in the most unchecked colonies, exercised all executive powers and
could enact laws directly by proclamation.10 With colonies spread across the
globe, “the distance between the centre and the periphery required a policy of
trust” (Banton, 2008). In effect, high monitoring cost rendered “any attempt to
conduct the details of the administration from this country [UK] [...] absolutely
impracticable.” The autonomy of the governor created widely different policies
9The main duties were (Regulations of 1862): (i) Control over public finance (III.16), (ii)
Legislate (I.23) (iii) Confer civil service appointments in colonies (III.20) (iv) Security (III. 26),
(v) Grant pardon (III.5) and approve marriages (I.18). Overall, the aim was to “direct [...]
attention to [...] the Aboriginal advancement in civilisation” (III. 25).
10The governor was also not responsible for the defense of the colonies as this was an
Imperial responsibility.
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and practices across the dependencies.11 The delegation of power from London
to the colonies enabled governors to develop “real” authority.
This tension between devolving real authority to the governor to promote
initiative and the loss of control for the Secretary of State reflects the classic
delegation problem (Aghion and Tirole, 1997). Not only did governors balance
the demands of the local elites against the directives from the Secretary of
State; governors would often also seek to maximize their own rents from
the public office (Gardner, 2012). As Banton (2008) summarizes, “in distant
Crown Colonies the Home Government can only supervise - they cannot judge
except on the governor’s local information. Their original act is sending a
good governor, and their check is dismissing him”. With the appointment and
dismissal subject to the discretion of the Secretary of State, however, patronage
is likely to have a large impact on the selection and incentives of the governors.
1.2.2 Data sources and digitization
I undertook a large-scale data digitization exercise to construct an individual-
level personnel dataset of the Colonial Office. My analysis combines newly
digitized data from four sources: the Colonial Office List 1860-1966, the
Colonial Blue Books 1821-1949, biographical data from DeBrett’s and the UK
Who-is-Who, and genealogical data from the online database The Peerage. The
sample period is 1854-1966, tracing the entire period of the Colonial Office from
its establishment to dissolution. The Appendix Section A.2 provides a detailed
documentation.
Colonial Lists. The first source of data on the postings, backgrounds and
salaries of governors is derived from the Colonial Office Lists. These files have
been systematically compiled by the Colonial Office to document changes in
the administrative structure and personnel of each colony under the British
Empire from 1860-1966. I digitized the entire set of Colonial Office Lists. This
allows me to match governors at any given point in time to the appointed
11”[The Secretary of State] necessarily relies mainly upon the governor to lay before him all
the necessary information and considerations [...] To overrule the considered and maintained
advice of a governor is a thing which no Secretary of State would do lightly.” (Jeffries, 1938).
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colony and the corresponding salary. For the period before these lists were
available, I derive the same information from the Blue Books (see below).
Blue Books. The main source of colonial statistics is drawn from the Colo-
nial Blue Books 1821-1949. The Blue Books were annually compiled adminis-
trative statistics providing detailed information about public finance (revenue
and expenditures), demographics (population size, births and deaths), trade
and socio-economic statistics such as education (e.g. number of schools) and
prices. The key advantage of the Blue Books is the comparability across
colonies and time. Statistics from the Blue Books were collected through
standardized forms, which governors were required to submit on an annual
basis (See Figure A.1). I conducted extensive archival work and digitized
the full set of 3,905 volumes from holdings at the UK National Archives, the
Commonwealth Library and the library of the Royal Commonwealth Society
to construct comparable economic series across colonies and time. For the later
periods, I use colony-specific statistical yearbooks to extend the series up to the
dissolution of the colonies around 1966. The final dataset contains 70 colonies
(See Appendix Table A.1 for list).
Genealogical data. I obtained biographical information about the Secre-
taries of State and governors from the DeBrett’s database and the UK Who-
is-Who. For governors that were not listed in these data sources, information
was drawn from the Colonial Lists and secondary sources. Finally, I draw upon
genealogical data to create a comprehensive family network of the British elite.
I use family tree data from The Peerage (www.thepeerage.com). The data
provides a genealogical survey of the peerage of Britain as well as the royal
families of Europe, including the family trees of the British elite. This enables
me to create a measure of connectedness between the Secretary of State and
his subordinate governors. The construction of the measure of connectedness
is described in Section 1.2.3.
[Table 1.1 here]
Table 1.1 reports descriptive statistics for a wide set of governor and colony-
level characteristics. About 9% of the governors are aristocrats and members
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of the peerage (Panel A).12 The vast majority of governors (84%) have served
as civil servants before their first governorship. 44% of governors pursued
a military career before first serving as a governor. 9% of governors have
held political positions prior to joining the Colonial Office. 18% (15%) of the
governors have graduated from Oxford (Cambridge). Governors are senior:
the average age at entry is 49 years. In terms of colony-level characteristics
(Panel B), average public revenue and expenditure have been increasing over
time. Trade taxes comprise nearly half of all revenue across the entire sample
period. Governor salaries have been increasing over time. There is substantial
cross-sectional variation in salaries. 76% of this variation is explained by
differences in colony size, as measured by total revenue and population
(Appendix Table A.6).
1.2.3 Measuring connectedness
A valid measure of social ties between the Secretary of State and the governors
is central to this study. This measure must meet two criteria. First, the
measure must capture objective ties. This is a challenge as social connections
are difficult to directly observe. Second, the measure social ties must address
the issue of endogenous network formation (Manski, 1993). If high performing
governors are more likely to be both promoted and establish social ties with
their superior, the resulting estimates would mistakenly attribute differential
ability to the effect of connectedness in explaining promotion patterns. To
meet both criteria, I combine several pre-determined measures to proxy for
unobserved social ties: shared ancestry, membership in the aristocracy, and
having attended the same elite school and university. These are group traits
that historians have shown to be important predictors of patronage networks in
the 19th century British colonial service (Kirk-Greene, 2000; Laidlaw, 2005).13
12Peerage is defined as encompassing the heriditary titles of Duke, Marquess, Earl, Viscount
and Baron.
13Networks were consciously employed, “overtly as ‘connections’ or more obliquely
through the recognition of shared politics, professional camaraderie, or the obligations of
friendship and family.” (Laidlaw (2005), p. 14)
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Shared ancestry. I use exogenous family networks to proxy for unobserved
social ties. By measuring connectedness through relatedness by blood,14
I derive a network measure that is both predetermined and objectively
measurable using family trees. The use of family networks as a measure
of connectedness is particularly suitable in my context. As a large share of
Secretaries of State and governors originate from the British elite, their ancestry
is well documented in existing genealogical datasets. Furthermore, the role
of family ties in securing jobs has been well documented in the literature
(Laidlaw, 2005).
The main source of genealogical data comes from the online database The
Peerage, which maps the ancestry of over a million individuals across Europe’s
elite. I first extract the data to create a large dataset of dyadic relationships.
I then restrict the relationships to blood-relations and then identify the 456
governors and 37 Secretaries of State by matching them against their full name
and date of birth. 94% of the Secretaries of State and 34% of the governors
are reliably matched in the genealogical data. Missing individuals are not
connected.15 Since I am exploiting within-governor variation, this assumption
does not introduce selectivity issues. For the remaining individuals, I apply
Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm16 to calculate the degrees of separation
between any governor and his superior Secretary of State. I define a Secretary
of State and governor to have shared ancestors if the governor and Secretary
of State are connected in the family tree and if the degree of separation is
sufficiently close. To obtain sufficient variation in shared ancestry, I use the
cut-off of 16 degrees of separation, which corresponds to 25% of the governors
sharing ancestry with their superior in the sample.17 The cut-off was chosen
14I exclude relatedness through marriage that occured after entry into the colonial service.
15 The two Secretaries of State that could not be matched (George Hall, Arthur Jones) are
Labour party politicians who tend to come from non elite backgrounds. The missing governors
are also less likely to be aristocrats. Since the family trees of Secretaries of State are fully
mapped out, I assume that governors who are not within the family trees of these secretaries
are unconnected. This can also be interpreted as having an infinite degree of separation.
16The computation is implemented using Matlab’s graphshortestpath package. For details
refer to Dijkstra (1959).
17To put this in perspective, I drew 1,000 random pairs from the full Peerage dataset and
find that only 10% of those are closer than 16 degrees of separation. As the database already
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to maximize the switcher sample (Appendix Figure A.4). The results, however,
do not critically hinge on this choice of the cut-off. The data appendix contains
a detailed documentation of the construction and validation procedure.
Membership in aristocracy and common schooling. I complement the
measure of shared ancestry with three additional measures of connectedness.
First, I define “both aristocrats” to be a dummy that is 1 if both the governor
and Secretary of State are members of the British peerage, holding hereditary
aristocrat titles (e.g. Baron, Duke). Second, I construct a dummy “Both Eton”
that is 1 if the governor and Secretary of State both attended Eton, an elite
school nearly half of the Secretaries of State attended. Finally, I construct a
dummy “Both Oxbridge” that is 1 if both the governor and Secretary of State
either attended Oxford or Cambridge.18
These proxies of social ties do not go without objections. In terms of shared
ancestry, being connected per se, especially if with a large degree of separation,
need not always imply the presence of social ties. Indeed, neither the intensity
nor the direction of the actual social tie between two relatives is observed.
Similarly, belonging to the aristocracy does not imply that two individuals
have necessarily established social ties. All these measure of connectedness
are, in effect, instruments for social ties that are not directly observed. For
the purpose of the identification strategy and the interpretation of my reduced
form estimates, I only require that two connected individuals are more likely to
share social ties with each other than two unconnected individuals. Although
the actual social ties are never observed, all four measures of connectedness
are, consistent with the assumption, highly positively correlated (Appendix
Table A.5). In my later analysis, I combine all measures into a single measure
of connectedness.
covers a highly elite group of individuals, the actual distance between two randomly drawn
individuals in the broader UK population is likely to be even larger.
18Oxford and Cambridge are pooled as there are the number of switchers for “both
Oxford” is too small. The remaining schools and universities are too dispersed to allow for
accurate coding. There is not enough statistical power to break down Oxford and Cambridge
attendance by specific colleges as membership is almost entirely concentrated in Christ Church
(Oxford) and Trinity (Cambridge).
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1.3 Conceptual framework
I introduce a model of job allocation and career concerns for two purposes.
First, to make precise the distinction between patronage and social connections.
Second, to guide the interpretation of the empirical analysis by delineating two
margins through which patronage impacts performance: (i) by affecting the
allocation of governors and (ii) their effort on the job. I derive three predictions
that guide the empirical analysis in Sections 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6.
1.3.1 Technology, preferences and incentives
For parsimony and without loss of generality, I consider the setting with two
colonies and two governors. One colony is large (s = 1), and the other colony is
small (s = 0). One governor is connected (c = 1) and the other is unconnected
(c = 0). The Crown’s objective is to maximize colonial revenue less wage
bill across both colonies. The objective function is W = yc1 + yc0 − w1 − w0,
where ycs is the revenue generated by the governor with connectedness c in
the colony with size s = {1, 0}. The salary of the governor in colony s is
denoted ws > 0. As is common in bureaucracies, salaries ws are fixed across
positions. Matching the empirical setting, salaries are increasing in the colony’s
size so that w1 > w0. The revenue of governor c in colony s is given by
ycs = κθsms + ec, where ec denotes the privately observed effort, θs the observed
ability of the governor, and ms the size of the colony.19 I assume that the
higher ability governor generates higher revenues in the large colony, so that
m1 > m0 > 0. This is due to their greater span of control (Lucas, 1978). The
parameter κ > 0 measures the strength of the complementarity between ability
and colony size.
The Secretary of State’s utility depends on a fixed salary f , the welfare of
the organization W and the salary of the subordinate governors wS(c),
US = f + gW + σ1wS(1) + σ0wS(0) (1.1)
19Allowing the return to effort to vary by colony size does not affect results (See Appendix
Section A.1.1). I assume constant returns to effort to simplify the exposition.
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where s = S(c) returns the colony size of the governor with connectedness
c = {0, 1}.
Patronage enters as the parameter g ≥ 0. This captures the quality of
governance and determines the Secretary of State’s degree of alignment with
the organization’s objective. Under patronage (g = 0), the Secretary of State
has full discretion in the allocation of governors. A civil service reform
that limits the extent of patronage, then, constitutes an upward shift in the
parameter g. Clearly, this specification abstracts from the potential upside of
patronage as g > 0 is always weakly decreasing the organizational welfare.
This however comes at no empirical loss as my setting uncovers large costs of
patronage.20
Social connections enter as the Secretary of State’s private preference.
Similar to Prendergast and Topel (1996) and Bandiera et al. (2009), the Secretary
of State’s utility depends on the salary of his subordinate governors. The
parameter σc captures the Secretary of State’s preference for the governor
with connectedness c. The Secretary of State has a greater preference for the
connected governor so that σ1 > 0 and σ0 = 0.
In the absence of performance pay, career incentives induce the governor to
exert effort. The total benefit of governor c when allocated to colony s is,
UG(ec) = ws + βV(ys(ec), c, g)− 12θc e
2
c (1.2)
In addition to a fixed salary ws, the governor also enjoys a promotion prospect
with utility of V(ys(ec), c, g). This continuation value depends on the observed
revenue performance, social connections and patronage. It can be interpreted
as a future promotion, or the progression into a more distinguished job outside
the organization. Specifically, the promotion prospect is linearly increasing
in the observed revenue performance and connectedness to the superior, so
that Vy(g) > 0, Vyy(g) = 0 and V(y, 1, g) > V(y, 0, g). Those with better
performance and enjoying social connections have greater chances of securing
a profitable job in the future. These returns, however, will depend on the
20Drugov (2015) introduces a trade-off between the disincentivizing effect of patronage and
the higher return to effort associated with winning the patronage position.
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prevailing institutional environment, as captured in the patronage parameter
g. Finally, β ∈ [0, 1] is the discount rate and governor c faces a disutility of
effort of 12θc e
2
c , which is decreasing with governor ability.
1.3.2 Effort choice and allocation decision
The governor chooses effort levels ec ≥ 0 to maximize utility as shown in
equation (1.2). The first order condition yields governor c’s optimal effort,
e∗c = θcβVy(c, g) (1.3)
Governor effort is increasing in ability θc and in the degree to which higher
revenue performance translates into better promotion prospects Vy(c, g).
Taking ability and effort choices of the governors as given, the Secretary of
State chooses the optimal allocation to maximize his own utility. The Secretary
of State will allocate the connected governor to the large colony if,
g
(
y11(e∗1) + y00(e
∗
0)
)
+ σ1w1 > g
(
y01(e∗0) + y10(e∗1)
)
+ σ1w0 (1.4)
1.3.3 Results: Allocation, performance and misallocation
Result 1: Allocation. In the presence of patronage, the connected governor is more
likely to be allocated to the large and higher salaried colony than the unconnected
governor.
The connected governor is allocated to the large colony if,
σ1
g
≥ −
(
θ1 − θ0
)
m1 −m0
w1 − w0 κ (1.5)
The Secretary of State trades off the private gain from assigning the connected
governor to the large and higher salaried colony against the potential loss in
revenue associated with misallocating the governor. As patronage increases
(g → 0), the private gain more likely outweighs the potential revenue loss.
This implies that connected governors are screened less on ability. There is
no trade-off when the connected governor is more able than the unconnected
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governor. As patronage is curtailed (g → ∞), the assignment is increasingly
merit-based.
Equation (1.5) bears two empirical implications. First, to disentangle
differential ability θ1 − θ0 from the extent to which favoritism is feasible, I
estimate the promotion gap between the connected and unconnected governor
of same ability using the within-governor identification in Section 1.4. Second,
the extent to which the connected governor with same ability is allocated to
the large colony depends on the interaction between social connections and
patronage (σ1/g). This motivates the double-differences strategy where I study
the impact of patronage on socially connected governors before and after the
removal of patronage.
Result 2: Performance. Under patronage, connected governors exert more
(less) effort if social connections and performance are complements (substitutes) for
promotions.
Comparing revenue performance within governor and colony identifies the
effort effect,
Incentive effect = ∆y∗|θ,s = ∆e∗|θ,s = θβ
(
Vy(1, g)−Vy(0, g)
)
(1.6)
Under the prevailing extent of patronage g, the impact of social connections
on revenue performance is ambiguous. If connections and performance are
complements in the governor’s promotion prospect Vy(1, g) > Vy(0, g). The
connected governor then exerts more effort than the unconnected governor.
The perhaps most prominent example for this is the case of loyalty, where
the connected governor’s promotion prospect also depends on how well
the Secretary of State performs.21 The connected governor, however, exerts
less effort than the unconnected governor if connections and performance
are substitutes. In the extreme case, the connected governor’s promotion
prospect does not depend on performance so that Vy(1, g) = 0, whereas the
unconnected governor needs to exert effort to gain promotions Vy(0, g) > 0.
21The promotion prospect, for example, could depend on the governor’s own revenue
performance and the Secretary of State’s utility, V(ycs, c, g) = αycs + σcUS.
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The difference in revenue generation while holding constant ability and
colony identifies the incentive effect. I estimate the performance gap using the
within-position identification in Section 1.5. Furthermore, estimating equation
(1.6) before and after the removal of patronage in a double-differences also
provides a test for whether social connections and performance are substitutes
or complements for promotions under two different allocation regimes.
Result 3: Misallocation. The removal of patronage improves the match quality
between governor and colony. The impact of patronage extends beyond the incentive
effect by inducing misallocation.
The observed revenue difference between a connected and unconnected
governor holding the colony constant is,
Incentive + Selection effect = (1.7)
∆y∗|s = κms(θ1 − θ0) + β
(
θ1Vy(1, g)− θ0Vy(0, g)
)
This comparison captures both selection and incentive effects. The first term is
the selection effect. In presence of complementarities between governor ability
and colony size κ > 0, governor and colonies are assortatively matched to
maximize revenue. Patronage lowers the connected governor’s threshold for
the allocation to the large colony (1.5). This increases the range in which
the ability of the connected governor is lower, increasing the likelihood of
misallocation. The second term is the incentive effect, which is similar to (1.6)
but now allows ability to vary across governors since higher ability governors
exert more effort. The sign of the incentive effect will now depend on the
difference in governor ability and the complementarity or substitutability
between social connections and performance (Result 2).
I estimate the combined incentive and selection effect in Section 1.6 by
exploiting a six year rotation rule to predict connected appointments holding
constant fixed colony-level characteristics. This allows me to estimate the
effect of appointing a connected governor across positions. Again, interacting
connected appointments with the removal of patronage in a double-difference
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allows me to test whether the combined effect varies by the degree of
patronage.
1.4 Salaries, Promotions and Connectedness
Under patronage, connected governors are more likely to be allocated to higher
salaried governorships (Result 1). To test this prediction, I first estimate the
reduced form effect of social connections on the salary and allocation of serving
governors. I then combine the shocks in connections with the removal of
patronage. The resulting double-differences then identifies the extent to which
patronage affected the pay and allocation of connected governors.
1.4.1 Salary premium of social connections
I first estimate the reduced form effect of social connections on governor
remuneration. For governor i in colony s at time t, I estimate following
specification:
log wist = β× cit + θi + x′itγ+ τt + εist (1.8)
where wist is the governor’s salary and the dummy cit = {0, 1} denotes
the connectedness to the Secretary of State in office. The connectedness
between the governor and his superior is measured by the shared ancestry,
the membership in the British aristocracy, or having attended the same elite
secondary school (Eton) or university (Oxford/Cambridge).
The turnover of Secretaries of State in London generates variation in
social connections to serving governors. To exploit this source of variation,
I introduce governor fixed effects θi. These absorb all unobserved governor-
specific heterogeneity that are correlated with connectedness, for example
that higher ability governors receive higher salaries and are more likely to
be connected. The identification is therefore driven by governors who change
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their connections during their career. Table A.2 provides balancing statistics
for these “switchers”.22
Around 21% of the 456 governors experience a change in connections over
their career, corresponding to 28% of the full sample in the governor-year
panel. Governors are as likely to be connected early on in their careers and
appointments as later. There is also no statistically discernible difference in
the likelihood of transfer to another governorship and retirement from the
Colonial Office, though the combined measure suggests that governors are, if
anything, less likely to either transfer or retire when connected. Throughout
the subsequent analysis, I include the remaining governors to remove noise
and to obtain more precise estimates.
With the governor fixed effects holding constant time-invariant confounders,
the remaining identification threat is that “within-governor” shocks in connec-
tions are correlated with other time-varying governor-specific characteristics.
As Table A.2 shows, however, this variation is uncorrelated with time-varying
individual-specific observables. While concerns over unobserved time-varying
governor-specific characteristics may still remain, introspection does not
suggest obvious candidiates. The reason is that the measure of connectedness
is pre-determined and driven by the temporal turnover of Secretaries of State
which, in turn, generates cross-sectional variation in connectedness to all
serving governors. So although the unobserved lobbying activities of an
exceptionally powerful governor may, for example, induce the appointment
of a connected Secretary paying higher salaries, the entry of the new Secretary
will generate shocks to connections to all other serving governors. This implies
that lobbying as an omitted variable will only pose a threat if all governors who
became connected at a given time engaged in lobbying. This case, however,
is captured by the inclusion of year fixed effects τt that absorbs unobserved
temporal shocks common to all serving governors. The ministerial turnover
occurs through elections unrelated to colony outcomes.23
22In terms of descriptive statistics, the “switchers” are between those who are always
connected and never connected (Appendix Table A.7).
23The only predictor of turnover are elections (Appendix Table A.4). The results are robust
to using only variation in connections induced by elections (Appendix Table A.14, Column 2).
32
Nonetheless, I include xit as a vector of time-varying characteristics: these
comprise the total number of colonies served and a full set of dummies for
each year of tenure in the current governorship. Finally εist is the error, which
is clustered at the governor-secretary level, corresponding to the level of the
identifying source of variation.24
[Table 1.2 here]
The results are presented in Table 1.2 and suggest that connected governors
receive substantially higher salaries. Column 1 to 4 include each separate
measure of connectedness, showing that the same governor, at times connected
to the Secretary of State, receives higher salaries based on all four measures.
In terms of the point estimate, the salary premium is largest when both are
members of the British aristocracy and comparable for the shared ancestry
and having attended the same elite school and university. These four
measures of connectedness are positively correlated, suggesting that connected
individuals are more likely to share similar biographies and socio-economic
backgrounds:25 when including all four measures of social connectedness
(Column 5), the point estimates are smaller and noisier. Given the noisiness
of the estimates, however, I cannot statistically reject the equality of all point
estimates. To increase the power, Column 6 combines all measures into a
single measure of connectedness that is 1 if the governor and Secretary of State
are connected based on at least one of the four dimensions.26 The combined
estimate shows a salary premium of 9.8%.27
24The results are robust to alternative clustering strategies, such as two-way clustering on
the governor and Secretary of State level or clustering on the dyadic governor-secretary level
and the year level as multiple governors are connected to the same secretary at any point in
time (Cameron and Miller, 2014). See Appendix Table A.18.
25See Appendix Table A.5 for the correlation matrix for all measures.
26The results are robust when dropping one of the four dimensions in turn (Appendix Table
A.13).
27An alternative interpretation of the results is that the shock in connections does not only
reflect changes in the dyadic connection to the direct superior but to the entire cabinet. To
provide evidence against this interpretation, Appendix Table A.14, Column 1 runs a horse-race
between the connectedness to the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Prime Minister.
The results show that the salary premium is only driven by the connectedness to the direct
superior. The premium for connections does not vary by the party in office (Column 4).
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While the within-governor analysis alleviates concerns over unobserved
fixed governor-specific confounders, these estimates are invariably conditional
on governors not exiting from the Colonial Office. Since the main focus of
this paper is to understand how social connections shape the allocation of jobs
within the organization, exit in this context implies a salary of zero. Given the
seniority of the governors (the median age at exit is 58), almost all governors
retire after their last governorship. The estimate of the premium I obtain from
only comparing the salaries of those who did not exit the organization will
hence constitute a lower bound.28
The large increase in salaries for connected governors is striking as salaries
within bureaucracies are typically fixed across positions. Table 1.3 sheds light
on the drivers of the observed salary increase by exploring two channels:
increasing the salary for connected governors in the same colony or by
transferring connected governors to higher paid colonies.
[Table 1.3 here]
Column 1 reports the salary premium based on the combined measure of
connections (the same as in Table 1.2, Column 6). To first test whether the
observed increase by 9.8% is driven by increasing the salary for the same
position, I repeat the exercise by holding constant the position using colony
fixed effects (Column 2). The result suggests that the increase is not driven
by the intensive margin, and the salary premium for connections within the
same colony is near zero. Consistent with the rigidity of the salary structure
within bureaucracies, the finding suggests that the salary increase is driven
by transferring connected governors to higher paid governorships. As larger
colonies pay more (See Appendix Table A.6), this implies the disproportionate
promotion of connected governors to larger colonies.
I provide evidence for this in Columns 3 to 5, where the dependent
variables are time-invariant colony characteristics. The results suggest that
connected governors are indeed more likely to be promoted to larger colonies
28See Appendix Figure A.5 for the survival curve for remaining in the colony. Note that
there is also no association between the overall length of service and the share of connectedness
in the switcher sample.
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(Column 3). In line with a career based civil service, both the salary and the
assigned colony are increasing with experience, as captured by the number
of colonies served. Evaluating the coefficients, the premium of connections
corresponds to almost a half of the gain from serving in one additional
colony (Column 1). Connected governors therefore receive higher salaries by
being fast-tracked in their careers. The reallocation channel through which
Secretaries of States increase their connected subordinates’ salary stands in
stark contrast to the private sector, where discretionary salary hikes within
the same position are common (Kramarz and Thesmar, 2013). Discretion in
promotions could hence undermine the ability of fixed wage schedules to limit
favoritism.
Although all governors exercise comparable administrative tasks across
different colonies, one concern for the interpretation is that differences in
salaries may reflect compensating differentials (Dal Bo et al., 2013). While
expenses in the colonies were typically covered by the Crown, thus alleviating
concerns over differences in local price levels, salary differences could still arise
due to amenity differences across colonies: governors are then, for example,
compensated with a higher salary for serving in colonies with a greater disease
burden or further away from London. In Columns 4 and 5, I test if the higher
paid and larger colonies are also more likely to be in tropical regions or further
away from London. The results show that this is not the case, providing
evidence against compensating differentials. Higher paid governorships thus
are more likely to indeed reflect more desirable jobs.29
1.4.2 The removal of patronage - Warren Fisher Reform 1930
The results demonstrate the centrality of social connections in shaping the allo-
cation of governors during a period in which securing senior positions through
connections was the norm. Although the practice of patronage appointment
was gradually eliminated from the domestic civil service following the seminal
Northcote-Trevelyan report of 1854, civil service reforms within the Colonial
29If anything, colonies with higher settler mortality pay lower wages. Given the incomplete
data on settler mortality, however, I only report the cross-colony correlations in Appendix
Table A.6.
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Office had lagged behind. While competitive examinations were introduced
for the lower-tier colonial administrative service as early as the 1850s, the right
to appoint senior governors by patronage remained a legal privilege until the
reform of 1930.
Implementing the Warren Fisher report “On the System of Appointment
in the Colonial Office and Colonial Services” published in the same year, the
Colonial Office saw sweeping changes in the system of appointment. As the
report noted, the “system is open to criticism first and foremost as being at any
rate in theory, a system of patronage”, where the “[Secretary of State] has the
sole power, through his private secretary, over the selection of candidates.”30
The report hence recommended that the “existing arrangement should be
replaced by a system of recruitment at once more authoritative and more
independent”.
More specifically, the reform replaced the role of the private secretary of
appointments, who acted under the direct control of the governor, with the
Colonial Service Appointments Board. This board consisted of a Chairman and
two members nominated by the independent UK civil service commission.
Although the final selection was submitted to the Secretary of State on
whose authority appointments would ultimately be made, the board imposed
considerable constraints on the extent of discretion by oveseeing the machinery
of recruitment and appointments. The Warren Fisher Reform, therefore,
replaced the “century-old patronage system by a public process of application
and interview under the auspices of an independent and formal selection
board” (Kirk-Greene, 2000). The reform led to the creation of a personnel
department by separating the recruitment functions from the direct influence
of the Secretary of State. In effect, these reforms led to the professionalization
of the colonial bureaucracy. Hailed as the “Magna Carta of the Colonial
Service”, the 1930 reform was a defining moment of the Colonial Office (Kirk-
Greene, 2000).31
30Warren Fisher Committee Report on System of Recruitment (1930, CAOG 13/317), page
21
31Interestingly, Kirk-Greene (2000) also mentions the lack of scalability as a reason for the
abolition of patronage. He writes: “With the increase in demand for colonial administrators
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The reform provides a natural experiment to study the extent to which the
removal of patronage appointments limited favoritism. I test for a differential
effect of social connections after the reform by estimating the difference-in-
differences:
log wist = β0 × cit + β1 × cit × 1[t ≥ 1930] + x′itγ+ θi + τt + εist (1.9)
where wist is the wage and cit = {0, 1} is the dummy for connectedness.
This specification now allows the gap between the connected and unconnected
governor to vary before and after the reform. Since the Warren Fisher reform
formally abolished patronage, I expect the promotion gap to be smaller after
the reform. The remaining variables are defined as before, with the only
difference that the vector xit now also allows for the impact of a large set
of observable characteristics to vary after the reform. This mitigates concerns
that the reform also had impacts on dimensions other than social connections.
These time-interacted characteristics include the number of colonies served, as
well as the previous career background of the governor (civil servant, military,
politician).
[Table 1.4 and Figure 1.2 here]
The results in Table 1.4 show that the promotion gap disappears after
the 1930 reform. While connected governors receive 12.7% higher salaries
before 1930, the salary gap after the reform is statistically indistinguishable
from zero (Column 2). This is an important result as the introduction
of a formalized appointment board changes the allocation and promotion
patterns of governorships: the preferential treatment of connected governors,
as evidenced in the positive salary difference, disappears after the reform
limited the extent of discretion the Secretary of State could exercise. This
suggests that the Warren Fisher reform was effective in reducing the impact
of social connections in shaping the allocation of public leadership positions.
The results are robust to more flexible controls. The remaining columns
allow the impact of social connections to trend linearly (Column 3) and vary
in Britain’s new and sizeable African acquisitions, patronage in its sense of family favouritism
and personal protA˜ c©gA˜ c©s would be insufficient to find enough staff”.
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by a host of individual characteristics (Column 4) to account for trends or
shifts in the composition of governors. The main concern is that the Warren
Fisher reform also affected other characteristics correlated with connections.
To alleviate this, I interact all individual background measures with the post
1930 dummy. The results are nearly identical. Finally, Figure 1.2 provides
visual evidence by plotting the salary gap for social connections over time.
The gap is estimated using an augmented version of (1.9) where the effect
of social connections is allowed to vary by five year bins. The figure shows
that the point estimate for the salary gap is positive in the pre-reform period.
After 1930, however, the point estimates are close to zero, consistent with the
weaker impact of social connections in determining the salaries and positions
of governors after the abolition of patronage.
1.5 Governor and colony performance
The interpretation of the salary premium hinges on the performance of
connected governors. If connected governors perform better than unconnected
governors, social connections need not be detrimental to organizational
performance. Under patronage, I expect connected governors to perform
worse (better) if connections and performance are substitutes (complements)
for promotions (Result 2). I test the performance prediction in this section.
I focus on revenue generation as the central measure of performance.
Revenue generation was a key performance measure for the Colonial Office
and the governors exercised direct control over colony public finances.32 Under
the “revenue imperative”, colonies were expected to balance budgets: “the
colonies were expected to pay their way [...] If they were prosperous, they
were free to go ahead with whatever [...] developments the local authority
wished” (Jeffries, 1956).33 The size of the budget therefore is a direct measure
of state capacity.
32As the Colonial Rules and Regulations state, all the “monies to be expended for public
services are issued under his [the governor’s] warrant”. (Colonial Rules and Regulations 1862,
III. 17.)
33By the 19th century, the administration of the colonies had become a financial burden to
London. The revenue imperative, whereby administrators were “tasked with raising sufficient
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To identify the reduced form impact of social connections on the perfor-
mance measure yist of governor i in colony s at year t, I first estimate:34
yist = β× cit + γ′xit + νis + τt + εist (1.10)
where cit = {0, 1} is the dummy for connectedness. The governor-colony fixed
effects νis limit the variation to “within-appointment” shocks in connections.
This alleviates concerns over governor-colony specific match heterogeneity that
may be correlated with connections, for example that higher ability governors
perform better in larger colonies. As appointments are fixed for six years, I
compare the performance of the same governor already allocated to a colony
when connected and unconnected, holding constant the selection margin.
Interpreted through my model, these within-position performance differences
reflect incentive effects (Result 2). Table A.3 reports balancing statistics for the
within-appointment switcher sample.
The switcher sample is now more stringent. Only 15% of all 729
appointments experience a shock in connections, corresponding to 20% of
governors. Table A.3 shows balance on all time-varying characteristics:
governors are as likely to experience a shock earlier on in their appointment as
later on. The probability of exit does not significantly vary by connectedness.
Finally, the inclusion of year fixed effects τt absorbs shocks common to all
colonies. The errors εist are clustered at the governor-secretary level.35 As
before, I estimate the regression using the full sample to obtain more precise
estimates.
[Table 1.5 here]
Table 1.5 reports the key result. Under patronage, governors perform
worse when connected to their superior.36 The same governor in the same
revenue locally to pay for the local costs of colonial governance [...] and the construction of
public works”, was a direct response (Gardner, 2012).
34The results are also robust when using revenue growth instead of levels (Appendix Table
A.15).
35Again, the results are robust to alternative clustering strategies. See Appendix Table A.18).
36This result stands in contrast to Jia et al. (2015) and Jia (2014) who document that
connections to the Chinese Central Committee induce higher performance. In theory, the
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colony generates 4% lower annual revenue in years connected compared to
years unconnected to the Secretary of State (Panel A, Column 1).37 Consistent
with the mitigating effect of the Warren Fisher reform on the salary gap, the
negative performance gap vanishes after the abolition of patronage in 1930
(Column 2). Patronage hence impacts the revenue performance of colonies run
by connected governors, suggesting that the incentives of leaders can affect
macroeconomic outcomes.
The remaining columns provide the breakdown of the aggregate revenue
to shed light on the nature of the observed fiscal reduction. For data
quality reasons, this analysis is confined to a subsample: changing accounting
standards often prevented the construction of comparable time-series. The
main results, however, also apply to this subsample, thus alleviating concerns
of sample selection. I break down revenue by external and internal sources:
external sources comprise trade/customs taxes, while internal sources are
primarily licenses and direct taxation (e.g. land revenue, hut/income taxes).
Trade taxes are collected at entry points (e.g. a customs house at ports),
whereby the collection of internal revenue is more decentralized. The decrease
in revenue generation is primarily driven by a reduction in customs revenue,
which make up the bulk of the colonial revenue (Table 1.1). The point estimate
for internal revenue is negative but insignificant (Columns 3 to 4).
Turning to the expenditure side (Table 1.5, Panel B), the lower revenue
generation coincides with a decline in overall expenditure for connected
governors, though the point estimate is statistically insignificant (Column
5). Once broken down by reform period, however, the expenditure gap is
statistically significant (Column 6). This suggests that the negative gap is
once again driven by the patronage period. The decline in public spending
can be interpreted in two ways: first since colonies were self-financed under
the Crown’s “revenue imperative”, the decrease in revenue will necessarily
sign depends on whether connections and effort are complements or substitutes. Appendix
Table A.8 replicates the main result of Jia et al. (2015) and shows that connections and effort
are substitutes and not complements in the Colonial Office, reconciling the different findings.
37The results are robust when using per capita total revenue. But since the population data
is interpolated between decadal Census years, my preferred specification is to examine the
total revenue.
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translate into a decrease in public spending. Second, since spending public
funds requires active effort, lower expenditures can also be interpreted as a
measure of performance. To that end, I also disaggregate expenditures to
study spending for revenue collection services and public works (Panel B,
Columns 7 to 8). Observing differential spending on revenue collection and
infrastructure investments may provide further evidence for the underlying
mechanism that drives the decrease in revenue generation. As most of the
expenditures are determined by the size of the bureaucracy fixed by the Crown,
I focus on “extraordinary” spendings over which governors have purchase.
The decrease in public investments in revenue collection is substantial: the
point estimate suggests a significant decrease by about 8.9%. For public
works, there is a significant decrease by 10.7%. Connected governors, hence,
decrease their revenue generation. Faced with a smaller budget, this translates
disproportionately into lower spendings for revenue services and public works.
One threat to the interpretation of the results is selective exit. In the
absence of a perfect compliance with the fixed six year term limit, the results
could be spuriously driven by selective attrition: if connected governors, for
example, are more likely to be kept in their appointment when subsequent
revenue performance is low, the negative results may be driven by the fact that
unconnected governors never stay in the colony when revenue grows. Three
pieces of evidence, however, suggest that selective noncompliance with the six
year term is unlikely to be a major concern: first, as Table A.3 shows, the
probability of exit does not significantly vary with connectedness.38 Second,
entering connected and “switching out” has a symmetric effect to entering
unconnected and “switching in” (Appendix Table A.16). Finally, I conduct
a bounding exercise to rule out that the results are driven by connected
governors more likely to remain when subsequent revenue growth is low
(Appendix Table A.17).
38There is also no statistically significant difference in the survival curves for governors
when connected and unconnected (Appendix Figure A.6).
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1.5.1 Tax policy and exemptions
The revenue decline by 4% is striking. Indeed, there are many channels
through which connected governors may have impacted fiscal performance:
connected governors could have exerted lower effort in monitoring, thereby
increasing tax evasion. Similarly, connected governors could have also engaged
in more corruption by diverting revenue. Given the covert nature of such
activities, however, it is inherently difficult to test specific channels.
To provide evidence for one observable channel, I examine whether the
reduction is driven by actual changes in policies. Raising taxes in the colonies
required legitimacy, and “rebellion by [local] taxpayers was a constant worry
which shaped tax policy” (Gardner, 2012).39 Governors were hence forced
to balance pressure from urban elites against the directives of the Secretary
of State to whom they were ultimately accountable to. Connected governors
could have acted against the interest of the Crown by succumbing more easily
to local political pressure or by extracting private rents from providing tax
exemptions.
In order to test this, I extracted information on legislation from the National
Archive’s catalogue and the Blue Books. By the colonial regulations, governors
were required to report changes in legislation made through ordinances and
proclamations to the Colonial Office. These changes were communicated in
two ways: through direct correspondence with the Secretary of State, and by
reporting the full set of ordinances and proclamations in the Blue Book. I
code both the direct correspondence catalogued in the National Archives into
different types of legislation as well as the content of specific laws.40
Given data constraints, extracting and reading the full set of correspon-
dence and legislation lies beyond the scope of this paper. To reduce the
data intensity, I therefore constrain the historical sample to the switcher
sample (Table A.2). This is the sample of governors that experience a switch
in connectedness while serving in the same colony and hence drive the
identification of the main results (Section 1.5). Dropping the large part of the
39For an account of other conflicts between the colonies and London, see Francis (1992).
40See the Data Appendix for a more detailed description of the procedure.
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full sample, while not impeding the identification strategy, however, comes at
a cost of noisier estimates. The results of this subsample are therefore more
likely to be attenuated.
[Table 1.6 here]
The results are summarized in Table 1.6. The regressions are based on the
same within-appointment identification used to estimate performance effects
in previous sub-section. In Column 1, the dependent variable is the total
number of ordinances as computed based on the National Archive’s catalogue
extract. Consistent with the proposed institutional mechanism, I find that
connected governors are more likely to issue ordinances than unconnected
governors. As before, the effect is driven the patronage period. The remaining
columns break down the total number of ordinances by type. The results show
that the increase in legislation is primarily driven by more ordinances in tax
and customs, which primarily comprise legislation on import tariffs and duties.
This is consistent with customs driving the decline in colonial revenue (Section
1.5). As before, the removal of patronage mitigates the gap.
One concern is that the number of legislation on trade tax laws does not
allow me to infer to the exact policies that were implemented. More legislation
need not be detrimental but instead indicate a more active governor. To
address this interpretational issue, I read and hand-coded 405 years worth
of laws. Given data constraints, I focus primarily on an easily measurable
policy change, namely the introduction of import tariff exemptions.41 There are
several reasons why this is particularly suitable. First of all, tariff exemptions
are more systematically recorded and unambiguously reduce trade revenue.
Identifying changes in exemptions is hence substantially easier than computing
the average tariff rates for all goods. Customs laws are also more harmonized
than tax laws, making it easier to compare policies across colonies. In addition,
import customs revenue is economically significant as it makes up more than
50% of the revenue throughout the study’s sample period. Finally, import
exemptions have been documented to be one of the contested margins of
41See Appendix Figure A.2 for an example of such laws.
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colonial tax policy, as perhaps most famously known in the Boston Tea Party
rebellions against the Townshend import duties.42
The result is summarized in Column 4, where the dependent variable
is a dummy that is 1 if the governor introduced a customs exemption in
a given year and zero otherwise. Connected governors are more likely to
legislate import exemptions during the period of patronage but not thereafter.
Finally, connected governors have no statistically discernible bearing on other
legislation, such social programs encompassing education, health and welfare
(Column 5) or public works (Column 6), consistent with the fiscal channel
uncovered.
1.5.2 Additional performance measures
Revenue generation may not be an adequate measure of governor perfor-
mance. Lower revenue generation, for example, could indicate that connected
governors are less extractive. Under multitasking, connected governors may
have also directed their efforts to other dimensions of performance which
revenue does not capture. My analysis does not take a stance on whether
revenue generation is detrimental for the colonies. The focus instead lies on
the principal-agent relationship between governors and their superior. Since
revenue generation was one of the declared duties of the governors, deviations
from this objective can be interpreted as lower performance.
To alleviate remaining concerns over the interpretation of the revenue
measure, I corroborate the findings using additional performance proxies.
In particular, I use newspaper reports of social unrests, sentiment analysis
of parliamentary debates and individual-level public awards to proxy for
performance. To keep the exposition concise, I only briefly describe the
outcome measures and refer to the Appendix Section A.2.3 for a detailed
description.
I examine social unrest as an additional colony-level outcome. Uneven
taxation of the natives and dismal colony conditions have been associated
42Despite all efforts, the sample is smaller as it was not possible to obtain the tax legislation
for all years. The results documented using the full sample, however, also apply to the smaller
sample, alleviating concerns over selectivity.
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with unrest, with the infamous Sierra Leonian Hut Tax riots of 1898 and
the Jamaican Morant Bay rebellion 1865 as prominent examples. I use the
reports of riots in UK newspapers to proxy for social unrest. This has several
advantages. First, it enables the measurement of conflict in a consistent way as
colonial conflict data is largely absent. Second, while reported unrests may not
capture all unrests in the colony, the visibility of colony conditions in London
explicitly captures the principal-agent relationship: bad news about a colony in
the domestic press is likely to reflect poorly on the Secretary of State. Following
the same logic, I text mine parliamentary debates in London. As Secretaries
of State were themselves accountable to the parliament, observing a large
number of discussions over a given colony and its associated sentiment can
be seen as an alternative performance measure. For this purpose, I extracted
all parliamentary debates between 1855-1966 during which a given colony
was mentioned. For each of the mentions, I compute the sentiment using
standard text mining procedures.43 The algorithm assigns sentiment scores
to text passages, where a negative score indicates a more negative sentiment.
Finally, for awards as an individual-level performance measure, I focus on the
highest awards, the Knight Grand Cross for the Order of St. Michaels and the
Order of Bath (GCMG/GCB). These awards were introduced by the Crown in
1818 as part of an honours system to recognize the outstanding performance of
public servants in the colonies. The recommendation is made by the Secretary
of State, but the final approval is made by the Crown.
[Table 1.7 here]
Table 1.7 summarizes the results using alternative measures of perfor-
mance. To be consistent, I use the same double-differences specification as
in (1.10). In column 1, the dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if a
social unrest was reported in the UK newspapers. The estimate suggests
that colonies of connected governors are 3.8% points more likely to have
social unrest reported during the period of patronage. As before, this gap
43The sentiment analysis is implemented using R’s qdap polarity. See Appendix for a detailed
description.
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vanishes after the removal of patronage.44 Columns 2 to 3 report evidence
from parliamentary debates. On average, connected governors see their colony
mentioned more than unconnected governors in a given year, though the
estimate is not statistically significant (Column 2). The associated sentiment,
however, is significantly less likely to be positive (Column 3). Consistent with
previous results, this negative sentiment gap vanishes after the removal of
patronage. Finally, the dependent variable in Column 4 is a dummy that
is 1 if the governor received the Knight Grand Cross (GCMG/GCB), the
highest award. The estimate suggests that connected governors are 3.1% points
less likely to receive the highest recognition. Compared to the mean of the
dependent variable (2%), the decrease is economically large. Taken together,
the evidence suggests that connected governors indeed perform worse on a
wide range of margins.
1.6 Misallocation and selection effects
The estimated effects in previous section, by nature of the within-appointment
variation, are conditional on governors who were not moved to another colony.
While this alleviates concerns over unobserved governor heterogeneity, these
effects hold constant the selection margin and identify only within-governor
changes, which, interpreted through the lens of the conceptual framework,
only capture incentive effects.
Patronage, however, also affects the selection of governors (Result 3). In
presence of complementarities between ability and colony size, high ability
governors should be allocated to the largest colonies. Under patronage,
however, favoritism may induce misallocation as the Secretary of State screens
less on ability. To motivate the test for selection effects, I first provide
descriptive evidence consistent with selection. Figures 1.3 and 1.4 plot the
relationship between colony and governor fixed effects for the pre- and post-
patronage period. The estimates are based on (log) revenue as the dependent
44 While this appears at odds with the tax exemptions granted, reductions on trade taxes
benefited the local elites. Social unrests, however, are sparked by the broader, native population
(Gardner, 2012).
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variable and a variant of the specification (1.10), where I now separately
estimate colony and governor fixed effects.45 While there is no association
between governor and colony fixed effects in the patronage period (Figure
1.3), the association is significant and positive for post-patronage appointments
(Figure 1.4).46 The figure also shows the shift towards higher governor fixed
effects. Seen through the lens of the model, this increase in the matching
assortativeness suggests an improvement in the overall matching efficiency.47
[Figure 1.3 and 1.4 here]
While consistent with selection, the patterns remain descriptive. For the
remainder of this section, I therefore proceed to estimate the causal impact
of appointing a connected governor. This will capture both the incentive and
selection effects of social connections (Result 3).
1.6.1 Effect of appointing a connected governor
Let the index st denote the appointment in colony s at time t. Let yst+nst be the
revenue or expenditure level at the end of the appointment, where nst is the
duration of the appointment. By the colonial regulations, this duration is fixed
for six years. The fiscal growth over the appointment period is then estimated
using two-stage least-squares:
gy = β× Cst + γ′xst + µs + εst (1.11)
where gy = log (yst+nst /yst) and Cst = Σ
t+nst
t cI(s,t)st is the number of connected
years in the appointment. i = I(s, t) is a function that returns the governor i
serving in colony s at time t.
45The results are comparable using (log) expenditure as the alternative outcome variable.
Specifically, I estimate following augmented model: yist = β× cit + γ′xit + θi + µs + τt + δs ×
t + εist, where θi is the governor fixed effect, µs the colony fixed effect and δs × t captures
colony-specific trends.
46The relationship remains significant for the post-patronage period when using
bootstrapped standard errors.
47Similar to Card et al. (2013), the key assumption required for this interpretation is that
match-specific effects remain constant across the pre- and post-patronage period.
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The main challenge in estimating the effect of appointing a connected
governor is that connected governors are not randomly allocated. Indeed,
previous results suggest that connected governors are more likely to be
allocated to higher salaried governorships which also tend to be in larger
colonies. To estimate the causal effect of social connections on the extensive
margin, I therefore require an instrument that predicts the likelihood of a
given colony to receive a connected governor, but that is otherwise unrelated
to colony-level characteristics.
I construct an instrument that exploits two sources of variation to meet both
the relevance and exclusion condition. The first source of variation I exploit
stems from the allocation rule that predicts the pool of candidates who are
more likely to be transferred to a vacant colony: by the colonial regulations,
the length of a governorship is limited to no more than six years. As Figure 1.5
shows, the majority of the governorships indeed end in the sixth year.
[Figure 1.5 here]
The second source of variation stems, once again, from the turnover of Sec-
retaries of State which generates cross-sectional variation in the connectedness
of serving governors. The interaction of both sources of variation results in
temporal variation in the number of connected governors who are likely to be
moved to a vacant colony. The share of connected governors with at least 6
years of tenure in t− 1 is an instrument for a connected appointment in t,
pt =
Σi1[Tit ≥ 6]× cit
Σi1[Tit ≥ 6] (1.12)
where Tit denotes the years of tenure for governor i in year t. I refer to those
governors with at least 6 years of tenure (Tit ≥ 6) as “available” governors.
Appendix Figure A.3 shows the variation which, given the interaction
of two distinct sources of variation, appears idiosyncratic. The figure also
illustrates the intuition behind the instrument. While half of the available
governors were connected in 1855, for example, none of the available governors
were connected a year later. A colony that falls vacant in 1856 due to the six
year term limit is then much more likely to receive a connected governor than
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a colony that opens up a year later. The first-stage for (1.11) then is,
Cst = α× pt−1 + η′xst + νs + est (1.13)
where the number of connected years in the appointment is instrumented by
the share of available connected governors the year before the appointment
pt−1. This instrument is valid for following reasons: a colony is more likely
to receive a connected governor if the pool of available connected governors at
time of vacancy is larger.48 Which exact colony falls vacant at a given point in
time, however, depends on the six year tenure limit. Here, introspection does
not easily suggest why characteristics of the vacant colony should be correlated
with the number of available connected governors, which depends both on the
six year transfer rule and the connections to the serving Secretary of State.
With colony fixed effects µs and νs absorbing time-invariant cross-colony
differences, the identifying variation of the instrument pt−1 is temporal and
driven by the share of connected governors who are available for transfers. To
ensure that the results are not driven by growth picking up over time while the
share of connected appointments declines, I include a linear time trend in the
control vector xst.49 The vector also comprises the (log) initial governor salary
of the appointment and spell length fixed effects.50 Perhaps most importantly,
I include previous spell duration dummies to control for whether the previous
appointment ended regularly. This alleviates concerns that appointments were
systematically terminated early (or later) when many connected governors had
to be reshuffled.51 Finally, the errors are clustered by year and colony. The
year level corresponds to the identifying source of variation, and the colony
clustering accounts for serial correlation within a colony over time.
48Monotonicity is satisfied as long as a higher share of connected governors with at least
6 years of tenure does not reduce the likelihood of a given colony to receive a connected
appointment.
49The results are also robust to quadratic trends and decade fixed effects, though the first-
stage is weaker.
50The length of the spell is uncorrelated with the instrument. The inclusion serves to obtain
more precise estimates.
51Early or late termination of previous appointments is uncorrelated with the share of
available connected governors (Appendix Table A.20).
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[Table 1.8 here]
To demonstrate the relevance of the instrument, Column 1 of Table 1.8
reports the first stage to confirm that the share of available connected governors
in the year prior to the appointment predicts the probability of a colony to
receive a connected governor. Indeed, governorships are more likely to be filled
by a connected governor if the share of available connected governors in the
year before the appointment was high. The probability of a governorship to be
filled by a connected governor is 21% points higher if all available governors
in the previous year were connected vis-a-vis when all available governors
were unconnected. This implies that the instrument also predicts the number
of connected years (Column 2). The inclusion of colony fixed effects does not
substantially move the point estimates (Column 3), consistent with the share of
available connected governors being unrelated to fixed colony characteristics
of the vacancy. Finally, in line with the intuition of the instrument, it is only
the variation in the share of available connected governors the year prior to
the opening that drives the first-stage. Leads and lags in the variation do not
predict connected appointments (Column 4)52
The first-stage is not mechanic: the Secretary of State may override the
transfer rule and appoint a connected governor who has not completed the
term. Similarly, the Secretary of State may decide to choose from outside
the pool of available, serving governors by appointing a new governor. It
is exactly this endogenous source of variation in the appointment of governors
that is purged using the instrument. The complier population hence constitutes
those serving connected governors who are transferred in accord to the colonial
regulations.
[Table 1.9]
The reduced form and IV estimates are summarized in Table 1.9 and
suggest the presence of negative selection effects. As expected, the OLS is
upward biased: while OLS shows no difference in the revenue growth between
52The results are similar when using two period leads and lags but this substantially reduces
the number of observations (Appendix Table A.19).
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a connected and unconnected appointment, as measured by the connected
years (Column 1), the reduced form estimate in Column 2 suggests that a
higher probability of being allocated a connected governor is associated with
significantly lower revenue growth over the entire appointment. As before, the
inclusion of colony fixed effects leaves the point estimate nearly unchanged
(Column 3). In order to facilitate the comparison of the estimated magnitudes
with those recovered from the intensive margin in previous section, Column
4 reports the instrumental variable estimate. The point estimate, insignificant
due to the weak first stage, suggests that an additional year under a connected
governor is associated with a 13% point lower revenue growth over the
appointment.
Mirroring the analysis in previous section, Column 5 tests if the negative
impact of connected appointments is mitigated after the abolition of patronage.
Given the weak first stage, I only report the reduced form estimates. As
before, the negative impact of social connections is mitigated after 1930.
The last column repeats the same estimation for public expenditures. The
corresponding spending declines as well, consistent with the estimates based
on within-position variation in connections. Once again, the negative impact
is mitigated after the removal of patronage. The fiscal performance results
using two different identification strategies are consistent: connected governors
perform worse both within and across appointments.
1.7 Long-run persistence
The large short-run costs of patronage motivate the question whether patron-
age in the colonial period has had any scarring effects. Indeed, there are
numerous channels through which events in the colonial period may translate
into long-term differences in state capacity. The lack of historical investments
in fiscal capacity mechanically affects the ability of states to raise taxes and
provide public goods (Besley and Persson, 2010; Besley et al., 2013; Guardado,
2016). The differential policies of connected governors could have also led
to institutional lock-ins (North and Weingast, 1989; Acemoglu et al., 2001;
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Robinson et al., 2005). While pinpointing each mechanism is clearly beyond
the scope of a single paper, I document one channel through which historical
patronage can have long-run effects.
Specifically, I focus on an institutional lock-in induced by historical changes
in tax and customs policies. The reason is twofold: first, evidence from the
historical period showed that the reduction in revenue was driven by lower
customs revenue (Section 1.5). Second, the reduction in customs revenue
coincided with a larger number of legislation on trade taxes, especially
exemptions (Section 1.5.1). These historical policies in the patronage period
may not only have a short-run bearing on revenue performance but also a
persistent impact on the ability to raise taxes: legislation, once in place, is
likely to persist (Morris and Coate, 1999).
Relating historical colony-level variation in connected governors to con-
temporary outcomes requires a mapping of colonial territories into modern
regions. This is straightforward for the majority of colonies which can be
directly mapped into modern countries. For Australia and Canada, historical
colonies can be mapped into subnational provinces. I omit two dependencies
that cannot be mapped into modern regions,53 as well as the set of territories
that still remain dependencies of the UK. These cases all constitute small
islands.54 The Appendix provides a detailed summary of the mapping
process. When using country-level data, I impute the same value for all
subnational provinces, implicitly assuming that within-country differences
have been equalized. For the main result on tax/GDP, however, I compute
the corresponding subnational values from statistical yearbooks of the modern
countries.
With the mapping completed, the long-run effect can be estimated using a
cross-sectional regression. For the modern country or subnational province
coinciding with the historical colony s, the estimation of contemporary
53Heligoland is a tiny island that is now part of Germany, Ionian Islands are a group of isles
now part of Greece.
54The 7 colonies that are still part of Britain are small entities: Bermuda, Cayman Islands,
Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, St. Helena, British Virgin Islands.
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outcome ys is:
ys = β× Cs + γ′xs + µR(s) + εs (1.14)
where Cs = ΣtcI(s,t),t denotes the number of historical connected appointments
and i = I(s, t) is the link function that returns the governor i serving in colony
s at time t.
The empirical challenge in estimating long-run effects in this setting is
that connected governors are - as before - systematically allocated to higher
salaried and larger colonies. If historical cross-colony differences persist,
any observed correlation is likely to be spurious: higher salaried colonies,
for example, may have been richer to begin with. If these initial income
differences persist, the estimated relationship between historical connectedness
and income differences today will be upward biased. The estimation of long-
run effects therefore demands an instrument that predicts the likelihood of a
given colony to receive connected governors, but that is otherwise unrelated to
historical colony-level characteristics.
I use the same instrument from previous section to estimate the long-run
effects of social connections. The long-run instrument is implemented by
aggregating the identifying source of variation from the appointment level st
to the colony-level s. This allows me to instrument the endogenous number of
connected years in the colonial period with the expected number of connected
appointments as predicted by the instrument. For each colony, I calculate the
expected number of connected appointments Ps calculated for the same time
period,
Ps = Σt pt−1 × 1[TI(s,t),t = 1] (1.15)
where pt−1 is the proportion of connected governors among all governors
available for transfers a year before the position in colony s is filled. The
indicator 1[TI(s,t)t = 1] counts the total number of appointments, where
TI(s,t)t = 1 denotes the first year of the appointment. Instead of weighting
each appointment with the actual dummy of connectedness, the colony-
level instrument Ps is the number of appointments weighted by the share of
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connected governors available the year before the appointment pt−1. I compute
the connected years and the instrument separately for the pre- (1854-1930) and
post-patronage period (1930-1966).
The relevance of the instrument has been shown in the estimation of
historical selection effects (Section 1.6.1). The exclusion restriction is that
the historical shares of connected governors with at least 6 years of tenure
and who were thus available at time of a governor vacancy are unrelated to
modern outcomes other than by affecting the historical propensity of connected
governors to be appointed. The first stage then is,
Cs = α× Ps + δ′xs + νR(s) + es (1.16)
where the cumulative number of connected years is instrumented by the
expected number of connected appointments Ps constructed as described in
equation (1.15). The vector xs comprises a set of pre-determined colony-
level controls. Since countries that were longer under British control are
mechanically more likely to have received more connected appointments, I first
and foremost control for the years under British rule. In addition, I include
colony-level characteristics such as the initial (log) governor salaries and the
share of land area within the tropics. Finally, µR(s) and νR(s) are region fixed
effects, where r = R(s) denotes the region (Africa, Europe, North America,
Latin America, Asia and Oceania) the historical colony is located in. Given
the high level of aggregation, the level of treatment coincides with the unit of
observation, and I compute heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
1.7.1 Effects on subnational fiscal capacity
With the instrument at hand, I relate variation in exposure to connected
governors before and after the removal of patronage to a summary measure of
fiscal capacity: the tax/GDP ratio. This is the central measure in a large body
of literature on fiscal capacity. It is also highly correlated with GDP per capita
across countries (Besley and Persson, 2009). Appendix Table A.9 provides the
summary statistics for the modern outcomes and explanatory variables.
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The results are reported in Table 1.10 and provide evidence for a negative
impact of connected governors on post-independence fiscal capacity. As
expected, the OLS estimate is upward biased. While the endogenous number
of connected appointments is not significantly correlated with the tax/GDP
ratio in 2010 (Column 1), instrumenting the endogenous regressor yields a
statistically significant and negative elasticity: one additional year under a
connected governor in the colonial patronage period decreases tax/GDP in
2010 by 0.7% points (Column 2). The first-stage for the patronage period is
strong.55
[Table 1.10 here]
Most importantly, the historical variation in connectedness after the abo-
lition of patronage 1931-1966 has no impact on modern tax capacity. In
Column 3, I separately instrument variation in connected governors for the
post-patronage period using the corresponding instrument. While exposure
of connected governors in the patronage period remains associated with
negative long-run fiscal capacity outcomes (Column 2), there is no impact
after the removal of patronage (Column 3).56 Consistent with the historical
evidence, the impact of connections is only detrimental under patronage. The
flat relationship in Figure 1.7 stands in stark contrast to the strong negative
relationship from the patronage period (Figure 1.6).
Column 4 reports the combined instrumental variable estimates. Due to
the inclusion of both instruments, the first-stage is substantially weaker.57
Reassuringly, however, the point estimates remain nearly identical. To remain
consistent, I proceed with reporting the combined IV estimates. All results are
robust in reduced form (see Appendix Table A.11).
55The first-stage is reported in Appendix Table A.10.
56The first-stage of the instrument for 1931-1966 is weaker due to two factors: (i) a shorter
time period post-patronage and (ii) less variation in connected governors, which in itself may
result from the removal of patronage.
57As Appendix Table A.10 shows, each instrument is only relevant for the corresponding
endogenous variable. Given the matrix form of the F-test statistic, the inclusion of both
instruments will lower the power of the test.
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To see how persistent the effects are, Columns 5 to 7 constrain the sample
to a balanced panel for which I have regional data in 1990, 2000 and 2010. The
point estimates suggest that the negative persistence strengthens over time.
[Figures 1.6 and 1.7 here]
The main results are robust: as the partial correlation in Figure 1.6 shows,
the results are not driven by outliers.58 Perhaps more striking, the relationship
is even negative when confining the sample to only modern provinces of
Australia and Canada (Figure 1.8). This is the sample for which the effect
should be weakest as national policies are likely to have equalized any
historical regional differences. Finally, the results are robust to dropping
the “Neoeuropes” and to the inclusion of additional colony-level controls,
like landlockedness, ethnic fractionalization and genetic distance to the UK
(Appendix Table A.21).59 While the sample size is clearly limited by the
number of colonies administered by the Colonial Office, the effect is found
among a homogeneous group exposed to the same colonizer.
To gauge the magnitude, moving the number of connected years from the
1st quartile to the 3rd quartile corresponds to 18.5 connected years (Appendix
Table A.9). With the elasticity of 0.7, this implies an increase in tax/GDP by
13% points, corresponding to moving from the tax/GDP ratio of Kenya (15%)
to New Zealand (28%). While the estimated magnitudes appear large, it is
important to caution that this elasticity is derived from subnational regions
and countries with British colonial legacy. Results derived from this sample
may therefore not correspond to those uncovered from average cross-country
relationships.60 Variation in connections during the period of patronage
explain about 7% of the cross-sectional variation in tax/GDP in 2010.61 In
comparison, variation in the area under tropics explain 31%.
58When removing Lesotho, the elasticity is -0.525***. Due to small sample size I include
Lesotho throughout.
59The results are also robust when excluding the sample of small islands or modern tax
havens.
60In the sample, for this no significant association between tax/GDP and GDP per capita
in 2010. There is also no statistically significant impact on GDP per capita in 2010 (Appendix
Table A.12).
61In comparison, Besley and Persson (2009) find that the impact of external wars, a key
driver of fiscal capacity (Tilly, 1990), is of a larger magnitude, with one additional year of
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[Table 1.11 here]
Table 1.11, Panel A breaks down country-level revenue by using data from
the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD). The ICTD provides
harmonized data on government revenue that is aimed at addressing concerns
over incomparable fiscal data (Prichard, 2016). The harmonized ICTD data
allows me not to only probe deeper into the sources of revenue, but also
validate the results using an independent country-level dataset, where I impute
the country value for all subnational units. The results show that the decline in
tax/GDP is primarily driven by trade taxes. Column 1 confirms the main result
by showing that more years under a connected governor decreases tax/GDP
ratio today. The decline is not driven by non-tax revenue, which comprises
natural resource revenue (Column 2). Columns 3 to 6 provide cuts along
direct and indirect taxes. The negative impact is only driven by the reduction
in indirect taxes. While the impact on goods and service tax is negative,
only the reduction trade revenue is significant. This is consistent with the
disproportionate reduction of customs revenue and the increased provision of
exemptions in the colonial period. Again, connectedness in the post-patronage
period has no bearing except on non-tax revenue.
1.7.2 Effects on customs and quality of tax systems
To provide evidence consistent with policy persistence, I now examine whether
connectedness affected customs and tax policy. These are the two margins that
were relevant in the historical period (Section 1.5). Table 1.11, Panel B relates
the exposure to connected governors before and after the removal of patronage
to measures policy outcomes. Consistent with the large number of exemptions
and the negative impact on trade revenue, colonies administered longer under
connected governors during the period of patronage have lower average tariff
external war between state formation and 1975 increasing the average tax/GDP ratio between
1975-2000 by 0.7% points.62 Comparing across 103 countries, they also find that countries with
Scandinavian legal origin have 29% points higher tax/GDP ratios today. Dincecco and Prado
(2012) find that 1 additional casualty per square km between 1816-1913 (mean casualty 0.10,
standard deviation 0.26) is associated with 0.13% point higher tax/GDP today.
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rates (Column 7).63 While a decrease in indirect taxes and trade barriers per se
may not be detrimental, there is evidence that the modern trade tax systems are
less effective. Using WTO data on tariffs, I find that modern countries that were
longer administered by connected governors during patronage are more likely
to have customs systems with more tariff lines (Column 8). These countries
also experience more misreporting at the customs (Column 9), as measured by
the discrepancy in the reported values of imports on the 6-digit level from the
UK (Fisman and Wei, 2004).64 Countries exposed to more connected governors
are also more likely to report longer time needed to clear customs and comply
with tax regulations (Columns 10-11). Finally, exposure to connected governors
is also associated with lower trade volumes, as measured by the share of
trade over GDP. Consistent with all previous results, the exposure to cnnected
governors after the removal of patronage has no long-run impact (Column 12).
[Table 1.11 here]
Overall, the evidence from multiple independent datasets is consistent with
the disproportionate reduction of customs revenue for connected governors
in the colonial period and the higher number of exemptions granted. The
higher number of trade taxes and exemptions legislated in the colonial period
coincides with more misreporting, consistent with Fisman and Wei (2004) and
Sequeira and Djankov (2014), who document that more complex customs sys-
tems create more ambiguity and scope for corruption and misclassification.65
Taken together, the evidence along several cuts is consistent with the evidence
from the historical period, lending credence to policy persistence as a plausible
channel for the long-run effects.
63See Appendix Figure A.7 for the corresponding first-stage.
64Let Xis denote the value of exports of 6-digit level class of good i to country s reported in
UK and Zis the corresponding imports reported in country s. Misreporting is the sum of mean
absolute deviations, log(ΣNi N
−1|Xis − Zis|).
65Consistent with a narrow fiscal channel, there are no impacts on other measures of
institutional quality, such as the quality of legal and judicial institutions or the quality of
land administration (Table Appendix A.12).
58
1.8 Conclusion
For much of human history, bureaucrats have been selected and allocated
based on discretionary appointments. It was only through the seminal thinking
of Weber (1922) and landmark contributions like Northcote-Trevelyan (1854)
and Warren Fisher (1930) that this practice has been curtailed and modern
professional bureaucracies developed.66 Despite numerous civil service re-
forms, the use of patronage in appointing civil servants remains widespread
today. Whether or not discretionary appointments undermine government
effectiveness and state capacity, however, remains an open question and theory
is ambiguous about this issue.
My paper contributes to answering this question. I undertook a large-
scale digitization of colonial records to construct a unique dataset that
matches personnel records with public finance data of all British territories
administered by the Colonial Office from its birth in 1854 to its dissolution in
1966. Two sources of variation are critical for my analysis. The first source
of variation stems from observing how connected governors and colonies are
linked to the Secretary of State in London. The second source of variation
is the Warren Fisher reform of 1930 which removed the full discretion of the
Secretary of State to appoint governors. Combining changes in connections
to the Secretary of State with the introduction of the Warren Fisher reform
enables me to study if differences in the promotion and performance of socially
connected bureaucrats vary with the extent of discretionary appointments.
My data and empirical setup is particularly relevant as governors were
administrative leaders of the colonies. I am hence able to examine whether
or not patronage had costs by affecting the revenue performance of these
territories, both during the colonial period and beyond decolonization. Being
able to observe both connectedness during the period of patronage and
after the Warren Fisher reform provides a unique opportunity to study
how patronage affects economic performance in the long-run. This paper
66As Max Weber succinctly conjectured in his seminal work, “bureaucracy develops more
perfectly the more it succeeds in eliminating all personal elements that escape calculation”
(Weber, 1922).
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therefore goes beyond the existing body of literature that focuses on lower
level bureaucrats and front-line providers who are unlikely to have discernible
individual effects on macroeconomic outcomes.
Four key findings emerge from my analysis. First, I find that governors
when connected to the Secretary of State enjoy higher salaries through the
promotion to higher paid and larger colonies. This salary premium only
appears in the period before the discretionary power of the Secretary of State in
appointing governors was curtailed. Second, even when examining the same
governor in the same position, I find that the colony’s revenue performance
declines in years during which the governor is connected to the Secretary of
State. This is strongly consistent with the interpretation that patronage exerts a
negative effect on the performance of socially connected governors. Consistent
with previous result, the negative fiscal performance gap disappears after the
removal of patronage. Third, exploiting the fact that governors are transferred
after their sixth year, I also shed light on selection effects by comparing the
performance across appointments. Consistent with the interpretation that the
Secretary of State is screening less on ability when allocating governors, the
revenue performance of connected appointments is lower during the period of
patronage. Finally, by linking historical datasets with contemporary data in
countries and subnational provinces corresponding to the historical colonies,
I am able to show that regions exposed longer to connected governors still
exhibit lower fiscal capacity today. Interestingly, and in line with the other
results, this only holds for connected years in the patronage period.
Taken together, these results provide compelling evidence that there are
large costs of patronage, both for the British Empire but also for the inde-
pendent countries that emerged from the Empire following decolonization.
This paper therefore has implications for bureaucracies around the world
who still rely on patronage as a means of allocating public office. The key
conclusion hence is that incremental reforms aimed at curtailing discretion in
the appointment of bureaucrats might often improve government effectiveness
and economic performance.
60
1.9 Tables and Figures
Figure 1.1: Territories administered by the Colonial Office - 1905
Notes: British territories administed by the Colonial Office in 1905.
61
Figure 1.2: Salary gap and the removal of patronage (Warren Fisher Reform
1930)
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Notes: Difference in (log) salaries for connected and unconnected governors around the Warren
Fisher Reform 1930 (solid vertical line). The salary gaps are estimated with an extension of
specification (1.10), where connectedness is allowed to vary by five year bins.
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Figure 1.3: Matching assortativeness before the removal of patronage
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Notes: The relationship between colony and governor fixed effects for the patronage period
(1854-1929). Reporting the estimated slope and corresponding robust standard errors.
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Figure 1.4: Matching assortativeness after the removal of patronage
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Post-patronage Linear fit b=.312 (se=.125)
Notes: The relationship between colony and governor fixed effects for the post-patronage
period (1930-1966). Reporting the estimated slope and corresponding robust standard errors.
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of tenure length for completed governorships
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Notes: Distribution of tenure length for completed governorships between 1854-1966. The
statutory term limit is six years.
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Figure 1.6: Current Tax/GDP and connected appointments under patronage
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Notes: Second stage (IV) partial correlation between the regional Tax/GDP ratio in 2010 and
the number of connected appointments 1854-1930. Controlling for the years under British rule,
(log) initial governorship salary, the share of land area within tropics and absorbing continent
fixed effects. Robust standard errors.
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Figure 1.7: Modern Tax/GDP and connected appointments in the post-
patronage period
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Notes: Second stage (IV) partial correlation between the regional Tax/GDP ratio in 2010 and
the number of connected appointments 1930-1966. Controlling for the years under British rule,
(log) initial governorship salary, the share of land area within tropics and absorbing continent
fixed effects. Robust standard errors.
67
Figure 1.8: Regional Tax/GDP and connected appointments (Within Canada
and Australia)
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Notes: Second stage (IV) partial correlation between the regional Tax/GDP ratio in 2010 and
the number of connected appointments 1854-1930. Controlling for the years under British rule,
(log) initial governorship salary, the share of land area within tropics and absorbing country
dummy (Australia/Canada). Robust standard errors.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive characteristics of governors and British colonies
Panel A: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Governor characteristics Pooled years By year
Mean SD 1860 1900 1930 1960
Peerage 0.085 0.280 0.047 0.157 0.027 0.000
Civil servant 0.843 0.363 0.809 0.921 0.810 1.000
Military 0.439 0.496 0.416 0.424 0.333 0.200
Politician 0.087 0.283 0.166 0.131 0.027 0.000
Eton 0.109 0.312 0.125 0.068 0.068 0.111
Oxford 0.178 0.383 0.136 0.151 0.303 0.100
Cambridge 0.150 0.358 0.103 0.171 0.242 0.600
Age at entry 48.652 8.990 41.600 46.078 50.800 48.900
Observations 456 (330) 42 (22) 38 (29) 37 (29) 10 (9)
Panel B: (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Colony characteristics Pooled years By year
Mean SD 1860 1900 1930 1960
(log) Total revenue 12.309 2.185 10.850 12.638 13.135 15.961
- Share customs revenue 0.470 0.206 0.550 0.467 0.431 0.575
(log) Total expenditure 12.333 2.166 10.879 12.551 13.236 15.964
(log) Population 11.689 1.995 10.823 12.037 12.071 13.052
(log) Governorship salary 7.928 0.795 7.739 7.961 8.078 8.877
Area tropics 0.652 0.423 0.564 0.591 0.720 0.742
(log) Distance from London 8.562 0.612 8.464 8.608 8.567 8.577
Observations 3,510 (2,595) - - - -
Number of colonies 70 (54) 42 (28) 39 (30) 37 (30) 10 (3)
Notes: Panel A reports descriptive governor characteristics for all years, and 1860, 1900,
1930 and 1960. Peerage is a dummy that is 1 if the governor is a Duke, Marquess, Earl,
Viscount or Baron. Civil servant/military/politician are dummies that are 1 if the governor
served as a civil servant/in the military/as a politician before assuming the first governorship.
Eton/Oxford/Cambridge are dummies that are 1 if the governor was educated in the named
institutions. Age at entry is the age of the governor at time of first governorship. Panel
B reports descriptive colony-level statistics. Total revenue and expenditures are in nominal
terms. Share of customs revenue is the share of external (trade) taxes over total revenue. Area
tropics is the share of the colony within the tropics. Distance from London is the distance
from London to the nearest port in the colony. Number in parentheses denotes the minimum
number of observations across all variables.
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Table 1.2: Governor salary and connectedness to Secretary of State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log Governor salary in GBP
Mean of dep. var 7.929 7.929 7.929 7.929 7.929 7.929
No. colonies served 0.221*** 0.222*** 0.223*** 0.222*** 0.224*** 0.224***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Shared Ancestors 0.103** 0.093**
(0.047) (0.046)
Both Aristocrats 0.214* 0.175
(0.124) (0.121)
Both Eton 0.132* 0.117
(0.077) (0.081)
Both Oxbridge 0.072 0.074
(0.047) (0.045)
Connected 0.098***
(0.036)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Governor FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spell length FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,510 3,510 3,510 3,510 3,510 3,510
Notes: Unit of observation is the governor-year. Sample period 1854-1966. Dependent variable
is the (log) salary in GBP paid to a governorship in a given year. No. of colonies served
is the number of colonies the governor has served in up to the given year. Connected is a
dummy that is 1 if the governor and Secretary of State share either common ancestry, are
both aristocrats, both went to Eton or studied at Oxford or Cambridge. Spell length FEs are
dummies for each year of the term. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the
dyadic governor-secretary of state level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.3: Transfers and connectedness to Secretary of State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fixed colony characteristics
log Governor log Initial Area in log Distance
salary (GBP) revenue tropics London
Mean of dep. var 7.929 7.929 10.74 0.653 8.563
No. colonies served 0.224*** 0.034 0.737*** -0.017 0.063**
(0.035) (0.019) (0.095) (0.025) (0.029)
Connected 0.098*** 0.011 0.177* 0.014 -0.019
(0.036) (0.017) (0.099) (0.029) (0.033)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Governor FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Colony FEs - Yes - - -
Spell length FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,510 3,510 3,510 3,510 3,510
Notes: Unit of observation is the governor-year. Sample period 1854-1966. Dependent variable
is the (log) salary in GBP paid to a governorship in a given year. No. of colonies served is the
number of colonies the governor has served in. Connected is a dummy that is 1 if the governor
is connected to the Secretary of State, defined as either sharing ancestry, both belonging to the
peerage or having attended the same elite schools (Eton/Oxford/Cambridge). Initial revenue
is the (log) initial revenue in GBP of the colony, area in tropics is the share of the colony’s land
area in tropics and distance to London is the (log) distance in km to London. Spell length FEs
are dummies for each year of the term. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the
dyadic governor-secretary of state level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.4: Warren Fisher 1930 - Removal of Patronage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Governor salary
Mean of dep. var 7.929 7.929 7.929 7.929
Connected 0.097*** 0.127*** 0.205*** 0.169***
(0.036) (0.043) (0.059) (0.060)
Reform dummy × Connected -0.123** -0.222*** -0.182**
(0.056) (0.079) (0.084)
Connected + Reform dummy × Connected - 0.004 -0.017 -0.013
(0.040) (0.043) (0.048)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Governor FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spell length FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Connected × Trend (centered 1930) - - Yes Yes
Reform dummy × Governor characteristics - - - Yes
Observations 3,510 3,510 3,510 3,027
Notes: Unit of observation is the governor-year. Sample period 1854-1966. Dependent variable
is the (log) salary of a governorship. Connected is a dummy that is 1 if the governor is
connected to the Secretary of State. Reform dummy is a dummy that is 1 after 1930. Time-
varying controls comprise the number of colonies the governor has served in. Governor
characteristics comprise: dummies for previous career track prior to first governorship (civil
servants, military, politician) and number of colonies served. Connected × Trend interacts
the connected dummy with a linear time trend which is centered around 1930. Controls
× connected interacts all these controls with the connected dummy. Spell length FEs are
dummies for each year of the term. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the
dyadic governor-secretary of state level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.5: Revenue performance and connectedness to Secretary of State
Panel A: Revenue (1) (2) (3) (4)
Colony-level Public Finance
Public revenue
Overall Trade Internal
Mean of dep. var 12.31 12.31 11.47 11.58
Connected -0.040** -0.055*** -0.053** -0.043
(0.017) (0.021) (0.026) (0.032)
Connected × 0.061*
Reform dummy (0.033)
Connected + Connected × - 0.005 - -
Reform dummy (0.026)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Governor-Colony FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spell length FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,510 3,510 2,670 2,652
Panel B: Expenditure (5) (6) (7) (8)
Public expenditure
Overall Tax Works
Mean of dep. var 12.33 12.37 9.015 10.32
Connected -0.029 -0.042* -0.089* -0.107*
(0.019) (0.023) (0.053) (0.062)
Connected × 0.053
Reform dummy (0.034)
Connected + Connected × - 0.010 - -
Reform dummy (0.025)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Governor-Colony FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spell length FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,510 3,510 1,742 2,588
Notes: Unit of observation is the governor-year. Sample period 1854-1966. The dependent
variable in Panel A is the (log) total revenue (Column 1-2), trade (customs) revenue (Column
3) and internal revenue (Column 4). Panel B reports the overall expenditure (Column 5-6),
expenditures for revenue services (Column 7) and public works (Column 8). Columns 2 and 6
interact connectedness with a reform dummy that is 1 after 1930. Connected is a dummy that
is 1 if the governor is connected to the Secretary of State. Time-varying controls comprise the
number of colonies the governor has served in. Spell length FEs are dummies for each year of
the term. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the dyadic governor-secretary of state
level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.6: Tax ordinances, exemptions and connectedness to Secretary of State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Legislation Broken down by ordinance type
ordinances Direct tax Customs Exemptions Social Works
Mean of dep. var 0.020 0.0105 0.0140 0.226 0.0122 0.00698
Connected 0.085** 0.048 0.068** 0.202*** 0.004 -0.011
(0.037) (0.031) (0.031) (0.063) (0.027) (0.019)
Connected -0.083** -0.051 -0.066** -0.369*** -0.003 0.013
× Reform dummy (0.037) (0.032) (0.031) (0.137) (0.029) (0.019)
Connected + Connected × 0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.167 0.001 0.002
Reform dummy (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.125) (0.005) (0.003)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Governor-Colony FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spell length FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Data source National Archives Blue Book National Archives
Observations 573 573 573 405 573 573
Notes: Unit of observation is the governor-year. The sample is restricted to the “switchers” of
serving governors who experience a change in connections within the position. In Column
1, the dependent variable is the number of ordinances issued, as recorded by the National
Archive catalogue. Columns 2-6 provide more detailed breakdowns. This is broken down
by topic of the ordinances: tax related (Column 2), customs related (Column 3), social
i.e. education/health/poor relief related (Column 5) and public works related (Column 6).
Column 4 is a dummy that is 1 if an exemption was added to the import tariff schedule.
Connected is a dummy that is 1 if the governor is connected to the Secretary of State. Reform
dummy is a dummy that is 1 after 1930. Time-varying controls comprise the number of
colonies the governor has served in. Spell length FEs are dummies for each year of the term.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the dyadic governor-secretary of state level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.7: Alternative performance measures and connectedness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social Parliamentary debates Highest
unrest Mentioned Sentiment award
Mean of dep. var 0.049 0.724 0.097 0.021
Connected 0.038* 0.029 -0.045* -0.031**
(0.022) (0.028) (0.024) (0.015)
Connected -0.037* -0.040 0.039 -0.007
× Reform dummy (0.022) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028)
Connected + Connected × 0.001 -0.010 -0.006 -0.037
Reform dummy (0.002) (0.015) (0.016) (0.024)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Governor-Colony FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spell length FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Data source News Hansard Who’s Who
Observations 3,510 3,510 2,481 3,510
Notes: Unit of observation is the governor/state-year. Sample period 1854-1966. Dependent
variables are a dummy for reported unrests in London newspapers (Column 1), whether a
colony has been mentioned in the parliamentary debates (Column 2), the mean sentiment
in the debates (Column 3) and a dummy for being awarded a GCMG/GCB, the highest
distinction class (Column 4). Connected is a dummy that is 1 if the governor is connected
to the Secretary of State. Reform dummy is a dummy that is 1 after 1930. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at the dyadic governor-secretary of state level. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.8: Predicting connected appointments - First-stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Connected Connected years
Mean of dep. var 0.304 1.460 1.457 1.423
Prob. connected 0.233
appointment t− 2 (0.451)
Prob. connected 0.215*** 0.871*** 0.715** 0.808*
appointment t− 1 (0.065) (0.274) (0.354) (0.430)
Prob. connected 0.222
appointment t (0.352)
Colony FEs No No Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spell length FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prev. spell FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 598 598 591 537
Notes: Unit of observation is the appointment. Sample period 1854-1966. Dependent variable
connected is a dummy that is one if the governor was connected at time of appointment
(Column 1) and the years the under a connected governors (Column 2-4). Prob. of connected
appointment is the share of governors that are connected and beyond the six year term limit
(and hence available for reshuffle) the year prior to the appointment. Column 4 includes
one period leads and lags. Controls comprise the (log) governor salary at the start of the
appointment and the appointment spell length. Previous spell FEs are dummies for the
previous appointment’s length. Robust standard errors are clustered at the year and state
level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.9: Public finance and the impact of connected appointments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public finance growth over the appointment
Public revenue Expenditure
Mean of dep. var 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.166
Connected years -0.007 -0.129
(0.005) (0.091)
Prob. connected -0.115** -0.092* -0.101* -0.055
appointment (0.054) (0.052) (0.057) (0.066)
Prob. connected 0.054 0.021
× Reform dummy (0.121) (0.121)
Connected years + - - - - -0.047 -0.034
Connected years × Reform dummy (0.106) (0.099)
Estimation OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS
Colony FEs No No Yes No Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prev. spell FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F - - - 4.506 - -
Observations 598 598 591 591 591 589
Notes: Unit of observation is the appointment. Sample period 1854-1966. Dependent variable
is the growth in public revenue (Columns 1-5) and the expenditures (Column 6) over the entire
appointment. Connected years is the number of years the appointment was administered by
a connected governor. Prob. of connected appointment is the share of governors that are
connected and beyond the six year term limit (and hence available for reshuffle) the year prior
to the appointment. Reform dummy is a dummy that is 1 after 1930. Controls comprise the
(log) salary at the start of the appointment, a linear time trend and spell length FEs. Previous
spell FEs are dummies for the previous appointment’s length. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the year and state level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.10: Connected governors (pre/post patronage) and fiscal capacity in
2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Share of tax revenue (% of GDP) - Subnational tax/GDP
All former colonies Balanced sample
in 2010 1990 2000 2010
Mean of dep. var 19.76 19.76 19.76 19.76 20.58 18.95 19.77
Connected years -0.196 -0.722*** -0.721*** -0.744* -0.871** -0.936*
1854-1930 (0.173) (0.263) (0.261) (0.443) (0.443) (0.490)
Connected years -0.051 -0.049 2.067* 1.475 2.089**
1931-1966 (0.579) (0.969) (1.140) (0.937) (1.018)
Estimation OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat - 25.497 7.767 3.850 3.243 3.243 3.243
Observations 48 48 48 48 29 29 29
Notes: Unit of observation is the post-independence country or sub-national province
corresponding to the historical colony. Connected years is the number of connected years
the country/province was administered by connected governors between 1854-1930 (under
patronage) and 1930-1966 (post-patronage). The dependent variables is the regional tax/GDP
ratio in 2010 (Columns 1 to 4) as well as for a balanced sample for 1990, 2000 and
2010 (Columns 5 to 7). The number of connected years between 1854-1930/1931-1966 is
instrumented by the expected number of connected appointments calculated based on the
share of available governors the year before the appointment separately calculated for 1854-
1930/1931-1966. All specifications include continent fixed efects for Africa, Europe, North
America, Latin America, Asia and Oceania as well the years of British colonization, the initial
governor salary of the historical colony and the share of the region/state within the tropics as
controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.11: Connected governors, revenue sources and the quality of tax
systems in 2010
Panel A: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of revenue (% of GDP) in 2010
Tax Non-tax Direct Indirect tax revenue
revenue revenue tax Total GST Trade
Mean of dep. var 20.62 5.326 9.897 10.64 7.473 3.258
Connected years -0.427** 0.170 0.092 -0.523*** -0.117 -0.488***
1854-1930 (0.187) (0.163) (0.097) (0.153) (0.096) (0.135)
Connected years 0.426 -0.601** 0.220 0.010 0.164 -0.102
1931-1966 (0.597) (0.292) (0.242) (0.417) (0.252) (0.399)
Estimation IV IV IV IV IV IV
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat 3.850 3.850 3.850 3.850 3.799 3.799
Data source International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD)
Observations 48 48 48 48 47 47
Panel B: (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Tariff # tariff Customs Customs Tax Trade/
rate lines misreporting hours hours GDP
Mean of dep. var 7.061 74.765 12.030 3.511 5.052 0.898
Connected years -0.442** 4.234*** 0.088*** 0.060*** 0.025* -0.053***
1854-1930 (0.218) (1.070) (0.028) (0.022) (0.014) (0.017)
Connected years 0.483 -4.730 0.005 -0.083 0.017 0.042
1931-1966 (0.299) (3.552) (0.061) (0.059) (0.053) (0.047)
Estimation IV IV IV IV IV IV
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat 4.373 2.493 3.659 3.817 3.817 3.850
Data source World Integrated Trade Solution Doing Business WB
Observations 48 43 45 46 46 48
Notes: Unit of observation is the post-independence country. Connected years is the number
of connected years the country was administered by connected governors between 1854-1930
(under patronage) and 1930-1966 (post-patronage). The dependent variables are: the share of
tax revenue over GDP (Column 1), the share of non-tax (including natural resources) revenue
over GDP (Column 2), the share of direct tax (Column 3), the share of indirect taxes (Column
4) and its breakdown by goods and services tax (Column 5) and trade taxes (Column 6). In
Panel B, the dependent variables are the weighted tariff rate (Column 7), the total number of
tariff lines in 1,000 (Column 8), the (log) mean of absolute discrepancy between import values
reported at the importing and exporting country (Column 9). Customs hours is the (log) hours
needed to clear customs (Column 10). Tax hours is the (log) hours needed to comply with tax
regulation (Column 11) and Trade/GDP is the sum of the import and export value divided by
GDP (Column 12). The number of connected years is instrumented by the expected number of
connected appointments calculated based on the share of available governors the year before
the appointment. Controls include the years of British colonization, the initial governor salary
of the historical colony and the share of the region/state within the tropics. Continent fixed
effects include dummy for Africa, Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia and Oceania.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Chapter 2
The Costs of Bureaucratic Rigidity:
Evidence from the Indian
Administrative Service
Using a stakeholder survey and rich administrative data we study elite civil servants
in India. We find that officers that enter state cadres older and in larger cohorts are
less effective and more likely to be suspended. We argue that this is due to weaker
promotion prospects and career incentives. We demonstrate that states containing a
higher proportion of these officers grow less quickly and that these effects are driven
by senior officers and felt most acutely in the organized industrial and service sectors
of the economy. Career concerns of bureaucrats therefore affect both their effectiveness
and aggregate economic performance.
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2.1 Introduction
Bureaucrats are a core element of state capacity. They are responsible for
implementing policy and may therefore have a critical bearing on societal
outcomes. Bureaucratic effectiveness is particularly important in developing
economies. Many have recently adopted economic and social reform programs
that are aimed at promoting structural change and have the potential to
substantially raise living standards. The eventual success or failure of these
programs depends centrally on how they are implemented in the field.
Yet, despite their centrality to development and poverty reduction, the
incentives civil servants face within bureaucracies are seldom studied. It
is striking, for example, how the study of bureaucrats, and professional
bureaucracies in general, has lagged well behind that of politicians or private
sector managers. While the influence of political leaders on economic growth
(Jones and Olken, 2005) and the impact of CEOs on firm performance (Bertrand
and Schoar, 2003) have been extensively studied, we know very little about how
bureaucrats affect the growth and development processes.
This paper tries to address this gap in the literature by studying the elite
cadre of civil servants in India - the Indian Administrative Service (IAS). The
IAS, often called the “steel frame” of India, is responsible for running all key
government departments at the state and federal levels as well as a range of
public sector enterprises and corporations.1 This makes them a particularly
interesting set of bureaucrats to study as they oversee the implementation of a
range of policies that have the potential to affect aggregate economic outcomes.
A few key features distinguish professional bureaucratic organizations from
other organizations: selection through competitive examinations, a virtual
absence of discretionary firing (and hence limited exit) and, our focus in this
paper, seniority-based progression rules and a fixed retirement age. These
rules are a direct response to earlier patronage systems, where appointments
1For much of its post-Independence history India has been a centrally planned economy
with IAS officers being responsible for implementing successive five year plans. Post-1991 they
were responsible for liberalising the economy and dismantling the planning architecture that
had built up since the 1950s (Aghion et al., 2008).
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and promotions were decided based on personal or political favors.2 The
reliance on objective selection criteria is meant to ensure that the most
talented, as opposed to the best connected, are recruited. Once recruited,
clear progression rules and limits on discretionary firing are meant to restrict
wasteful lobbying or influence activities by agents who seek to affect the
principal’s decisions (Milgrom, 1988). Seniority-based promotion rules also
reduce principals’ and politicians’ ability to engage in favoritism, patronage
and corruption by providing objective, impartial criteria for career progression
in settings where performance is difficult to measure (Iyer and Mani, 2012).3
As Weber (1922) notes, “bureaucracy develops more perfectly, the more it is
dehumanized, the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official
business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional
elements which escape calculation” (p. 975).
The IAS shares these classic characteristics of modern professional bureau-
cracies. Selection into the IAS, as for many other civil services around the
world, is based on a competitive entry examination, with the top 100-150
scorers on the exam being admitted each year (out of about 450,000 exam
takers). Once selected, IAS officers are allocated to a state, also known as a
“cadre”, through a quasi-random allocation process and officers stay part of
2The earliest modern bureaucracies go back to the British Northcote-Trevelyan (1854)
report which recommended that recruitment into the civil service be by open examination,
that the entry age window be between 19 to 25 years, that entrants should be recruited into a
unified, permanent civil service and that promotion should be based on merit, not preferment,
patronage, purchase or length of service. Many of the recommendations in the report were
influenced by the earlier Macaulay reforms in the Indian Civil Service, the predecessor of the
modern IAS which was the first of the British civil services to abolish patronage. The Macaulay
Report recommended the replacement of the patronage-based system of appointment in
the Indian Civil Service by open and competitive examinations (which were made open to
Indians), the establishment of a permanent civil service, and an age window for new entrants
of 18-25 years. After recruitment, candidates underwent two years of training - one year of
formal training in the UK and one year of district training in India - similar to the training
structure of the modern IAS (Fulton, 1968; Arora and Goyal, 1996; ?). See also Bai and Jia
(2016) for a discussion of the Chinese recruitment system for elite civil servants and its impact
on political outcomes.
3Objective performance measures are also confronted with the multi-tasking problem
where bureaucrats exert effort only on measurable dimensions (Holmstrom and Milgrom,
1991). Rasul and Rogger (2016), for example, show that the introduction of monitoring can
result in excessive “box ticking” activities that are detrimental to project completion rates.
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the same cadre throughout their career. Promotions within the IAS are subject
to tenure-based rules, with promotion waves occurring at 4, 9, 13, 16, 25 and
30 years of service. As Figure 2.1 shows promotions are based on seniority
according to age at entry. Officers do not move to to a higher payscale until the
required number of years of experience have been achieved. While the timing
of actual promotions closely tracks the promotion grid for junior officers (< 16
years of service), senior officers (> 16 years of service) have to wait beyond the
minimum tenure levels to access the top ranks of the bureaucracy.
In the absence of firing and performance pay, career concerns are one
of the few sources of incentives for bureaucrats. Promoting bureaucrats
predominantly based on seniority can therefore weaken the link between effort
and return, blunting a critical source of career incentives. A wide entry age
window4, combined with seniority-based progression and a fixed retirement
age (see Figure 2.2), implies that those who enter older will face barriers to
reaching senior payscales (see Figure 2.3). These limited progression prospects
may demotivate officers and reduce their effectiveness.
This is the issue we take up in this paper. We make two contributions. First,
we empirically assess whether rigidities in promotion affect IAS officers’ on-
the-job effectiveness. Second, we examine whether bureaucratic-rule induced
variation in the effectiveness of elite civil servants influences the aggregate
economic performance of Indian states.
To make progress we must confront the key difficulty associated with
studying civil servants - the lack of reliable individual performance measures.
Politicians need to win elections and the performance of CEOs may be reflected
in sales or stock prices. What the “output” of civil servants is, is much less
clear particularly for generalists like IAS officers who work in a variety of
departments across their career.5 We get around this difficulty by polling a
group of stakeholders who operate in the same state as an IAS officer and
elicit their perception of the effectiveness of that named civil servant. The
key stakeholders we survey include IAS officers, state civil servants, elected
421 to 30 for general candidates, extended to 35 for lower caste candidates.
5In our data the average posting length of an IAS officer is 16 months and officers careers
typically involve postings in a large variety of departments.
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politicians, representatives of business associations, local TV and print media,
and civil society organisations. For each IAS officer they know, we ask
stakeholders to grade them on a 1 (low) to 5 (high) scale for: effectiveness,
probity, the ability to withstand illegitimate political pressures, pro-poor
orientation and overall rating. We gather this information in the 14 main states
of India and cover the majority of centrally recruited IAS officers in each state.
Figure 2.4, which is based on these surveys, motivates much of our
subsequent analysis. The figure shows the raw relationship between an IAS
officer’s perceived effectiveness in the stakeholder survey and the officer’s
age at the time of entry into the IAS. As expected if a lack of promotion
prospects is particularly demotivating for officers that enter the service older,
we find a negative relationship between officers’ perceived effectiveness and
their age at enty into the IAS. This negative correlation is robust to controlling
for a rich vector of fixed effects and background information derived from
the administrative data for each of the IAS officers, such as their gender,
rural/urban background, caste affiliation, education, work experience, and
scores on the entry exam and training marks.
We also find that officers that enter state cadres older and as part of a
larger cohort of individuals allocated to the same state cadre in the same year
are deemed to be less effective. This, we argue, is because, irrespective of
age, officers are considered with members of their entry cohort at each of the
promotion stages. An older officer that enters in a relatively small cohort will
be encouraged by the fact that they will face few competitors and less delays
in reaching the higher echelons of the state bureaucracy. The reverse would be
true for an older officer entering in a large cohort. Short-run fluctuations in
cohort sizes driven by the number of vacancies in the year of entry, therefore,
can have long-lasting impacts on career incentives by locking in officers with a
larger or smaller pool of “competitors.”
We validate our subjective performance measures by showing that age at
entry interacted with cohort size is also positively related to the number of
suspensions a given officer has experienced. In addition, holding constant age
at entry and cohort size, we find that officers which enter the IAS in cohorts
with a higher proportion of younger officers are perceived to be less effective.
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This is consistent with them being disincentivized by having to compete with
officers with longer career spans. Finally, we exploit a natural experiment
induced by the 1998 pension reform, which increased the retirement age for
IAS officers by two years from 58 to 60. From a career perspective, the
reform disproportionately benefited older entrants as these officers became
more likely to qualify for senior positions. We find that, after the pension
reform, those officers who entered the service older were less likely to be
suspended.
We then leverage this core finding that officers that enter the IAS older
and in larger cohorts are deemed to be less effective to address the question
of whether bureaucratic effectiveness affects state-level economic performance
in India. We focus on the 1990-2011 liberalization period when extensive
reforms were being implemented and aggregate age at entry and cohort
size among serving IAS officers to the state-year level. We argue that, due
to the quasi-random manner in which officers are allocated to states at the
start of their careers, age at entry and cohort size at entry are exogenous
to contemporaneous state-level economic performance. This empirical set-up
enables us to conduct a state-year panel analysis to examine whether having a
state cadre which contains a higher fraction of IAS officers which entered older
and in larger cohorts adversely affects state-level economic performance.
We find that states containing officers that entered older and in larger
cohorts grow less quickly. This is due to effects on the organised industrial
and service sectors of the economy which are more dependent on policies
controlled by IAS officers. Agriculture, in contrast, which is largely unorgan-
ised, is unaffected by the composition of IAS state cadres. Structural change
thus appears to proceed more slowly when there is a higher proportion of
demotivated, ineffective officers in a state cadre. When we break the cadre
into junior officers and senior officers, we find that the effects on economic
performance are driven by the latter. This is consistent with the fact that senior
officers head up the key government departments in a state and therefore
have greatest purchase over policies that might influence state economic
performance.
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Taken together, we find compelling evidence that the career incentives
bureaucrats face influence their effectiveness, and that this has wider impacts
on the economic performance of the states over which they have jurisdiction.
Our paper thus shines a light on the costs associated with rigid progression
rules in public organizations. Given a range of public services from health
and education through to the diplomatic services are organized like the IAS,
understanding these costs and gaining insights into how bureaucrats might be
better motivated represents an important undertaking. Indeed it is central
to improving the implementation of public policy, to promoting economic
performance and to improving societal outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
details about the institutional background and introduces our data sources.
In Section 3, we test the impact of bureaucratic rigidities on individual
performance. Section 4 moves on to investigating the aggregate effects on
state-level economic outcomes. We conclude in Section 5.
2.2 Background and data
2.2.1 The Indian Administrative Service
The Indian Administrative Service (IAS), the successor of the Indian Civil
Service (ICS), is the elite administrative civil service of the Government of
India. In 2014 the IAS had an overall strength of around 3,600 centrally
recruited officers. These officers are civil service leaders, occupying key
positions critical for policy implementation. The most senior civil service
positions - the Cabinet Secretary of India, the Chief Secretary of States, heads
of all state and federal government departments - are occupied by IAS officers.
Senior IAS officers also oversee major state-owned enterprises and state-run
corporations. Senior IAS officers are known and publicly visible.
The recruitment of officers is based on performance in the Civil Service
Exam, which is organized annually by the Union Public Service Commission
(UPSC). Entry into the IAS is extremely competitive, with several hundred
thousand applicants competing for a small number of spots. In 2015, for
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example, 465,882 UPSC exam takers applied for only 120 IAS slots. The highest
performing exam takers are typically offered slots in the IAS. Those who do
not qualify for the IAS may obtain positions in less competitive civil service
streams such as the Indian Police Service (IPS), the Indian Forest Service (IFS),
the Indian Revenue Service (IRS) or the state civil services. There are quotas
for the reserved castes, namely the Other Backward Castes (OBC), Scheduled
Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST).
The age limit for entry into the IAS in our study period lies between 21 and
30 years. This constraint is relaxed for reserved groups, who can enter up to
35 years of age. Once selected, IAS officers are allocated to a state cadre at
entry into training. The assignment to a state is typically fixed for life,6 and
officers are attached to their state cadre even when serving in Delhi or abroad.
After selection and allocation to the state cadre, IAS officers undergo training
at the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration (LBSNAA)
and in the states they have been assigned to. The two-year training consists
of one year of academic training at the LBSNAA (“course work”) and one
year of practical training (“district training”). After training, recruits are
initially placed in district administration (e.g. as district collectors), and
are subsequently promoted to higher level positions. Promotion is seniority
based occuring after 4, 9, 13, 16, 25 and 30 years. The discrepancy between
minimum and actual tenure required to enter a higher payscale increases for
later promotions (Figure 2.1), which are subject to more stringent performance
review and depend on the availability of vacancies (see Appendix Table B.1).
Finally, retirement occurs at 60 years of age for both male and female officers
(58 years before 1998). Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of age at exit for the set
of retired IAS officers. There is very little exit before the designated retirement
age - 20% of all officers exit before 58 years of age, and only 8% of officers exit
with fewer than 50 years of age.
A wide entry age window, combined with seniority-based progression and
a fixed retirement age implies that those who enter older will face barriers to
6The only exception which allows for transfers across states is in the case of marriage to
another IAS officer. These cases, however, have to be approved on a case-by-case basis and are
rare.
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reaching senior payscales (see Figure 2.3). This may disincentivize effort and
lower effectiveness. The potential cost of this bureaucratic rigidity, indeed,
has been acknowledged by both the Government of India and the media. The
10th Report of the Administrative Reform Commission, for example, points
out that a higher age at entry mechanically implies a “shorter service span,
which means [old entrants] may not have adequate opportunities to contribute
to policy-making at higher levels”.7 Similarly, media reports frequently point
to the disadvantages of combining seniority-based promotion with a fixed
retirement age, suggesting that “seniority is an objective basis for promotion
but often an ineffective one” 8 and “the problem goes down to the age of
entry, since [...] promotions go as much by seniority as merit alone.”9 In line
with the recommendations of the Administrative Reform Commission, these
media articles call for more flexibility, concluding that the service must “put
the best people, irrespective of age, in the right positions”, and that “from [an]
age-based [retirement] system, we should move to fixed tenures [...] for all
civil servants irrespective of joining age” 10. However, despite repeated calls
by these Commissions and other bodies to lower the maximum age at which
officers can enter the service,11 the actual window has been widening over time
(see Appendix Figure B.1).12
7Administrative Reform Comission (ARC, 2008), Chapter 5, page 96.
8The Indian Express (1 April 2015), “A new kind of babu” , by Manish Sabharwal.
9The First Post India (22 December 2012), “Quotas: How bias in favour of SC/STs works
against them”, by R. Jagannathan.
10The Hindu (8 September 2012), “Fixed tenure a way forward on promotions”, by Vivek
Katju.
11See Administrative Reform Commission (2010), p.105.
12The age at entry window for the Indian Civil Service (ICS), the colonial precursor of the
IAS, was fixed between 21 and 24 years of age just before Independence and geared primarily
towards fresh British graduates from Oxford and Cambridge. After Indian Independence this
narrow window was maintained into the early 1970s; however, mounting political pressure to
include poor and disadvantaged candidates and those from non-elite academic institutions
(who it was argued need more preparation time) has pushed the entry window steadily
outwards and away from the 19-25 window recommended by Northcote-Trevelyan (1854). The
pressure to extend age at entry continues today - the age limit was extended to 32 years for
general candidates and 37 years for reserved groups in 2014.
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2.2.2 Measuring bureaucrat performance
We collected cross-sectional data on the subjective assessments of IAS officers
in the 14 main states of India13 for 2012-13. IAS officers were assessed on five
dimensions: (i) effectiveness on the job, (ii) probity,14 (iii) ability to withstand
illegitimate political pressure, (iv) pro-poor orientation, and (v) overall rating.15
All dimensions are scored on a 5 point integer scale, where 1 is the lowest and
5 the highest performance.
To obtain assessments from a wide range of stakeholders, we elicited
these subjective assessments from respondents of six societal groups in
each state: (i) a random sample of IAS officers, (ii) a random sample
of state civil servants, (iii) politicians, drawn from a random sample of
members of the legislative assembly (MLA), (iv) industry, business and
professional associations, comprised of the highest representatives for the
major associations,16 (v) print and TV media, comprised of key journalists
covering politics for the largest newspapers and TV stations by circulation and
viewership respectively, and finally (vi) civil society, comprised of the highest
representatives of major NGOs, trade unions17 and think-tanks. For each state,
we sampled about 10 respondents from each of the groups.18
We compiled a list of all centrally recruited IAS officers for each state. In
each state, interviewers then systematically worked through the list, asking
respondents to provide assessments for each known candidate. We excluded
13These states are: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.
We excluded joint cadres (Union Territories, Assam - Meghalaya, Manipur - Tripura), as well
as the smaller states (Jammu & Kashmir, Nagaland) and the new cadres resulting from state
splits in 2000 (Jharkhand, Uttarakhand, Chhattisgarh) from the sample.
14Note that a higher value on the scale corresponds to less corruption.
15The exact questions are: (i) “How would you rate his/her effectiveness in his/her
assignment?” (ii) “How much do you feel this officer uses his/her official position for
making money?” (iii) “How much do you feel this officer can withstand illegitimate political
pressure?” (iv) “How sensitive is this officer to the needs of the poor and weaker sections in
society?” (v) “What is your overall rating of this officer?”.
16Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce
and Industry (FICCI), the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ACCI).
17All India Trade Union, Secretariat Employees Union.
18For logistical reasons, we were unable to survey state civil servants in Gujarat and IAS
officers in Punjab.
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junior officers with less than 8 years’ tenure as they are often in district postings
and less visible. Finally, we recorded the source of information to account
for reporting biases, differentiating between information obtained through
personal exposure, friends or social networks, or the media.
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics of the 360 degrees19 measures. The
sample sizes range from N = 15, 153 for the probity measure to N = 17, 753
for the effectiveness measure. The number of complete assessments across all
dimensions is N = 14, 037. We were able to elicit scores for about 70% of all
IAS officers in our sample. All dimensions are correlated, with the highest
correlation being between pro-poor orientation and the ability to withstand
illegitimate political pressure.
A known concern regarding subjective measures is whether these capture
actual information or merely biased perceptions (Prendergast, 1999; Olken,
2009). Respondents, when providing assessments, may compress ratings
around norms or systematically provide positive or negative ratings to all
assessed officers (“centrality bias”). In the presence of halo effects, a
respondent’s overall impression of an officer may also affect the assessments
on each of the performance dimensions. Respondents may also base their
assessment on public information, such as media reporting, generating an
“echo chamber.”
We address concerns of reporting biases in three ways. First, we purge
respondent-specific biases in measurement. Accounting for level differences
in reported effectiveness is important: IAS officers, for example, tend to rate
their colleagues more highly, while media representatives provide, on average,
more negative ratings (Appendix Table B.2). Second, we control for source
of information fixed effects to alleviate “echo chamber” biases, namely that
those who did not know IAS officers personally merely repeat (potentially
biased) perceptions originating in the media. For example, IAS officers known
personally by a respondent tend to receive higher effectiveness rating than
those rated based on knowledge through media or social networks (Appendix
Table B.3). Third, we account for interviewer fixed effects to ensure our
19The term “360 degree” feedback refers to multi-source feedback used by organizations to
elicit information about employees’ work-related performance.
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results are not driven by artifacts of the data collection method. Finally, in
Section 3.3.2, we also provide evidence on actual suspensions, a relatively
clear-cut objective measure of (non-)performance, to complement the subjective
measures.
2.2.3 Administrative data
To study the determinants of effectiveness, we combine our 360 degree survey
data with administrative data obtained from the LBSNAA, the facility where
IAS recruits undergo training before their first posting. We use three sources
of administrative data.
First, we draw upon the descriptive rolls of 5,635 IAS officers who
entered between 1975-2005. This dataset contains a rich set of individual
background characteristics ranging from year and location of birth to caste,
family background, educational degrees and work experience, allowing us to
examine how pre-determined characteristics at point of entry into IAS correlate
with later effectiveness.
Second, we use data on internal rankings20 which covers 4,107 IAS officers
from 1972-2009. This dataset provides information about the initial allocation
of officers to cadres, the size of their cohorts in a given entry year, their scores
on the entry exam as well as their marks on the training courses.
Finally, on-the-job outcome measures are derived from the executive
record sheets of 10,817 IAS officers who entered between 1949-2014. These
record sheets contain detailed information about the postings (e.g. job title,
department and duration) and payscales of each officer throughout his or her
career. This dataset allows us to track suspension episodes for each officer. The
data is provided by the Ministry of Personnel, Grievances and Pensions and is
publicly available.
Table 2.2 summarizes the IAS officers’ background characteristics for the
cross-section of 2012-13, providing a snapshot of the IAS at the time of our
survey. The typical IAS officer is about 24.5 years old at the time of entry into
the IAS. A large majority of IAS officers are male (86 percent). More than a
20In the IAS, these lists are referred to as the “inter-se-seniority” lists.
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quarter of IAS officers are drawn from minority castes (OBC = 8 percent; SC
= 14 percent; ST = 5 percent). Nearly three quarters of the IAS officers come
from an urban background. A large share of IAS officers (32%) had previously
obtained tertiary degrees in Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics,
Statistics (STEM) or Economics. Among those that have worked prior to joining
the IAS, a third held public sector jobs.21 About 3 percent of IAS officers had
previously worked in another branch of the All India Services (AIS), such as
the Indian Police Service (IPS) or the Indian Forest Service (IFS) before joining
the IAS.
Finally, in order to examine the effects of bureaucratic effectiveness on
state-level outcomes, we construct a state-year panel covering the 14 Indian
states for which we collected survey data. We assemble state-level time series
for GDP covering the post-reform period 1990-2011 from data published by
the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).22 To examine, in greater detail, outcomes
over which bureaucrats exert control, we use data from the Annual Survey of
Industries (ASI). We also use data from the Public Finance Statistics to examine
the impact of bureaucrats on revenue generation and spending. Finally, when
relevant, we use population data from the decennial Census of India to derive
per capita measures.23
2.3 Effects on individual effectiveness
2.3.1 Age at entry and individual effectiveness
As shown in Figure 2.1, the IAS is characterized by rigid seniority-based
promotion rules. Officers are only promoted to jobs in the top two payscales
if they have at least 25 (second highest payscale) or 30 (highest payscale) years
of tenure in the IAS. As the figure also suggests, access to the senior jobs is
delayed - likely due to the limited number of vacancies at higher payscales.
21The most frequent jobs in this category comprise junior positions in the Indian Railway
Service, Income Tax Service, Customs and Telecommunications.
22The data is obtained from the RBI’s online Data warehouse, available at
http://dbie.rbi.org.in.
23We (log-)linearly interpolate the annual state-level population between the Census years.
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For example, among officers that have 32 years of tenure in the IAS, essentially
all of them are still in the second highest payscale even though they are
already eligible for a promotion to the top payscale. Such seniority-based
promotion rules, combined with substantial delays in actual promotions and
forced retirement at 60 years of age (58 years of age prior to 1998), implies
that individuals who enter the IAS at a relatively older age face a mechanical
barrier to promotion - they will reach the compulsory retirement age before a
job at the highest payscale becomes available for them. In fact, based on the
evidence in Figure 2.3, any individual that enters the IAS above the age of 28
(26 pre 1998) will have almost no chance of getting promoted to the highest
payscale.
This suggests that bureaucratic rules may be a first order factor in
explaining the negative correlation, observed in Figure 2.4, between age at
entry and effectivenesss. Individuals who enter the IAS at an older age may
be less motivated to do well on the job as they do not expect to progress into
the top echelons of the bureaucracy, even if they have stellar report cards.
This rigid progression rule stands in stark contrast to the private sector, where
the practice of fast-tracking high performers is often considered to be “good”
management practice (Bloom et al. 2016).
While Figure 2.4 is consistent with the hypothesis that those who are
older at entry are more likely to be disincentivized by the seniority-based
progression rule, the obvious threats to this interpretation are omitted variable
bias and selection. For example, those entering older may be of differential
ability or more likely to come from minority castes. We therefore move beyond
the univariate correlation and assess the robustness of the correlation to a
battery of officer-specific controls which might be correlated with age at entry.
For individual i with k years of tenure rated by respondent j, we estimate the
relationship between the perceived effectiveness and age at entry as:
scoreijk = α× age entryi + xi′β+ zij′γ+ τk + θj + εijk (2.1)
where scoreijk is the subjective rating of officer i (who has k years of tenure) by
respondent j, age entryi denotes the age at entry and xi the vector of officer-
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specific background characteristics. zij are source of information dummies that
differentiate between knowing the rated officer personally, through networks
or through media reports. The coefficients θj are respondent fixed effects. As
no respondent rates officers in more than one state, these respondent fixed
effects also control for any state-specific differences in ratings. The coefficients
τk are fixed effects for each year of tenure k, which absorb seniority-specific
profiles in the ratings. We also include interviewer fixed effects in the vector
xi.24 Finally, εijk is the error term, which is clustered on the respondent level.25
We consider four sets of background characteristics in the vector xi in
addition to age at entry that may have some bearing on how effective bureau-
crats are in performing their duties. These include individual socio-economic
background characteristics, education, work experience and entry exam and
training scores. Individual socio-economic background characteristics include,
in addition to age at entry: gender, dummies for the reserved caste (which
we know to be mechanically correlated with age at entry due to the higher
age eligibility for reserved castes), and a dummy for whether the IAS officer
is coming from an urban area. The set of education characteristics include
a dummy for a STEM or Economics degree as well as a dummy for having
received an academic distinction, as measured by a first-class honours in
undergraduate or a distinction in graduate studies (equivalent to a GPA above
3.0). The previous work experience controls include dummies for a prior job
in education and research, the private sector, the non-AIS public sector or the
AIS (IPS and IFS).26 The omitted category comprises individuals that entered
the IAS without any previous work experience. Finally, we include entry and
training scores: the standardized UPSC score, the standardized training score,
as well as a dummy improvedi that equals 1 if the officer did better in training
than on the entry exam. The UPSC and training scores are standardized
24As interviewers were trained to collect data using one data collection method (face to
face, phone or web), the effects also absorb level differences driven by different data collection
methods.
25Our results are also robust when clustering on the individual IAS officer level.
26The All India Services comprise the Indian Administrative Service, the Indian Police
Service and the Indian Forestry Service which are, in that order of importance, the elite
branches of the civil service in India.
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within each intake year, thus indicating the relative position of an officer in
a given cohort. The dummy improvedi equals 1 if the officer’s relative position
during training - measured as standard deviations from the mean - improved
compared to the UPSC score.
The results are summarized in Table 2.3. All columns in Table 2.3
estimate the same regression described in equation (1), except that we vary the
dependent variable of interest to span all of the five subjective performance
measures considered in our 360 degree survey. To keep the table succinct,
we only report the coefficients for the entry exam score which, as a proxy for
ability, is likely to be a major confounder of the observed negative relationship.
Appendix Table B.4 reports the full set of coefficients.
Despite holding constant such a rich set of background controls in this
multivariate setting, individuals who enter the IAS at an older age still receive
statistically significantly more negative ratings across all dimensions. Note also
that the results show robust correlations between the entry exam score and the
subjective performance ratings. Officers that obtained higher scores on the
entry exam receive stronger evaluations in our 360 degree assessment survey.
This is particularly striking as we are examining a highly selected sample of
top ranking exam takers.
In summary, while there are multiple reasons beyond the disincentivizing
effects of rigid promotion rules that might explain a negative correlation
between age at entry and effectiveness, we conclude from Table 2.3 that the
relationship is robust to controlling for other sources of observed heterogeneity
between IAS officers. But of course this does not rule out the possibility that
the correlation of interest is driven by unobserved sources of heterogeneity.
In the following sections, we propose alternative empirical tests that make
more direct use of variation in how binding promotion rules are across officers
due to the quasi-random assignment of officers to state cadres each year. We
also exploit the natural experiment induced by the 1998 pension reform which
extended the retirement age by two years and hence mechanically gave officers
that entered the service older in affected cohorts a greater chance of reaching
the upper echelons of the bureaucracy before retirement.
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2.3.2 Age at entry, cohort size and individual effectiveness
We hypothesize that starting in the IAS older reduces individuals’ perfor-
mance, as rigid promotion rules and a fixed retirement age mechanically
means that they have a lower chance of reaching the highest echelons of the
bureaucracy. Extending this logic further, being an old entrant in a state cadre
cohort that is relatively large (i.e. with many officers in the state that have
the same tenure) might be particularly demotivating as a large cohort further
reduces the chance of being promoted in any given year. An older officer that
enters in a smaller cohort knows that he or she will be one of only very few
eligible for promotion when entering the 25th or 30th year in the IAS, and
hence their chance of being promoted before having to retire will be higher. In
contrast, an older officer that enters in a relatively large cohort should expect
more delays and is more likely to be forced into retirement before reaching
the top of the bureaucracy. All this suggests an alternative empirical test -
there should be a negative correlation between individual effectiveness and
the interaction term between the individual’s age at entry into the IAS and
the size of the state cadre cohort he or she was quasi-randomly allocated to,
holding age at entry and cohort size constant. We therefore augment equation
(1) by interacting age at entry with the cohort size of the state cadre batch the
IAS officer was allocated to:
scoreijk = α× age entryi + β× cohort sizei +
γ× age entryi × cohort sizei +
xi′δ+ z′ijη + τk + θj + εijk (2.2)
where cohort sizei is the number of officers that were assigned to the same
cadre in the same year as the officer that is being rated. Cohort size is centered
around the sample mean to facilitate interpretation of the results. The other
variables are as described in equation (1). In particular, we include the same
set of individual background controls as in Table 2.3.
Our results are presented in Panel A of Table 2.4. Consistent with the
hypothesis that rigid bureaucratic rules might demotivate older entrants, we
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find that the negative relationship between age at entry and effectiveness is
magnified in the presence of larger cohort sizes (Column 1). The interaction
term between age at entry and cohort size is also a negative predictor of
an officer’s overall rating (Column 5). While also negative, the estimated
coefficients on this interaction term and the three other subjective assessments
(probity, ability to withstand political pressures and pro-poor orientation) are
not statistically significant.
The key advantage of this test over that presented in Table 2.3 is that worries
about unobserved correlates of age that might directly affect bureaucratic
performance are no longer relevant. However, this specification is not
without its own concerns about unobserved heterogeneity. Other individual
characteristics may differentially impact an officer’s performance in larger
versus smaller cohorts. The appeal of this test however compared to that in
Table 2.3 is that introspection does not as easily suggest obvious concerns or
threats to our proposed career incentive-based interpretation.
To address remaining concerns over unobserved confounders that also vary
differentially with cohort size, we have replicated the results in Panel B adding
a full vector of interaction terms between cohort size and the rich set of
individual background characteristics. The estimated effect on the interaction
term of interest (age at entry × cohort size) is nearly unchanged compared to
Panel A and remains statistically significant in Columns 1 (effectiveness) and
5 (overall rating).
2.3.3 Additional evidence
The main threat to the interpretation of our findings as disincentives induced
by the rigid seniority-based progression rules remains selection on unobserv-
ables. Those who enter older may differ in unobserved characteristics from
those who enter young and those characteristics might differentially relate
to effectiveness depending on cohort size. Furthermore, while the negative
coefficient on age at entry × cohort size may indeed reflect lower incentives for
those who anticipate not being able to climb to the highest echelons, we cannot
rule out that older officers perform worse in larger cohorts for other reasons
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than those related to the rigidity of promotion rules. Finally, some doubts
may remain about the quality of our survey-based effectiveness ratings. In this
section, we propose three additional tests that help alleviate these remaining
concerns.
Cohort age composition and individual effectiveness
In the first additional test, we exploit cross-sectional variation in the age
composition of cohorts to which officers are allocated. As is discussed in
more detail in Section 4, the allocation of groups of officers to a given state
cadre in a given year is a quasi-random process. This means that, holding
an officer’s age at entry and the size of his or her cohort constant, there will
be as good as random variation in the share of officers in the batch that are
younger or older than the given officer. This variation can be exploited to
assess the impact of the bureaucratic rigidity on effectiveness. Indeed, having
many officers in one’s cohort that will reach retirement age later than oneself
mechanically decreases one’s chance of reaching the highest bureaucratic
echelons while having many officers in one’s cohort that will reach retirement
age earlier than oneself mechanically increases one’s chance of reaching the
highest bureaucratic echelons. Hence, we would expect an officer to perform
worse as the number of younger officers in his or her cohort increases. The
appeal of this additional test is that it can be implemented by holding constant
age at entry as the test only relies on the comparison of relative age among
officers in the same cohort.
We use the specification described in equation (1), controlling for the same
set of background controls (individual background characteristics, education,
previous work experience and entry exam performance), as well as the same
set of fixed effects described in Section 3.1. We add two additional independent
variables that capture the cadre age composition: the number of younger and
older officers in the individual’s cadre. Since the variation in the number of
younger and older officer relies on the age composition of the cohort, we can
hold constant the individual’s age at entry using fixed effects.
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The results are presented in Table 2.5. We find that officers who entered at
the same age but have a larger number of younger officers in their cohort
are deemed statistically significantly less effective (Column 1), less able to
withstand illegitimate political pressure (Column 3) and receive a lower overall
rating (Column 5). In contrast, exposure to a larger number of same age or
older officers is not associated with differential perceived performance, even
though all the point estimates are positive.
Direct measures of performance and longitudinal data
A different potential concern about our results relates to the quality of our
360 degree survey ratings. Yet, while systematic biases might likely exist in
the ratings when it comes to background characteristics (e.g. negative views
against women or minority castes might translate into negative subjective
performance assessment absent evidence for such negative assessments), it is
more difficult to think about such systematic biases driving the ratings for
a variable such as age at entry × cohort size. In other words, while there
might be unfair discrimination against some groups of officers, it is difficult to
imagine what would drive systematic negative biases against older officers in
larger cohorts.
Nonetheless, we also use suspensions as a direct measure of non-performance.27
Unlike the subjective assessments, suspension data is available for all IAS
officers, providing an additional robustness check to alleviate concerns of
sample selectivity. In particular, using the publicly available executive record
sheets, we can study suspensions for all centrally recruited IAS officers over
the period 1980-2012. This is the period for which the executive record sheets
cover all IAS officers.
While objective in terms of measurement, we note that this measure also
has its own limitations as suspensions may be politically motivated. An officer
that is unwilling to countenance the corruption of top state politicians, for
example, may be more likely to be suspended. We also note that suspensions
27Appendix Table B.6 shows that officers that have been suspended are percieved as less
effective and indeed perform worse on all 360 degree performance dimensions.
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are rare events and hence only provide a very crude measure of an officer’s
effectiveness. In fact, it is our lack of confidence in what these measures are
capturing that originally motivated the 360 degree evaluations.
Notwithstanding these caveats, we use the individual-level panel data to
run the following regression. For individual i in state s with k years of tenure
in year t, we estimate:
yikst = α× age entryi + β× cohort sizei +
γ× age entryi × cohort sizei +
xi′β+ τt + θs + κk + εikst (2.3)
The unit of observation in the regression is now the IAS officer i with tenure
k in state s and year t. The dependent variable is defined as the cumulative
number of suspensions experienced by officer i up to year t. The regression also
includes state fixed effects (θs), year fixed effects (τt) and year of tenure fixed
effects (κk). The vector xi is the rich set of individual background characteristics
from equation (1) when we limit the sample to the subset of observations where
we have both information on suspension from the executive record sheets
as well as information from the descriptive rolls and internal rankings. The
vector xi is limited to gender when we extend the analysis to all centrally
recruited officers over the period 1980 to 2012, as this is (in addition to age) the
only officer-specific background characteristic available in the executive record
sheets. Cohort size is again centered around the sample mean for ease of
interpretation. Standard errors are clustered at the individual-level to account
for the serially correlated nature of the panel data.
The results are presented in Table 2.6. In Columns 1 to 3, the sample is
restricted to officers for which we have descriptive rolls data. The sample more
than doubles in Columns 4 to 6 when we include all officers in the executive
record sheets. All columns indicate that there is a positive relationship between
age at entry and number of suspensions. However, the relationship is only
significant (at the 10 percent level) in the full sample (Columns 4 to 6). More
importantly, consistent with the results in Panel A of Table 2.4, we find that the
number of suspensions for officers that entered older increases when these
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officers were assigned to larger cohorts at entry. This pattern is robust to
allowing for a richer set of fixed effects that confine the identifying source
of variation to variation between IAS officers in the same state and of the same
tenure (i.e. fixed effects for each state-tenure year group; Columns 2 and 5).
In Columns 3 and 6, we show that this pattern is also robust to allowing for
interactions between other individual background characteristics and cohort
size (as in Panel B Table 2.4).
Pension reform and individual effectiveness
Finally, we provide evidence from the 1998 pension reform that relaxed the
age at entry constraint as a source of rigidity in progression. In particular, the
reform increased the retirement age for IAS officers by two years from 58 to
60 (see Figure 2.2). While all active IAS officers enjoyed two additional years
in service, the pension reform disproportionally benefited those who entered
older - under the new retirement schedule, previously age-constrained officers
became more likely to qualify for senior promotions. To illustrate this, consider
an IAS officer who entered the service at 29 years of age. Before the pension
reform, this officer was mechanically barred from qualifying for promotions
into the highest payscale which only open up after 30 years in service, since
at this point they will have to retire. After the pension reform, however, this
mechanical constraint is removed and the officer has one more year before
retirement to qualify for the most senior position. Although an officer entering
at 21 years of age will also enjoy two more years, the “return” to these two
additional years are relatively lower for him or her. More generally, under
the view that the negative correlation between individual effectiveness and
age at entry captures negative incentives induced by the bureaucratic rigidity,
we would expect this negative correlation to be weakened after the pension
reform.
We implement this empirical test as a difference-in-differences (DD) regres-
sion. For officer i with tenure k in state s and year t, we estimate the impact of
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age at entry on the performance outcome yikst as:
yikst = α× age entryi + β× age entryi × post1998t +
xi′β+ τt + θs + κk + εikst (2.4)
where post1998t = 1 after the pension reform and 0 otherwise. We define
the dependent variable as a dummy variable that equals 1 if officer i with
tenure k in state s was suspended in year t, and 0 otherwise. We note that for
this particular test, suspension is the only available individual performance
measure, as our 360 degree survey data is not historically available. The
coefficient β captures the differential impact of an additional year of age at
entry on the propensity to be suspended after the pension reform in 1998 and
is the coefficient of interest. Again, the standard errors are clustered at the
individual level to take into account the serially correlated nature of the data.
We estimate this equation on the full panel of IAS officers as in the last
three columns of Table 2.6 covering all centrally recruited IAS officers over
the period 1980-2012. We however exclude from the sample all officer-year
observations in which the officer is older than 58, the retirement age before the
pension reform. This ensures that our results are not contaminated by the fact
that officers are mechanically older in the post-pension reform period than in
the pre-pension reform period.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2.7 and suggest that the
extension of the retirement age by two additional years effectively mitigated
the negative impact of age at entry on suspension.
While increasing the age at entry by one additional year is associated with
a 0.09 percentage point higher suspension rate, the increase in the propensity
of older officers to be suspended disappears after 1998 (Column 1). Column
2 shows that this result is robust to allowing for a richer set of fixed effects
that allow the suspension rate to differ systematically across officers from
the same state and year of tenure. While decreasing precision, allowing for
a differential trended impact of age at entry on suspension (Column 3) and
introducing individual fixed effects (Column 4) does not substantially shift the
point estimates of the coefficient of interest.
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To further assess whether the results in Table 2.7 are indeed driven by
the pension reform, we also estimate a more flexible version of equation (4)
where we allow the age at entry coefficient to vary year by year. Figure 2.5
summarizes the results by plotting the estimated coefficients on age at entry
for each year. The figure provides evidence consistent with the view that the
diminishing effect of age at entry on suspension coincides with the pension
reform. While the impact of age at entry is smoothly trending up over time,
we observe a large and discontinuous decrease after the pension reform. Taken
together, the evidence in this section is consistent with the view that entering
the IAS at an older age reduces individual effectiveness (and increases the
probability of suspension) at least in part due to weaker promotion prospects
and hence weaker career incentives.
2.4 Effects on state-level economic performance
What are the implications of having a less motivated group of civil servants
for aggregate economic outcomes? This is the question we take on in the
final section of the paper. In Section 3.2, we suggested that officers that enter
the IAS at an older age might be particularly demotivated when “competing”
with a larger group of officers of the same tenure in their state as this reduces
their chance of ever reaching the top echelons of the bureaucracy. Because IAS
officers run all the key government departments and public sector corporations
and enterprises, and are central to the implementation of policy reforms, it
is possible that having a higher proportion of such demotivated officers (i.e.
older officers in larger batches) in a state cadre may adversely affect economic
performance.28 In a subset of years, we observe age at entry and cohort size
28As a legacy of central planning and the percieved need of the state to control the
commanding heights of the economy, large parts of the economies of Indian states still remain
in the public sector and under state control. IAS officers head up important state enterprises
(e.g. Bharat Petroleum Limited (Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas), Hindusthan Machine
Tools (Ministry of Heavy Industries & Public Enterprises) or Indian Rare Earth Limited
(Department of Atomic Energy)), run public corporations responsible for infrastructure (e.g.
state electricity boards, electricity regulatory commissions, power generation and distribution
companies) and oversee state banks and insurance companies (e.g. Industrial Development
Bank of India, National Insurance Co. Ltd. (Ministry of Finance)). The influence of IAS officers
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for the universe of IAS officers in each state cadre. Combined with data on
state-level economic outcome measures, this allows us to assess the empirical
relevance of this possibility.
For this state level exercise, we focus on the 1990 to 2011 period, a period of
large-scale liberalization reforms. Because the IAS oversees the implementation
of these reforms, it is possible that the motivation of its officers is germane to
the successful implementation of these reforms and ultimately to the genesis
of economic growth (Weber, 1922; Rauch, 1995; Rauch and Evans, 2000; Dal Bo
et al., 2013). As for the 360 degree survey data collection, we focus on the 14
main states in India. Moreover, we again focus on officers with at least eight
years of tenure, as they are more likely to be in charge of policy implementation
at the state level (rather than at the district level).
The allocation rule for IAS officers is central to our analysis in this section.
As indicated previously, the allocation process follows a set of rules that
effectively generates a quasi-random allocation of IAS officers across states.
The process follows three stages (see the online Appendix for a more detailed
description): (i) officers are assigned serial numbers in order of merit, as
determined by the civil service exam, (ii) vacancies determine the number of
officers needed in each state (i.e. cohort size) and (iii) officers are then allocated
to these vacancies by cycling through the list of states. Separate number lines
denoting caste status and insider/outsider status are used to match officers to
vacancies.29 The order of states rotates across years, ensuring that all states
have their turn at receiving the best talent.
Appendix Table B.5 formally tests for the quasi-random allocation of the
IAS officers across the 14 main states of India. For this table, the sample of
officers is restricted to the group for which we have rich individual background
data - those officers we observe in the descriptive rolls and internal ranking
data. This corresponds to all intake years between 1972 and 2005. We regress
individual officers’ characteristics on assignment state fixed effects and entry
thus extends beyond government departments and into large swathes of the productive parts
of state economies.
29Thus while IAS officers can indicate their preference for home state, the quasi-random
allocation process ensures that only a small minority of IAS officers are allocated to their
home state.
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year fixed effects. We then test for the equality of the estimated state fixed
effects. The corresponding p-values of the test are presented in Column
1 of Appendix Table B.5. Based on our rich set of observable individual
characteristics, we cannot statistically reject that states receive, on average,
officers that are statistically indistinguishable as regards age at entry, gender,
rural/urban background, caste affiliation, education, work experience, scores
on the entry exam and training marks.
Of course, due to the relatively small number of officers assigned to a state
each year, there will be variation in officer characteristics within states over
time, and within intake year across states. Appendix Figure B.6 and Appendix
Figure B.7 show the exam entry score and age at entry of IAS officers allocated
to the major states by year of intake. On average, and as formally demonstrated
in Appendix Table B.5, we see that all states receive officers of the same quality
(as proxied for by the exam score) and age at entry. But there is within-state
fluctuation around these means. In other words, by chance, a given state may
have, for example, a disproportionate share of older officers serving in its
senior ranks at a given point in time. This variation is clearly exogenous to
state economic outcomes at that point in time. This is true both because of
the quasi-random allocation process at entry but also because this allocation
process takes place many years before these officers have reached the positions
from which they are implement state-level policies.
There is also within-state variation over time in the entry cohort sizes, as
is evident from Appendix Figure B.8. The year-on-year fluctuation in entry
cohort sizes within a state is determined by the number of vacancies that arise
in that state and year. While one might argue that this variation might be
endogenous to economic conditions in a state at the time of entry, this variation
is arguably more exogenous to state economic conditions at the time these
cohorts are eight or more years into their tenures.
Our key variable of interest in this analysis, as in the individual data
analysis in Section 3.2, is the interaction between the age at entry of serving
officers and the size of their cohort. Figure 2.6 shows this variation across states
by intake year. Given the logic above, we argue that this variation is exogenous
to state economic conditions, and in particular to state economic conditions by
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the time the officers in those intake years are eight or more years into their
tenures.
Having argued that the allocation of IAS officers to states provides the basis
of a credible research design, we now lay out the precise empirical analysis we
perform in the state-year panel. Let s denote the state in which officer i is
serving at time t. The year of tenure is given by k. The average age at entry of
a state cadre s at least eight years into the IAS in year t is:
age entryst =
Σ{(i,t)|S=s∧k≥8}age entryi
Σ∀(i,t)1[S = s ∧ k ≥ 8]
(2.5)
In words, we aggregate the individual-level data to the state-year level by
calculating the mean age at entry of all active IAS officers with tenure ≥ 8 in
that state and year. We perform this aggregation for each year between 1990-
2011. We use the same aggregation method as described in (5) to compute
the average state cohort size in a given state and year, cohortst. Mirroring the
individual level analysis in Section 3.2, the key independent variable of interest
in the state-year panel is the interaction between cohortst and age entryst.
We note that, in computing these state-year means, we ignore transfers
to the central government or leave abroad (e.g. a posting at an international
organization or training assignment), which do not affect membership of the
state cadre. As secondments to Delhi and leaves are likely to be endogenous
to current state economic conditions, we focus on the (cohortst)(age entryst)
variation induced by all state cadre officers irrespective of whether they are
present in the state or not. A potential concern, however, lies in the endogenous
exit or transfers of IAS officers to other states. If older officers are more likely
to exit or transfer when growth is fast, the state-level correlation between age
at entry and cohort size may be spurious. Since compliance with the strict
retirement age is high and transfers to other state cadres are de facto negligible,
we argue that this is unlikely to be a major source of bias. We also verified that
deviations from the retirement age are not correlated with contemporaneous
state-level economic performance.
For state s and time t, we estimate the following reduced form state-level
regression:
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ln(Y)st = β0 × age entryst × cohortst + β1 × age entryst + (2.6)
β2 × cohortst + x¯′stγ+ θs + τt + εst (2.7)
where the dependent variable Yst is the state-level outcome of interest, and
the independent variables, such as age entryst, are constructed as described in
(5). Following the standard specification in a growth regression framework, we
add state fixed effects θs and year fixed effects τt. The vector xst controls for the
(log) overall state cadre size, which also includes IAS officers below eight years
of tenure and recruited from the state civil services, as well as region-specific
linear time trends. The standard errors are clustered at the state-level. While
we would in practice like to include in x¯st other characteristics of the average
IAS officer active in a state in a given year, the only other characteristic available
for this state-level analysis is gender. This is because the descriptive rolls and
internal ranking data, which contain the rich individual level characteristics,
only start with the 1972 intake. Many officers active in the 1990s and even the
early 2000s had joined the IAS before 1972.
A key alternative specification we perform in the analysis below separates
all active officers with tenure ≥ 8 into senior (at least 16 years of tenure) and
junior (8-15 years of tenure). A priori, it is the senior officers that we would
expect to have the greater influence on economic outcomes within a state and
we can empirically verify that. The key constructs above (cohortst, age entryst
and their interaction) can be constructed for these two groups of officers
using the same aggregation approach as above but appropriately restricting
the values of k.
2.4.1 Effects on GDP
Table 2.8 reports the impact of average age at entry × average cohort size on
state-level GDP per capita. The dependent variable is either total state-level
GDP per capita or a sectoral GDP per capita component (agriculture, industry
or services). The average cohort size is centered around the sample mean.
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We first briefly comment on the estimated coefficient on the direct effect of
age at entry. In the individual-level analysis in Section 3.1, we showed that
being older at entry was correlated with lower effectiveness. While we argued
that this correlation might in part be due to the lower career incentives IAS
officers that enter older face due to the bureaucratic rigidity, we also discussed
the obvious issues in separating such incentive effects from issues related to
selection and omitted variable biases. These interpretational concerns are also
present in these state-level regressions as we cannot control for the rich vector
of other individual level characteristics as we could in Section 3.1 due to the
data constraints discussed above. In particular, a direct effect of average age
at entry of active IAS officers on state outcomes may reflect an effect of other
average characteristics of the active IAS officers that are correlated with their
age. Moreover, even if age at entry is indeed the key characteristic of the IAS
officers leading to differential state outcomes, this could be due to selection
rather than career concerns induced by the bureaucratic rigidity.
With these caveats, we find that the estimated coefficient on average age
at entry is negative across all specifications but statistically insignificant.
Focusing on the point estimates, the magnitudes suggest that increasing
average age at entry of the state cadre by one year is associated with a
10% reduction in total output per capita (Column 1). While this estimated
magnitude appears large, the actual variation in the average age at entry
is small. A one standard deviation increase in the average age at entry
corresponds to about 0.3 years. Put differently, while the statutory age at
entry window increased by 4 years in our sample period of 1990 to 2011, the
actual average age at entry only increased by about one year showing that it
is difficult to move the average entry age of the state cadre (Appendix Figure
B.1). Historically for the period 1960-2011, an increase in the maximum age at
entry by one year is associated with an increase of the actual average age at
entry by 0.16 years.30 Using a back of the envelope calculation, this elasticity
would imply that an increase in the statutory maximum age at entry by one
30This elasticity is estimated by regressing the average actual age at entry on the maximum
statutory age at entry for regular entrants and controlling for a linear trend.
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year would be associated with a one-off decrease in state-level GDP per capita
by 1.6%.
Of more interest to us is the estimated coefficient on the interaction term
between average age at entry and average cohort size, which, as we argued in
Section 3.2, puts a sharper spotlight on the bureaucratic rule-induced career
concerns that may demotivate older IAS officers. This key interaction term is
statistically significant and negative in Column 1, suggesting that the negative
impact of average age at entry is magnified in the presence of larger average
cohorts. This result mirrors the individual-level results and is consistent with
the view that the career incentives of IAS officers have a direct bearing on the
performance of Indian states, affecting the lives of millions of people. The
magnitude of this effect is non-trivial. A one standard deviation in average
age at entry (0.3 years) reduces overall state-level GDP by about 3.9% when
combined with a one standard deviation in average cohort size (2.6).
If IAS officers indeed have a bearing on state-level outcomes, we expect
their impact to primarily affect sectors over which the state has purchase
(Kocchar et al. 2006). When breaking down the aggregate GDP into its
components, we find that the average age at entry × cohort size only affects
the non-agricultural sector (see Columns 3 and 4 in Table 2.8). The impact is
largest on the industrial sector (Column 3). This is perhaps not surprising as
the Indian industrial sector is well known for its large organized components,
where government policies such as those related to regulation, taxation
and public good provision may affect private firms and where state-owned
enterprises still play a major role (Basu and Maertens 2007). The service sector
is also significantly affected. The impact on agricultural output, however, is
statistically indistinguishable from zero (Column 2). We reconcile this pattern
using the fact that the bulk of agricultural production in India is subsistence
agriculture, which is largely unorganized.
Figure 2.7 presents visual evidence for the relationship we have uncovered
in Table 2.8. The figure plots the partial correlation between age at entry ×
cohort size and state-level outcomes, which are either overall state-level GDP
per capita or sector-specific (agriculture, industry, services). We compute the
partial correlations, stripping away state and year fixed effects as well as the
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impact of all other control variables before plotting the remaining correlation.
The figure visually confirms that states, in years when serving officers entered
older and in larger cohorts, exhibit lower overall GDP and non-agricultural
GDP per capita.
Since it is the senior IAS officers who occupy the key positions at the state-
level, one may expect the variation in average age at entry × average cohort
size among these IAS officers to matter more. To empirically test this, we
replicate the specification in equation (6) but separately compute the state-
year aggregates (average age at entry, average cohort size and their interaction,
share of female officers) for active officers with 8-15 years of tenure (which we
label as junior officers) and for active officers with 16 or more years of tenure
(which we label as senior officers). The cut-off at 16 is chosen to reflect the
move from junior to “supertime” scale, which is equivalent to senior positions
such as Joint Secretaries. This split also corresponds to the median years of
tenure.
Panel A of Table 2.9 reports the results of this analysis. We focus on the two
key interaction terms of interest: average age at entry among senior (junior)
active officers interacted with average cohort sizes among senior (junior) active
officers. The results confirm that the observed negative impact of a higher
average age at entry when cohort size increases is indeed driven by the
senior IAS officers. In Figure 2.8, we once again provide the corresponding
visual evidence. While the relationship for senior IAS officers is negative, the
relationship is flat for junior IAS officers indicating that the effect is coming
through senior officers.
2.4.2 Effects on other economic outcomes
Panels B to D of Table 2.9 replicate the analysis in Panel A of that Table, probing
deeper into various components of state economic performance.
Column 3 of Table 2.8, as well as Column 3 of Panel A of Table 2.9, suggest
particularly large effects in the industrial sector. In Panel B, we drill into
the industrial sector by breaking down its components. We find that officers
who are older at entry and in larger cohorts are particularly detrimental for
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the subset of industries that are dominated by state organizations, and hence
under tighter control from the IAS. In particular, we find that variation in the
state cadre composition of IAS officers affect the economic performance of the
mining and quarrying sector (Column 1), which makes up slightly less than
10% of India’s industrial GDP in 2011. This is a sector subject to substantial
regulation and licensing requirements, with a large number of public sector
undertakings, such as Bharat Industries or the Oil & Natural Gas Corporation,
that are under the oversight of ministries such as the Ministry of Mining,
Ministry of Coal or the Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas. As in Panel A, it
is the variation among senior officers that has the largest bearing on outcomes.
The dissection of manufacturing into registered (Column 2) and unregis-
tered (Column 3) sectors corroborates our findings from Section 4.1, whereby
IAS officers primarily affected growth through the organized sectors (i.e. not in
agriculture). The registered sector includes all firms with more than 10 workers
that are officially registered under the Factories Act of 1948, accounting for
approximately 70% of the average total state-level manufacturing output in
2011. Consistent with the fact that IAS officers have greater purchase over
formal industries (Besley and Burgess, 2004; Asher and Novosad, 2016), a
higher average age at entry and cohort size has a negative bearing on registered
manufacturing while having no discernible impact on the unregistered,
informal, manufacturing sector. We also find negative impacts on utilities,
which comprise electricity, gas and water supply which are often state-run
and under the control of senior IAS officers (Column 4).
In Panel C of Table 2.9, we attempt to validate our findings of impacts
on GDP in the formal manufacturing sector with evidence from another
independent dataset. We draw on state-level data from the Annual Survey
of Industries (ASI) for the same period 1990-2011. The ASI is a census of
all registered manufacturing establishments using more than 10 (20) workers
when (not) using power. The ASI provides detailed information about
production, employment and input costs. The results in Panel C suggest
impacts on the expansion of formal manufacturing and employment. States
with cadres of higher entry age and cohort size see a slower expansion
of industries, as measured by the number of manufacturing establishments
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(Column 1) and by total employment (Column 2). These are two margins
that are subject to tight regulation. Workers in the registered manufacturing
sector are covered by the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947, which places
substantial constraints on the extent to which firms can lay off workers (Besley
and Burgess, 2004). While statistically insignificant, the point estimate for the
impact on net value-added, a proxy for productivity, is negative (Column
3). Finally, the negative impact on industrial output, as measured by the
ASI (Column 4), validates our main state-level result (Table 2.8). Overall,
the evidence from the ASI is consistent with an effective bureaucracy being
conducive to state-level industrial growth by facilitating new business creation
or existing business expansion (Aghion et al., 2008).
In Panel D of Table 2.9, we zoom into the service sector to explore channels
through which bureaucrats may impact its growth. The results in Panel D
show primarily impacts on state-dominated service sectors, consistent with the
previous breakdowns by agricultural versus non-agricultural (Table 2.8) and
registered versus unregistered manufacturing (Panel B). We find significant
impacts on the segment of the sector encompassing transport, storage and
communications (Column 2), which make up about 11% of the service sector in
2011, the bulk of which is attributable to economic activity in railways and road
transportation. There is also a large impact on the banking and insurance sub-
sector (Column 4), which - despite deregulation - remains dominated by state
owned banks. Again, in both cases, the effect is driven by more senior officers.
In contrast, there is no statistically significant impact on retail trade, hotels
and restaurants (Column 3) and construction (Column 1) which, in India, are
largely unorganised.
Overall, the state-level results paint a robust and coherent picture of how
variation in the motivation of bureaucrat cadres, as induced by bureaucratic
rigidity, can impact economic outcomes at the state-level. The breakdown
by dimensions such as junior versus senior, as well as the disaggregation by
sectors, provides evidence consistent with senior officers exerting dispropor-
tionate control, and having disproportionate impact, over regulated sectors of
the economy.
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In the remaining two panels of Table 2.9, we conclude this state-level
analysis by examining potential impacts on public expenditures (Panel E)
and public revenue (Panel F), two key dimensions of state capacity (Besley
and Persson, 2009). A less motivated group of senior bureaucrats may
negatively impact economic outcomes at the state level by doing less, which
would translate in lower public spending (e.g. new schemes are not being
implemented, or are slow in being implemented) and lower revenue. In Panel
E, we consider possible impacts on total public expenditures (Column 1) but
also isolate social and economic expenditures. Social expenditures comprise
spending on education, health and welfare, while economic expenditures
comprise spending on rural development, special area programmes, energy,
industry, transport and communications. Consistent with the GDP analysis,
we find that age at entry × cohort size has negative impacts on total public
expenditures (Column 1), and that the effect appears particularly large for
economic expenditures, which might be particularly conducive to industrial
growth (Column 3). Again, it is the composition of the senior segment of
the bureaucracy that appears to matter. In Column 4 of Panel E, we examine
whether the number of large scale development projects, as measured by the
number of World Bank funded projects, is also affected. While of the expected
sign (negative), the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant.
Finally, Panel F of Table 2.9 suggests that state cadres with a higher average
age at entry and larger average cohort size are also associated with lower
revenue generation. The effect is primarily driven by lower tax revenue, either
coming straight from state taxes (Column 2) or obtained from taxes levied by
central government (Column 3). Again the effects are driven by senior officers
who occupy leadership positions in the government departments responsible
for collecting both state and central taxes in the Indian states.
2.5 Conclusion
The organization of the state is attracting increasing attention within economics
as a central determinant of economic performance (Besley and Persson, 2009;
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Finan et al., 2015). Bureaucrats and bureaucracies are considered to be the
backbone of the modern state but have been little studied. A recent wave of
papers that has studied selection and incentives of public servants has tended
to focus on lower level bureaucrats and frontline providers (Ashraf et al., 2014;
Dal Bo et al., 2013; Deserranno, 2016; Khan et al., 2015; Nath, 2015; Rasul and
Rogger, 2016). This contrasts with an older literature that sees bureaucrats
and bureaucracies as central to the industrialization and growth processes
(Northcote and Trevelyan, 1854; Tullock, 1965; Weber, 1922; Rauch, 1995; Rauch
and Evans, 2000).
Our paper fits between these two literatures by studying the Indian
Administrative Service. IAS officers hold positions at the apex of government
that grant them significant influence over the implementation of policies, rules
and regulations that may affect growth in a country of over a billion people.
How well incentivized or motivated they are may have far ranging effects as
their effort and actions affect not only the actions of subordinates but also,
via policy, the actions of individuals, households and firms which jointly
determine economic growth.
By fielding a large-scale survey in fourteen states in 2012-13 we were able
to open the black box of what determines bureaucratic effectiveness. Our
individual-level results, which leverage several empirical strategies, suggest
that the combination of seniority based promotion rules and a fixed retirement
age reduce bureaucrats’ effectiveness by dimming promotion prospects and
weakening career incentives. In a state-year panel, we find that state cadres
containing a higher proportion of officers who entered older and in larger
cohorts, and for whom the combination of seniority based promotion rules
and a fixed retirement age might be particularly demotivating, experience
worse economic outcomes. Moreover, these effects are driven by the impact
on industry and services which are the more organized sectors in India and
therefore more likely to be affected by policies controlled by IAS officers. We
also show that it is the senior IAS officers that appear responsible for these
effects.
Overall, our paper sheds light on some of the costs associated with the rigid
rules that govern bureaucracies such as the IAS. However, our paper does
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not answer the broader question as to whether the top Indian civil service
would be more effective if freed of these rules. Indeed, it is possible that a
first-order reduction in patronage, favoritism and influence activities, that a
bureaucratic system is meant to confront, dominate what might only be the
second-order costs highlighted in our study. This broader question is beyond
the scope of our paper. However, by isolating costs, our study certainly calls for
further work on trying to isolate those potential benefits.31 Only then would
one be able to engage in a robust policy discussion about possible better ways
to organize an elite civil service such as the IAS.
More humbly, our study does suggest that some more marginal, and
politically realistic, changes in the organization of the IAS might be beneficial.
In particular, our study provides empirical support for the concern raised
by the Administrative Reform Commission (ARC, 2008) about the rising
maximum eligible age at entry into the IAS. Our study also suggests that a
reform that would move away from an age-based retirement system towards
a system with fixed tenures for all civil servants irrespective of joining age
should be seriously considered.
31Xu (2016), for example, provides evidence for an improved selection and allocation of
governors following the removal of patronage in the British colonial administration.
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2.6 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of 360 performance measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean SD Ratings Officers Coverage
Effectiveness on the job 3.730 1.077 17,753 1,472 71.14%
Probity of IAS officer 3.670 1.105 15,153 1,451 70.13%
Withstanding illegitimate pressure 3.523 1.094 16,728 1,471 71.09%
Sensitive towards poorer 3.527 1.141 17,047 1,471 71.09%
Overall rating 3.646 1.057 17,698 1,472 71.14%
Notes: Performance scores for the cross-section of rated IAS officers in 2012-13. Reporting
the descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) for the subjective measures, where
the scores range from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest). Column 3 and 4 report the total number of
ratings and the total number of rated officers. Column 5 reports the coverage rate for the
sample population of all active, centrally recruited IAS officers with at least 8 years of tenure
in 2012/13.
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Table 2.2: Individual characteristics of IAS officers in 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Percentile
Mean SD 10% 50% 90% Obs.
Age at entry 24.474 2.088 22 24 27 1,472
Female 0.141 0.349 0 0 1 1,472
Other backward caste (OBC) 0.081 0.273 0 0 0 1,472
Scheduled caste (SC) 0.141 0.349 0 0 1 1,472
Scheduled tribe (ST) 0.052 0.222 0 0 0 1,472
Urban background 0.737 0.439 0 1 1 1,472
Academic distinction 0.326 0.468 0 0 1 1,472
STEM or Economics degree 0.324 0.468 0 0 1 1,472
Previous job: Education/research 0.168 0.374 0 0 1 1,472
Previous job: Private/SOE 0.121 0.326 0 0 1 1,472
Previous job: Public sector 0.324 0.468 0 0 1 1,472
Previous job: Public AIS 0.033 0.181 0 0 0 1,472
Ranking in year of intake 53.896 35.549 10 49 104 1,472
Cohort size 7.334 3.971 3 7 12 1,472
Notes: Mean, standard deviation and percentiles of IAS officers in 2012-13. Sample covers
the cross-section of centrally recruited IAS officers in 2012-13 with performance ratings.
Urban background denotes officers from urban backgrounds, Academic distinction is a
dummy for having received an academic distinction. STEM is a dummy for graduates of
Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics and Economics degrees. Previous job
denotes the sector of employment previous to entry into IAS (Education/research, Private
sector/State-owned-enterprise, Public sector-Non All India Service, Public sector-All India
Service). Ranking is the rank of the officer among all who entered in a given year based
on the entry and training scores. Cohort size is the number of IAS officers allocated to the
same state in a given year.
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Table 2.3: Age at entry and effectiveness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Effective Probity Pressure Pro-Poor Overall
Mean of dep. var 3.730 3.671 3.524 3.528 3.647
Age at entry -0.009** -0.009** -0.015*** -0.007* -0.010**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Entry score 0.041*** 0.021 0.023** 0.021* 0.041***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
Background controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interviewer FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific respondent FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source of information FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,750 15,138 16,719 17,043 17,695
Notes: Unit of observation is the score for a given IAS officer in 2012-13 with at least 8 years
of tenure. Relating the five performance measures (effectiveness, probity, ability to withstand
illegitimate political pressure, pro-poor orientedness and overall rating) to age at entry. Entry
score is the standardized UPSC score in the year of intake with a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation (SD) of 1. Background controls are: a female dummy, caste dummies (OBC, SC, ST),
a dummy for coming from an urban background, having received an academic distinction,
a STEM or Economics degree, having worked in education/research, private sector/SOEs,
public sector, public AIS, a standardized training score, as well as a dummy that is 1 if the
officer improved the ranking in the training relative to the entry exam. The summary statistics
of the background controls are shown in Table 2.2. Interviewer FEs are dummies for each
interviewer. State-specific respondent FEs are fixed effects for each respondent. Tenure year
FEs are dummies for each year since entering the IAS. Source of information FEs are dummies
for whether the respondent knows the officer personally, through friends or only through
media. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the respondent level. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 2.4: Age at entry, cohort size and effectiveness
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Effective Probity Pressure Pro-Poor Overall
Mean of dep. var 3.730 3.671 3.524 3.528 3.647
Age at entry -0.013*** -0.012** -0.017*** -0.008* -0.014***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Cohort size (centered) 0.064** 0.047 0.044 0.027 0.075**
(0.028) (0.033) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
Age at entry × Cohort size -0.003** -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Interviewer FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific respondent FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source of information FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Background controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,750 15,138 16,719 17,043 17,695
Panel B Effective Probity Pressure Pro-Poor Overall
Mean of dep. var 3.730 3.671 3.524 3.528 3.647
Age at entry -0.012*** -0.012** -0.016*** -0.009** -0.014***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Cohort size (centered) 0.066** 0.041 0.030 0.048 0.073**
(0.029) (0.035) (0.032) (0.031) (0.034)
Age at entry × Cohort size -0.003** -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Interviewer FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific respondent FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source of information FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Background controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls × Cohort size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,750 15,138 16,719 17,043 17,695
Notes: Unit of observation is the score for a given IAS officer in 2012-13 with at least 8 years
of tenure. Panel A relates the five performance measures (effectiveness, probity, ability to
withstand illegitimate political pressure, pro-poor orientedness and overall rating) to age at
entry, cohort size and their interaction, where cohort size is the size of the state cohort in
which the officer was allocated to, centered around the sample mean. Background controls
are: a female dummy, caste dummies (OBC, SC, ST), a dummy for coming from an urban
background, having received an academic distinction, a STEM or Economics degree, having
worked in education/research, private sector/SOEs, public sector, public AIS, standardized
scores for the (UPSC) entry and training scores, as well as a dummy that is 1 if the officer
improved the ranking in the training relative to the entry exam. Interviewer FEs are dummies
for each interviewer. State-specific respondent FEs are fixed effects for each respondent. Tenure
year FEs are dummies for each year since entering the IAS. Source of information FEs are
dummies for whether the respondent knows the officer personally, through friends or only
through media. Panel B interacts all background characteristics with cohort size. Robust
standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the respondent level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1
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Table 2.5: Effectiveness and own cohort age composition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
360 ratings - 2012/13
Effective Probity Pressure Pro-Poor Overall
Mean of dep. var. 3.730 3.671 3.524 3.528 3.647
Cohort size: Younger -0.009* -0.005 -0.014** -0.009 -0.016**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Cohort size: Older 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.000
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Interviewer FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific respondent FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source of information FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Background controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age at entry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,750 15,138 16,719 17,043 17,695
Notes: Unit of observation is the score for a given IAS officer in 2012-13 with at least 8 years
of tenure. Relating the age composition of an IAS officer’s cohort to the five measures of
performance (effectiveness, probity, ability to withstand illegitimate political pressure, pro-
poor orientedness and overall rating). Cohort size: Younger denotes the number of offices in
the same state cohort that are younger, and Cohort size: Older denotes the number of officers
in the same state cohort that are older. Background controls are: a female dummy, caste
dummies (OBC, SC, ST), a dummy for coming from an urban background, having received
an academic distinction, a STEM or Economics degree, having worked in education/research,
private sector/SOEs, public sector, public AIS, standardized scores for the (UPSC) entry and
training scores, as well as a dummy that is 1 if the officer improved the ranking in the training
relative to the entry exam. Interviewer FEs are dummies for each interviewer. State-specific
respondent FEs are fixed effects for each respondent. Tenure year FEs are dummies for
each year since entering the IAS. Source of information FEs are dummies for whether the
respondent knows the officer personally, through friends or only through media. Robust
standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the respondent level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1
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Table 2.6: Age at entry, cohort size and suspension 1980-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of suspensions
Mean of dep. var 0.0583 0.0583 0.0583 0.0637 0.0637 0.0637
Age at entry 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004* 0.004* 0.004*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Cohort size (centered) -0.037* -0.035 -0.039* -0.009 -0.013 -0.012
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Age at entry × Cohort size 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.001 0.001* 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FEs Yes - - Yes - -
Tenure year FEs Yes - - Yes - -
State-Tenure year FEs - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Controls × Cohort size - - Yes - - Yes
Sample Rich controls Full sample
Observations 42,629 42,605 42,567 108,725 108,663 108,663
Notes: Unit of observation is the IAS officer in a given year. The dependent variable is
the cumulative number of suspensions of an IAS officer up to the given year. Columns
1-3 report the estimates based on the restricted sample which controls for rich individual-
level background characteristics: a female dummy, caste dummies (OBC, SC, ST), a dummy
for coming from an urban background, having received an academic distinction, a STEM or
Economics degree, having worked in education/research, private sector/SOEs, public sector,
public AIS, standardized scores for the (UPSC) entry and training scores, as well as a dummy
that is 1 if the officer improved the ranking in the training relative to the entry exam. Columns
4-6 is based on the full sample for 1980-2012 and controls only for gender. Standard errors are
clustered at the individual IAS officer level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 2.7: Impact of pension reform on suspensions - 1980-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Suspended (× 100)
Mean of dep. var 0.740 0.740 0.740 0.741
Age at entry 0.089*** 0.084*** 0.083*
(0.028) (0.029) (0.048)
Age at entry × Post 1998 -0.102** -0.093** -0.091 -0.103
(0.040) (0.040) (0.072) (0.073)
Age at entry × Year -0.000 0.009*
(0.003) (0.005)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FEs Yes - - -
Tenure year FEs Yes - - -
State-Tenure year FEs - Yes Yes Yes
Individual FEs - - - Yes
Individual control Yes Yes Yes -
Observations 107,540 107,537 107,537 107,369
Notes: Unit of observation is the IAS officer in a given year between 1980-2012. Relating the
differential impact of age at entry before and after the pension reform in 1998 to suspensions.
Suspension is scaled by 100 to improve readability. Individual control holds constant gender
of the officer. Age at entry × Year allows age at entry to trend linearly. The year is centered
around 1998. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1
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Table 2.8: State-level GDP per capita and age at entry × cohort size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(log) State-level GDP per capita 1990-2011
Disaggregated by sector
Overall Agriculture Industry Service
Age at entry -0.102 -0.071 -0.168 -0.090
(0.107) (0.128) (0.207) (0.133)
Cohort size (centered) 1.324*** 0.311 2.760*** 1.577***
(0.362) (0.466) (0.817) (0.429)
Age at entry × Cohort size -0.051*** -0.014 -0.115*** -0.058***
(0.015) (0.020) (0.034) (0.018)
State FEs and Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-specific trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Background controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 305 305 305 305
Notes: Unit of observation is the state-year. Relating (log) state-level GDP per capita to the
average state cadre age at entry, cohort size and its interaction. Cohort size is centered around
the sample mean. Background controls are: the (log) overall cadre size, which includes all
active IAS officers in a given state (including those recruited from the state civil services and
below 8 years of tenure), and the share of female. Region-specific trends allow for linear trends
that vary by 5 regions: North India, Northeast India, South India, and West India. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at the state-level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 2.9: State-level GDP per capita and age at entry× cohort size by seniority
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: State GDP per capita Overall Agriculture Industry Service
Senior avg. age at entry × -0.036* -0.001 -0.101** -0.059**
Avg. cohort size (0.017) (0.025) (0.036) (0.023)
Junior avg. age at entry × 0.003 0.003 0.016 0.006
Avg. cohort size (0.008) (0.014) (0.020) (0.009)
State FEs and Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Background controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-specific trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 305 305 305 305
Panel B: Industrial GDP Mining Registered Unregistered Utilities
Senior avg. age at entry × -0.181** -0.142*** -0.005 -0.239***
Avg. cohort size (0.061) (0.036) (0.033) (0.045)
Junior avg. age at entry × -0.070** 0.024 0.043 -0.099**
Avg. cohort size (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.040)
State FEs and Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Background controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-specific trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 305 305 305 305
Panel C: ASI Factories Workers Value added Output
Senior avg. age at entry × -0.070*** -0.074** -0.050 -0.094***
Avg. cohort size (0.016) (0.033) (0.072) (0.027)
Junior avg. age at entry × 0.013 0.032** 0.042 0.011
Avg. cohort size (0.009) (0.013) (0.041) (0.019)
State FEs and Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Background controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-specific trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 304 304 304 301
Panel D: Service sector GDP Construction Transport Trade Banking
Senior avg. age at entry × 0.024 -0.093*** -0.048 -0.066***
Avg. cohort size (0.066) (0.020) (0.052) (0.021)
Junior avg. age at entry × -0.018 -0.001 -0.000 -0.009
Avg. cohort size (0.035) (0.013) (0.019) (0.012)
State FEs and Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Background controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-specific trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 305 305 305 305
Panel E: Public expenditure Total Social Economic World Bank
Senior avg. age at entry × -0.033* -0.052** -0.106*** -0.056
Avg. cohort size (0.019) (0.022) (0.029) (0.104)
Junior avg. age at entry × -0.012 0.003 0.001 -0.023
Avg. cohort size (0.012) (0.018) (0.030) (0.061)
State FEs and Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Background controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-specific trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 305 305 305 305
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(continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel F: Public revenue Total State own Central Non-tax
Senior avg. age at entry × -0.039** -0.078*** -0.053** -0.023
Avg. cohort size (0.014) (0.025) (0.023) (0.035)
Junior avg. age at entry × 0.003 0.011 0.019 -0.020
Avg. cohort size (0.008) (0.015) (0.013) (0.020)
State FEs and Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Background controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-specific trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 305 305 305 305
Notes: Unit of observation is the state-year. Relationship between (log) state-level outcomes and
the junior/senior average state cadre age at entry, cohort size (centered around sample mean),
their interaction, as well as the share of females among junior/senior IAS officers, controlling
for the (log) overall cadre size and allowing for region-specific linear trends. In Panel A, the
dependent variable is the (log) total state-level GDP per capita and its breakdown by sectors.
In Panel B, the dependent variable are (log) state-level GDP components of the industrial
sector, broken down by mining, registered and unregistered manufacturing and utilities. In
Panel C, the dependent variables are industry-level outcomes from the Annual Survey of
Industries (ASI): the (log) number of factories, (log) number of workers, the (log) value added
and (log) industrial output. In Panel D, the dependent variables are (log) state-level GDP
components of the service sector: construction, transport (railroads, road transport, water
transport, air transport etc.), trade (trade and repair services, retail, hotel and restaurants),
and banking (financial services and insurance). In Panel E, the dependent variable is (log)
state-level expenditure: total expenditure, social (education, health, welfare, housing, relief)
and economic expenditures (rural development, special area programmes, irrigation, energy,
industry, transport and communications), and number of new World Bank projects. In Panel F,
the dependent variables are: (log) total revenue, state-own revenue (taxes on income, property
and capital transactions), central revenue (corporation tax, income tax, estate, duty) and non-
tax revenue (interest receipts, dividends and profits). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at the state-level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Figure 2.1: Seniority based progression: Average payscale and years of tenure
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Notes: Average payscale of IAS officers as a function of the years served in the IAS (solid line)
for the cross-section of all centrally recruited IAS officers active in 2012. The dashed line marks
the payscale as predicted using the IAS promotion guidelines.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of age at retirement pre/post-1998
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Notes: Distribution of age at exit from IAS among retired officers in 2012. Grey (black) bars
denote retirement before (after) 1998. The retirement age was raised from 58 to 60 in 1998.
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Figure 2.3: Share of retired officers reaching senior payscales as a function of
age at entry
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Notes: Share of retired officers in 2012 reaching senior payscales as a function of age at entry.
Number in parentheses indicates the minimum number of years to qualify for the position.
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Figure 2.4: Effectiveness score and age at entry
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Notes: Raw correlation between the standardized effectiveness score and age at entry. Standard
errors used are clustered at the respondent-level.
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Figure 2.5: Pension reform 1998 - Age at entry and suspensions by year
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Notes: Summarizing the interaction coefficients for a regression of the suspension dummy on
age at entry interacted with each year dummy between 1985-2012. The regression includes
year FEs and state-specific tenure year FEs. The coefficients are rescaled by 100 to improve
readability. The solid line marks the pension reform. Standard errors used for computation of
the 95% confidence intervals are clustered at the individual-level.
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Figure 2.6: Quasi-random allocation across states: Age at entry × Cohort size
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Notes: Interaction between average age at entry and cohort size (standardized relative to their
year of intake) 1972-2009. The trend line is fitted as a non-parametric local polynomial.
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Figure 2.7: State-level GDP per capita and age at entry × cohort size
(a) Total GDP per capita
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(b) Agricultural GDP per capita
-
.
6
-
.
4
-
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
 
S
t
a
t
e
 
A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
a
l
 
G
D
P
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
-2 -1 0 1 2
Residual age at entry x Cohort size
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(c) Industrial GDP per capita
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coef = -.11474451, (robust) se = .03479117, t = -3.3
(d) Service GDP per capita
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Notes: The unit of observation is the state-year. Reporting the partial (residual) correlation between age at entry × cohort size and
(real) state-level GDP per capita 1990-2011.
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Figure 2.8: State-level GDP per capita and Age at entry × ln(Cohort size), by seniority
(a) Total GDP per capita, Senior cadre
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(b) Total GDP per capita, Junior cadre
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(c) Agricultural GDP per capita, Senior cadre
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(d) Agricultural GDP per capita, Junior cadre
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(continued)
(a) Industrial GDP per capita, Senior cadre
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Residual senior age at entry x Cohort size
coef = -.10061144, (robust) se = .03637813, t = -2.77
(b) Industrial GDP per capita, Junior cadre
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coef = .01638523, (robust) se = .02090015, t = .78
(c) Service GDP per capita, Senior cadre
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coef = -.05852877, (robust) se = .0233202, t = -2.51
(d) Service GDP per capita, Junior cadre
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Notes: Unit of observation is the state-year. Reporting the partial correlation between age at entry × cohort size and state-level GDP
per capita 1992-2011, broken down by effectiveness of junior (8-15 years tenure) and senior (≥ 16 years tenure) officers and sectors
(agriculture, industry and services).
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Chapter 3
How Does Collective Reputation
Affect Hiring? Selection and
Sorting in an Online Labour Market
Using data from an online labour market where the country of residence is the salient
group characteristic, we document a mechanism through which collective reputation
perpetuates group inequality. Using an IV strategy, we identify reputational
externalities between an employer’s first hire and the propensity to contract more
workers from the same country. Employers, contingent on their first worker’s
performance, continue to almost exclusively hire from the same country. This coincides
with a positive sorting response: Observing their predecessor’s success, workers from
the same country disproportionately apply and are of higher quality. Employers, facing
better applicants, in turn provide higher ratings. Collective reputation hence appears
to serve as a coordination device that enables workers to positively sort with employers:
Good workers then attract more good workers from the same country and vice versa.
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3.1 Introduction
Technological advances like broadband and cloud storage have greatly facil-
itated remote work and outsourcing. In recent years, online labour markets
such as oDesk, Guru, Elance, Rentacoder, Freelancer or Amazon MTurk have
enabled businesses to conveniently tap into a global pool of IT workers. The
potential gains from trade in these global markets are huge, as employers and
workers can match across great distance in a near “zero gravity” environment,
taking advantage of large wage differentials across regions and countries.
While varied in design, a common characteristic shared across all virtual
markets is incomplete information: Participants on these markets never
physically meet and often use aliases. Skills stated are hard to verify. In
these settings, reputation mechanisms have proven successful: By allowing
participants to publicly rate each other and provide feedback, dynamic
incentives are introduced to alleviate moral hazard that is otherwise pervasive
in environments of imperfect information (Stanton and Thomas, 2012; Cabral,
2012; Ghani et al., 2014).
In addition to measures of individual reputation, online markets typically
provide group-specific information such as country of residence or gender.
These collective traits can provide added information to employers (Phelps,
1972; Altonji and Pierret, 2001), but also enable workers to sort along a
dimension which, ex-ante, may be unrelated to worker productivity. The
possibility for workers to coordinate on a collective trait can, in theory, give rise
to inefficient “self-fulfilling stereotypes” (Coate and Loury, 1993; Tirole, 1996;
Moro and Norman, 2004). While the role of individual reputation in mitigating
moral hazard is well documented, much less is empirically known about the
role of collective reputation1 in facilitating or inhibiting market transactions.
How does collective reputation affect hiring and selection into jobs? This
paper delves into the role of collective reputation in a global online labour
1Following the definition of individual reputation (Mailath and Samuelson, 2006; Cabral,
2005), collective reputation is “the situation when agents believe another particular agent to be
something”, depending on an observable group-specific (collective) trait. Collective reputation
is hence typically discussed within as (dynamic) statistical discrimination framework (Blume,
2006; Kim and Loury, 2014).
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market, where the country of residence is the salient group characteristic.
Using detailed hiring data on all public transactions, we first examine
reputational externalities between an employer’s very first hire and the
propensity to contract more workers from the same country (the “first hire”
country). In absence of collective reputation, the individual rating given to
the first worker should not extend to others. After empirically establishing
the presence of reputational externalities, we examine changes in the applicant
composition and the employers’ final choices to shed light on the underlying
mechanisms at play.
A recurring challenge in any hiring setting is the lack of experimental
sources of variation that enables us to rule out alternative, observationally
equivalent explanations. To obtain causal estimates, we introduce a novel
instrumental variable (IV) strategy, where we exploit plausibly exogenous
variation in vertical traits within the first applicant pool to predict the actual
hire. The availability of rich data on the applicant pool level for over 25,000
employers is key to the empirical strategy, allowing us to take an unusually
close look at the mechanisms through which collective reputation emerges and
translates into market outcomes.
We present three key findings: First, we document the persistence of
the “first hire” country. Our instrumental variable estimate suggests that
employers are 3.1% points more likely to continue to hire from their “first hire”
country than from other countries in their first applicant pool (mean: 10%).
This observed persistence is primarily driven by the positive first rating given,
consistent with employer learning and a reputational externality. Second,
we document a strong and positive supply-side sorting response: Workers
from the “first hire” country disproportionately apply after observing the first
hire’s successful outcome: Following an earlier positive rating, workers from
the same country are 5.1% points more likely to apply than in response to
a negative rating (mean: 27.3%). These workers also tend to be of higher
quality, as measured by their previous rating and experience. Finally, the
sorting response amplifies the positive first hiring: Employers, faced with
more high quality workers from the successful “first hire” country, are in turn
11.1% points more likely to continue providing top ratings for their later hires
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(mean: 90%). Overall, the results provide empirical evidence for the role of
coordination in creating “self-fulfilling stereotypes”: An employer’s first rating
given to a worker with an observable collective trait serves as a group-specific
signal upon which later workers coordinate. Depending on the first experience,
good workers attract more good workers from the same country and vice versa.
The provision of collective traits hence perpetuates initial group inequalities by
creating a “herding effect”. Most importantly, the results suggest that collective
traits such as country of residence - even if uncorrelated to any economic
fundamentals ex-ante - can persistently shape the way workers sort and apply
to jobs.
We rule out competing explanations that appear observationally equivalent
to collective reputation. To ensure that the observed persistence is indeed
coming from a reputational externality across workers, we excluded rehires
throughout the analysis. Other than collective reputation, the sorting response
could however also reflect learning about the country-specific match produc-
tivity, revealed through the first hire’s country and rating. In this case, we
expect the effect to decline once we control for bilateral confounds or remove
language related tasks (e.g. translation). To ensure that the persistence is
not driven by same-country referral networks, we also explicitly omit private
transactions that are exclusive for invited workers, focusing only on public
transactions which are competitive and open to all. A remaining concern
is that employers “signal” their preference for certain groups by providing
a high rating in their first hire. If workers indeed sort in response to the
employer’s revealed taste for the collective trait, we expect the sorting effect to
be even stronger when the first worker appears particularly unattractive along
vertical traits, such as the individual rating or experience. We find no evidence
for these alternative explanations and provide further robustness checks to
support our main findings.
3.1.1 Related literature and implications
The results contribute to several strands of literature: First, our paper adds
to the emerging literature on online labour markets (Thomas, 2012; Cabral,
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2012). While a large body of literature has documented the importance of
individual reputation, as measured by online ratings and feedback (Resnick
et al., 2006; Cabral and Hortacsu, 2006; Hortacsu et al., 2009; Moreno and
Terwiesch, 2013; Agrawal et al., 2013; Pallais, 2014), few papers have examined
collective reputation. The closest papers to ours are Ghani et al. (2014) and
Nosko and Tadelis (2015). Ghani et al. (2014) provide evidence from oDesk that
ethnic diaspora Indians are more likely to initially outsource to India, and more
likely to continue hiring from the first country of hire when the experience
was positive. We confirm the correlations and provide causal evidence for
a sorting response through which the country of hire may appear persistent.
Nosko and Tadelis (2015) provide experimental evidence from eBay that buyers
overly rely on the first transaction to learn about platform quality, creating a
reputational externality. While the persistence of the first transaction appears
observationally equivalent, we provide evidence for another mechanism on a
two-sided market. In the labour market studied, the persistence is driven by
the supply-side response of the workers (or sellers, in their terminology) who
sort based on the rating and country of an employer’s first hire.
Second, this paper relates to the personnel economics literature on recruit-
ment and selection. While a large body of literature has documented moral
hazard and policies to motivate workers on the job, relatively little is known
about how to attract the “right” workers in the first place (Lazear and Oyer,
2007; Paul and Scott, 2011). In contrast to the literature that examines selection
by varying financial incentives (Dal Bo et al., 2013; Deserranno, 2016; Ashraf
et al., 2014), we focus on the impact of reputational externalities in attracting
or deterring applicants.
More broadly, the contribution adds value by documenting statistical
discrimination on the labour market (Altonji and Pierret, 2001; Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2004; Riach and Rich, 2006; Mill and Stein, 2015). Our results,
in particular, suggest that the provision of collective traits such as gender, race
or nationality in applications (e.g. on CVs) may further amplify existing group
inequalities as workers, anticipating discrimination, refrain from applying
altogether. The sorting response documented, in particular, sheds light on
a mechanism that could partly explain occupational sorting and persistent
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labour market differences along collective traits such as gender or ethnicities
(Glover et al., 2015; Bertrand, 2011; Botticini and Eckstein, 2013).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2,
we introduce the empirical context and the data. Section 3 discusses the
identification strategy. Section 4 presents the main results on the persistence of
the first hire. Section 5 discusses the mechanisms by turning the focus to the
applicant pool composition and final choices. Section 6 provides robustness
checks and Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Context and market structure
3.2.1 Empirical context
The empirical evidence is from rentacoder.com, one of the largest first-
generation virtual markets for outsourcing. In recent years, virtual markets
have become increasingly attractive for scholars to study, mainly due to the
availability of large datasets and the presence of information asymmetries
(Cabral, 2012; Thomas, 2012). The availability of the applicant pools in this
context is key for the implementation of our instrumental variables strategy.
In the market studied, employers contract out service jobs to workers
who compete by bidding a fixed wage and revealing observable measures
of quality.2 The market chosen is appealing for several reasons: As one of
the largest markets, it is representative of a range of competing outsourcing
markets. Up to its acquisition by a competitor in 2012, the market under study
was one of the five largest virtual markets for outsourcing, with 1.3 million
tasks posted by employers and cumulative worker earnings of $139 million.
Typical tasks on the platform are data entry tasks, small programming tasks
(e.g. creating websites) or simple design tasks.
The online platform offers two types of hiring for task assignment: Public
market transactions, which are competitive and open to all workers, and
2This type of mechanism is often also referred to as multi-attribute auctions, as sellers do
not only compete on price but several dimensions (e.g. rating and experience). In contrast to a
scoring auction (Asker and Cantillon, 2008, 2010), the scoring rule of the employer is unknown
to the bidding workers.
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private transactions, which restrict the set of potential workers to those invited
by the employer. These private transactions almost exclusively comprise
rehires or referrals of previous workers, where individual reputation is likely
to be more important (Stanton and Thomas, 2012). Since we focus on collective
reputation, however, our main focus is on transactions made on the large and
competitive public market.
With a public online market where entry is free and unregulated, infor-
mation asymmetries are particularly pervasive (Agrawal et al., 2013; Moreno
and Terwiesch, 2013): Anyone can sign up and bid as a worker and there is
no minimum skill requirement, rendering types unobservable to employers.
To sustain transactions given these information asymmetries, the market runs
a reputation management system where participants rate each other after
completion of tasks.
A typical public market transaction can be described as follows: Employers
post jobs requests on the market along detailed specifications about the
deliverables, contract type (e.g. fixed or hourly paid) and time frame. The
task is then reviewed by the market operator. When approved, it is listed on
the market and workers can bid for the job by submitting a wage for which they
would be willing to deliver it. Workers do not observe other bidding workers,
so there is limited scope for strategic interaction among them, a critical feature
for our empirical strategy. The employer observes a list of all applicant workers
along a narrow set of variables and chooses his preferred worker (the applicant
pool). The set of well-defined variables comprise the bid wage, a rating for past
quality and the number of tasks completed. The salient collective trait shown
is the country of residence, as indicated by a country flag and the location of
the worker.3 The employer can obtain additional information by viewing the
complete profile of each worker. Figure 3.1 presents a typical list of bids.
[Figure 3.1 here]
3While the display of sub-national locations may suggest a localized role of collective
reputation (e.g. city-level reputation for outsourcing hubs Gurgaon vs. Bangalore in India), the
within country variation of locations is too small to allow for a conclusive test for sub-national
collective reputation.
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Once an employer chooses a worker, the payment agreed upon is trans-
ferred from the employer to an escrow account to mitigate moral hazard on
the employer’s side. The worker then begins with the job, which can end
in two ways: Once the worker reports the task complete within the time
agreed upon, the worker is asked to upload the deliverables which will then
be checked by the employer. If the employer is satisfied with the results, the
task is reported complete in which case the payment (minus a commission to
the market provider) is transferred to the worker. If unsatisfied, the employer
may ask the worker to revise the work or cancel the task in which case the
money is returned to the employer and the worker receives nothing. Similarly,
when the worker failed to deliver on time, the employer may either extend
the time frame or cancel the task. After completion or cancellation of the task,
employers and workers are given the opportunity to rate each other on an
integer scale from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). The rating is only revealed once
both have submitted their rating or if two weeks have passed.4 Once revealed,
the rating is visible to anyone on the market. The employers’ hiring history is
hence visible to potential applicant workers in later hires.
While entry is free and unregulated, re-entry is relatively costly. Employers
and workers are required to provide their full contact and bank details to
ensure payment. The contacts are verified by phone calls and double or fake
accounts, when detected, are suspended. Finally, off-site communication is
discouraged as they are not legally binding and will not be taken into account
when tasks fail and employers report the case to the market provider for
arbitration.
3.2.2 Data and descriptive statistics
We collected data for all public market transactions between 2001 and 2012,
covering the entire period of market operation. We restrict the sample to fixed
wage bids, which make up 99% of all market transactions. The resulting core
4This is to avoid that poor workers, for example, do not strategically hide their anticipated
bad rating by not submitting their own bid.
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dataset contains 271,783 bids made by 60,083 workers for the respective first
job of each of the 25,652 employers.
The online market is international, with the main direction of contracting
from high income to low and medium income countries. Almost half of the
employers are based in the United States, followed by the United Kingdom,
Canada, Austria and Germany. Workers are primarily based in India, the
United States, Romania and Pakistan.
The main measure of individual reputation is the average rating assigned to
a worker. While ratings range between 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest), the majority of
workers receive the highest ratings. This highly skewed distribution of ratings
is common across virtual markets, as documented by Nosko and Tadelis (2015)
and Dellarocas and Wood (2008). In order to obtain informative variation,
we only focus on the top margin, examining the share of workers who have
obtained a top rating of 10/10. This corresponds to about 70% of the cases.5
Using the binary measure for top ratings, we break down the average
distribution of ratings by countries to examine cross-country differences in
the individual reputation score. In Figure 3.2, we plot the average share of
top rated workers for the largest countries, ranking them in descending order.
The plot indicates substantial variation in average ratings across country:
More than 85% of workers from Argentina, Germany and Bulgaria obtained
top ratings, while the share of top ratings is almost 10% points lower for
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and India. These differences are jointly significant: The
country fixed effects are jointly significant, even when controlling for employer
and all observable individual worker characteristics (See Appendix C.1)
[Figure 3.2 here]
The collective trait, hence, appears to contain added information to predict
the performance of workers. The presence of differences in group-reputation
alone, however, need not indicate collective reputation: For one, these
differences could simply be taste-based. Some countries are more popular
than others. Alternatively, the group differences could be an endogenous
5In later robustness checks, we confirm the robustness of the results to the continuous
measure as well as alternative dummies, e.g. based on above median rating (See Section 3.6).
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equilibrium outcome as workers sort across employers and tasks. Put
differently, these average group differences do not inform us to whether these
reflect actual (ex-ante) differences or are themselves a result, for example of
self-fulfilling stereotypes.
To make progress, our empirical strategy explicitly focuses on the employ-
ers’ very first hire on the market. This allows us to examine how the first
exposure endogenously shapes subsequent hiring outcomes. More specifically,
we first exploit a quasi-random source of initial assignment of employers
to workers from various countries. We then use this first country-specific
exposure to see how shocks to individual reputation extend to others to
subsequently generate differences in collective hiring outcomes. We discuss the
empirical strategy in the next section but before provide additional descriptive
statistics about the first applicant pool.
The data allows us to examine composition changes among applicants. For
each of the jobs, we observe the applicant pools with the characteristics of
the competing applicant workers. These characteristics range from the wage
bid submitted, to a rating (1 low to 10 high), the number of jobs completed,
a measure of experience, to the country of residence. Table 3.1 summarizes
the characteristics of the first applicant pools: For the pooled sample of all
employers, the average number of bids in the first applicant pool is about
10.6, with bidding workers from an average of 5.7 countries. Furthermore,
employers appear to be responsive to price and measures of reputation: The
average bid price is $323.3, but the chosen bid is only $170.7 on average.
Employers are also more likely to choose highly rated workers (an average
share of 24% vs. 31% chosen), and workers with more experience on the market
(average of 36.3 previous jobs vs. 59.4 chosen). These patterns are in line with
studies of hiring determinants on online markets (Ghani et al., 2014; Moreno
and Terwiesch, 2013).
[Table 3.1 here]
Only about a third of the employers continue to hire beyond the first hire.
While unusual for physical labour markets, the high numbers of entry and
exit are typical features of online markets (Nosko and Tadelis, 2015). The
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unconditional means are correspondingly low, with buyers on average hiring
only 1.34 times beyond the first hire. The unconditional mean for the average
subsequent amount paid per job is $29.15 and the total volume is $93.08.
3.3 Empirical model and identification
3.3.1 Regression model
We first test for reputational externalities between an employer’s very first hire
and the propensity to contract workers from the same country in the later hires.
In absence of collective reputation, the first hiring decision does not extend to
workers sharing the same collective trait.
With the worker’s country as the salient collective trait, we collapse the data
to the employer-worker country level. This allows us to compare employer-
specific differences in hiring outcomes between countries. Since the majority
of employers only hire once or twice, the simplification comes at no major
empirical loss. For each of the i = 1...N employers, we compute the bilateral
hiring intensity with respect to the j = 1...Mi worker countries from the first
applicant pool. We then compare if an employer’s likelihood to hire from one
of the Mi countries depends on the first country choice. Employer i’s overall
hiring intensity vis-a`-vis worker country j then is:
yij = β · ̂f irst hireij(zij) + ci + dj + x′ijγ+ eij (3.1)
where yij is a measure of the frequency of hiring between employer i and
country j. To capture the extensive margin in hiring, we first use a dummy
where yij = 1 if employer i hires any workers from country j for his second or
later jobs. We also use the number of hires and average wages paid to workers
to examine potential impacts on the intensive margin. The independent
variable of interest is f irst hireij, a bilateral dummy that is 1 if the employer’s
first hire was from country j. In presence of a reputational externality, we
would expect H0 : β 6= 0.
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The main challenge in this non-experimental setting is to rule out con-
founds that may bias the estimation. In particular, there are three main sources
of bias that the identification strategy must address: First, there may be sorting
among workers and employers. If only workers from j select into applicant
pools of large employers (who are also more likely to remain on the market),
for example, employers are mechanically more likely to hire from country j
both in the first and later hires. We address selectivity by comparing only
the set of countries that select into the same employer’s first applicant pool,
implemented using the employer fixed effects ci.
Second, there may exist time-invariant differences across worker country
j that could drive the differential probability of hiring across all hires:
The likelihood of a worker from country j submitting the lowest bid, for
example, increases mechanically with the size (in terms of workers on the
market) of the country. Similarly, if workers from country j consistently
submit more competitive applications, for example due to cross-country wage
differences, a spurious persistence may be created by unobserved cross-
country heterogeneity. As before, we address this econometric concern by
introducing worker country fixed effects dj that absorb cross-country level
differences. In robustness checks, we also allow these country fixed effects
to vary over time by using country-year and country-year-month fixed effects.6
Finally, a spurious effect may also appear in presence of bilateral employer-
worker country confounders, inducing a correlation between f irst hireij and
the error term eij. If an employer simply has a preference for country j,
the taste-based persistence in hiring will be observationally equivalent to a
reputational externality. We address this issue by proposing a novel IV.
3.3.2 Predicting the first hire: IV
We use an instrumental variable strategy to generate exogenous variation in the
country of first exposure. The intuition for the instrumental variable strategy
can be described in three steps: First, since employers are ceteris paribus more
6The results are robust to country-year and country-year-month fixed effects. The results
also remain robust when omitting the first five nascent years of the online market where large
changes (e.g. in terms of country composition) may have occurred (Table C.3).
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willing to select workers with cheaper bids, we can predict the first hire country
using the variation in wage bids among workers in the first applicant pool
(relevance). Second, given the institutional features, the variation in wage
bids within applicant pools is noisy, especially once absorbing cross-country
heterogeneity through the worker fixed effects. Third, this noisy variation in
the first applicant pool is unlikely to be correlated with the variation in wage
bids in future applicant pools, other than through the first hire (exclusion).
More specifically, we exploit the residual variation in the realized distri-
bution of wage bids to instrument for the first hire country. To see how the
instrument can be implemented, let wijk denote the wage bids of workers
k = 1...Ki from country j in employer i’s first applicant pool. We simply create
a bilateral dummy that is 1 if a worker from country j submitted the cheapest
bid in employer i’s first applicant pool:
zij = 1[wij· = min(wi··)] (3.2)
More generally, our instrumental variable strategy predicts the probability
of a worker from country j being hired as a function of the first applicant pool’s
realized distribution of bids, with cross-country differences partialled out. In
robustness checks, we also create IVs using other functions of the distribution
of bids (e.g. the average deviation from the mean wage bid) but focus on the
order statistic, the simplest instrument for the purpose of exposition. Figure
3.3 summarizes the final source of variation used to construct the instrument.
The figure shows the distribution of (standardized) bids after partialling out
both cross-applicant pool and cross-worker country differences. The residual
variation in bids remains large. We exploit this arguably idiosyncratic source
of variation to predict the country of first hire.
[Figure 3.3 here]
As described, the exclusion restriction in this context is that future (residual) re-
alizations of the distribution of bids are uncorrelated with the first realization.
In other words, the exclusion restriction maintains that the fact an employer
first hired a worker from country j just because workers from other countries
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were more expensive is uncorrelated with the relative competitiveness among
bid countries in later hirings, other than through the first hire. We argue that
the exclusion restriction is reasonable in this empirical context. The market
structure creates a high degree of uncertainty: Workers neither know the
number, bids and type of other workers when applying for a job. Similarly,
the nature of tasks varies across hiring pools, so there exists uncertainty about
the actual costs required to deliver the project. Since the instrument uses the
relative variation in wage bids within a given pool, we argue that this variation
is very likely to be uncorrelated with the subsequent relative variation created
by a very different set of workers, employers and application pool.
To complete the discussion of the empirical specification, we also include
a vector xij that controls for bilateral country-level confounders which may
determine both first and subsequent hiring. In our context, the main measures
are shared common languages, time zone differences and the geographic
distance between the employer and worker country.7 Finally, the standard
errors are clustered at the employer-level.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Reputational Externalities
The main results are reported in Table 3.2. Column 1 and 2 report the OLS
estimates. As expected, the inclusion of worker country fixed effects accounts
for the upward bias driven by cross-country level differences. Column 3
reports the instrumental variable estimate: Compared to countries from which
workers applied but were not chosen from, employers are 3.2% points more
likely to continue hiring another worker from the first hire country. The
point estimate is nearly unchanged when adding the common language, time
zone differences and (log) distance as bilateral controls, adding support to
the validity of the instrumental variable strategy (Column 4). In Column
7The bilateral data is drawn from the CEPII’s Gravity Dataset, see Mayer and Zignago
(2011).
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5 and 6, we report the results by replacing the binary outcome with the
subsequent number of hires (Column 5) and the total wage payments (Column
6). Employers are more likely to hire and pay higher wages to countries of first
hire, compared to countries from which workers applied initially but were not
chosen from. The first stage of the two-stage estimation is strong: Employers
are 27.2% points more likely to hire from a given country if one of the country’s
worker submitted the lowest (residual) wage bid. The first-stage conveniently
passes conventional tests of weak instruments, with a (Kleibergen-Paap) F-
statistic of 5214.54.
[Table 3.2 here]
The estimates are economically significant: With the mean of hiring
continuation at 10%, the increase by 3.1% points reflects a sizeable increase
of 31% when evaluated at the mean of the dependent variable. For the total
amount paid, the increase is even larger and at 56% when evaluated at the
mean of $16.35. Since the sample also includes a large number of employers
who do not continue after the first hire, the coefficients are even larger when
conditioning on the set of employers who at least hired twice (Table C.3,
Column 8). Since continuation itself is likely to be endogenous, however, our
interpretation relies on the unconditional, lower estimates. Notice also that
the effect does not include the rehiring of the same workers (as in first hire),
hence capturing solely the externality generated by the shared group trait, the
country of residence.
There are two potential reasons for why the instrumental variable estimates
are larger than the OLS estimates. First, the results may be driven by
measurement error, for example due to misreporting in the country of
residence. Second, if the treatment effect is heterogeneous, the instrumental
variable estimate will reflect a local average treatment effect (LATE) of those
employers who are particularly responsive to variations in prices, especially to
the cheapest price. In Section 6.2, we examine the complier population and
the robustness of the estimates upon alternative construction of the instrument
further (Table C.9). For the main result, however, it is assuring that the OLS
149
point estimate - which we suspect to be upward biased - is even smaller than
the point estimate of the instrumental variable procedure.
To explore how persistent the reputational externality is, we focus on a
subset of employers who continue to hire beyond the sixth hire (5% of all
employers) and estimate the probability of hiring from the first hire country
at each hire up to the sixth. We use the same specification as for the main
result (3.4.1). The estimates are reported in Figure 3.4. The country of hire
in the first job has a large impact on the probability of hiring from the same
country in the second job. Conditioning on the set of employers who continue
to hire, the point estimate is about twice the size of the overall unconditional
first country of hire effect in Table 3.2. While the coefficient magnitude drops
in the third hire, we observe an uptick and statistically significant effects for
the fourth and fifth hire, despite the imprecise estimates due to a substantially
smaller sample. The results provide evidence for a persistent effect of the
reputational externality that tapers off at the sixth hire. Although the duration
of persistence appears short, the number of rehires is generally low on the
market. About 90% of all employers hire only up to four times, which is in the
range where the persistence remains large.
[Figure 3.4 here]
3.4.2 Treatment heterogeneity
The persistence identified in Section 3.4.1 suggests that the country-specific
first exposure predicts later hiring patterns. In presence of a reputational
externality, we also expect employers to learn and update their beliefs about
the first worker’s country depending on his or her performance (Altonji and
Pierret, 2001). We therefore expect the persistence to be even stronger when
differentiating by the first job’s outcome.
To investigate this further, we extend the main regression model (3.1) by
allowing for treatment heterogeneity. Employer i’s hiring intensity vis-a`-vis
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country j then is:
yij = β0 · f̂ irstij(zij) + β1 · f̂ irstij(zij) · sij + (3.3)
ci + dj + x′ijγ+ eij
We interact the first hire dummy f̂ irstij with another dummy sij denoting
the success of the first job. We define success (sij = 1) as having obtained a
top rating of 10/10, which corresponds to 70% of the cases. With most of the
jobs rated as a success, our margin of comparison here is hence to compare top
rated workers to the rest.8 While the success of the first job sij is potentially
endogenous, we argue that the interaction f̂ irstij× sij is more likely to be quasi-
random. The specification can also be interpreted as a difference-in-differences:
intuitively, we now compare the subsequent hiring outcome of workers from
two first hire countries, with the added difference that one worker received a
high rating and the other a low rating.
Table 3.3 summarizes the results, now only reporting the instrumental
variable estimates. In line with a reputational externality, the results suggest
that the first hire effect is solely driven by the job’s outcome, as measured by
the rating given. In Column 2, the interaction between the first hire and the
top rating is positive and significant: As expected, the point estimate increases
in contrast to the previous first hire effect reported in Section 3.4.1. Only
conditional on success does the first hire translate into future hires.
[Table 3.3 here]
One potential concern is that the interaction is not capturing the actual
rating given for the first job but the individual quality of the hired worker:
If chosen workers with a high rating are more likely to succeed (and hence
rated highly), the key interaction could be spuriously driven by the individual
quality of the first worker. To address this concern, we control for the
8In robustness checks, we also use different definitions of success, such as stricter
definitions (e.g. rating of at least 2/10...7/10, 8/10... 10/10) or a more continuous measure
(See Table C.5)
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observable measures of individual reputation: In Column 3, we interact the
first hire country with the (ex-ante) individual rating of the chosen worker
at time of hire. Reassuringly, the interaction term is insignificant with a
substantially smaller point estimate. In Column 4, we use experience as the
second measure of individual quality but find a similarly insignificant result.9
In Column 5, we add all three interactions: The results confirm that it is indeed
the experience with the first worker, as measured by the first rating given, that
is driving the persistence.
In Column 6 and 7, we replace the dummy dependent variable with
continuous variables. The results remain comparable: Conditional on success
in the first hire, the times traded with a given country are significantly higher
(Column 6). We also find the same result for the cumulative payments (Column
7).
To further explore how the persistence varies with the first rating given,
we allow for a finer breakdown by ratings. If the heterogenous effect
indeed reflects a reputational externality and employer learning, we expect the
updating to be stronger the clearer the first signal, as captured by the rating,
is. We therefore break down the rating into five groups: Worst rating (Below
4), bad rating (4-6), neutral rating (7-8), good rating (9) and best rating (10).10
We estimate the effects relative to the neutral group.
[Figure 3.5 here]
The results are summarized in Figure 3.5, where the effects are plotted
by the constructed bins. The effect is symmetric: Employers are more (less)
likely to continue hiring from the first country of hire if the first rating was
positive (negative) relative to a neutral rating. This is consistent with learning,
as employers react accordingly to both positive and negative signals. While the
estimates for the negative ratings are somewhat noisier, this is due to the small
number of bad ratings observed.
9Experience is a dummy than is 1 if the worker’s number of jobs completed is above
median (17).
10The bins are chosen to reflect the classifications provided by the market and to ensure
sufficient numbers of observations by bin. As discussed, rating distributions are typically left-
skewed, with most of the mass concentrated among the highest ratings. The results, however,
do not change when we use alternative groupings (See Table C.5).
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3.5 Discussion and mechanisms
In the previous section, we found causal evidence consistent with a reputa-
tional externality: Shocks to the past performance of a worker extend over
to the entire group. We now explore the underlying mechanisms of this
persistence by exploring the role of coordination and worker sorting.
For a positive shock to collective reputation to generate the strong observed
persistence, we require the shock to endogenously shift the composition of
applicants so as to “rationalize” the employer’s belief about a given country’s
average worker quality. In theory, we require a sufficiently strong strategic
complementarity between the employer’s positive hiring response and the
incentives of higher ability workers from the first hire country to apply. We
test this condition by studying if the employer’s first exposure is indeed
accompanied by a positive supply-side sorting response: More and better
applicants apply in response to a positive shock to collective reputation. We
conclude this section by switching to the employer’s side, comparing the final
choices employers make. This allows us to assess how shifts in the applicant
composition coincide with changes in the final choices.
3.5.1 Sorting and applicant composition
We use the same specification as before in (3.4), but now turning to the
worker’s side by examining the applicant pool. The results are reported in
Table 3.4.
We first examine if the propensity of workers to apply in later jobs relates
to the employer’s first exposure (Column 1-2). The results show that workers
are more likely to apply to employers who initially hired from their country.
Comparing among countries in the first hire, workers from the same country
as the employer’s first hire are 3% points more likely to apply (Column 1).
Again, the effect increases when we allow for treatment heterogeneity (Column
2), suggesting that the effect is primarily driven by the first positive rating
given. In Column 3 and 4, we replace the binary measure with the number
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of applicants.11 The results remain similar and confirm the effect also in the
intensive margin.
[Table 3.4]
In Column 5-8, we explore whether the composition shift among countries
is also accompanied by a change in the quality of the applicants, as measured
by the individual rating and past number of jobs completed. The results
suggest that the sorting response is positive: Following a positive first exposure
to a country, workers from the same country do not only increasingly apply but
are also of higher quality. Compared to a negative first exposure, the number
of top rated applicants per country is 0.63 higher after a positive first exposure.
Evaluated against the mean number of 0.6 per country, this increase is large.
Interestingly, the results for experience also show that workers tend to sort
along the (ex-ante) experience level of the first hired worker. An experienced
worker in the first hire increases the average number of experienced workers
in later applicant pools by 0.3. This suggests that the employer’s first choice
may also signal the preferences for certain type of workers. We discuss this
alternative mechanism in Section 3.6. Once again, the point estimates are larger
when we condition on the set of employers who do not exit. As exit itself is
endogenous, however, we prefer the unconditional specification.
Overall, the results are consistent with the role of the first hire in solving
a coordination problem: As shocks to collective reputation induce positive
sorting, the employer’s first impression is likely to be subsequently confirmed.
3.5.2 Comparing chosen workers and ratings
How does the composition change in the applicant pool affect the final choice?
In order to make that comparison, and in contrast to previous specifications, we
now condition on the endogenous set of final hires. For each of the i employers,
we enumerate the t subsequent hires separately. The hires correspond to
11Since we hold constant the numbers of subsequent hires using the employer fixed effects,
there is no need to deflate these numbers by the overall numbers of applicants or jobs.
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workers, indexed j and from country c. We estimate:
yijct = ci + β · f̂ irstij(zij) + β1 · f̂ irstij(zij)× sij + dc + eijct (3.4)
As before, we include employer fixed effects ci and worker country fixed
effects dc. The identifying variation is therefore comparable to the previous
specification, but now only among the final hires (See Section 3.3.1). We
also use the same instrumental variable strategy. The standard errors remain
clustered at the employer-level.
The results are reported in Table 3.5. Among the set of hired workers, those
from a first hire country with a positive first rating are more likely to receive
a top rating themselves. Compared to a negative first rating, a positive first
rating increases the probability of receiving a top rating by 11.1% (Column 2).
This effect appears to be driven by the higher quality of selected workers from
the first hire country (Column 6). Followed by a positive first rating, later hires
from the country are 12.5% points more likely to have a top rating. In terms
of wage and experience, however, the final choices are comparable (Column 4
and 8).
[Table 3.5]
The results confirm the presence of strong strategic complementarities that give
rise to a “herding effect”: Higher ability workers, observing an employer’s
first positive experience with workers from their country, disproportionately
apply as they anticipate a higher probability of being chosen. The increased
entry of workers from the first hire’s country, however, drives down their
“country premium” so that workers from the first hire country do not receive
higher average payments.12 Faced with a larger pool of better applicants from
successful first hire countries, however, employers are more likely to select a
higher rated worker. These high reputation workers in turn perform better,
further amplifying the initial public group-specific signal, thus endogenously
12In Appendix C.6, we use an alternative specification by comparing the characteristics of
the final choice relative to the applicant pool average. The results confirm the absence of the
“country premium”.
155
creating persistent differences between countries. This closes the loop that
gives rise to self-reinforcing differences in application rates across groups.
3.6 Alternative mechanisms and Robustness
3.6.1 Alternative mechanisms
We consider several competing mechanisms that may appear observationally
equivalent to collective reputation. We first explore an alternative channel
through which the applicant composition change could be driven by. While
employers may not change their selection rule, they could strategically delay
their job postings to local hours where workers from the first hire country
are most likely to be awake. Akin to many online markets, workers respond
timely to job posts as these are displayed chronologically. We explore whether
employers change their time of job posting in order to increase the number
of applications from the first worker country. The test is implemented by
constructing a dummy for the hours when workers from the given country
are most likely to be awake. The window of active local hours is defined to
lie between 9am to 5pm local time in the worker’s country. For countries
with several time-zones, we average across all zones as an approximation. The
results are reported in Appendix Table C.2 and suggest that employers are
not more likely to strategically delay their job postings in response to the first
exposure. This suggests that the applicant pool shift is indeed driven by the
increased selection of first hire country workers into later applications.
Other than collective reputation, the sorting response could reflect learning
about the country-specific match productivity, revealed through the first hire’s
country and rating. First of all, however, it is unclear why there should be
country-specific match heterogeneity in the first place. Most of the jobs on the
platform are small tasks such as data entry or programming. In presence of
country-specific match heterogeneity, however, we expect the effect to decline
once we control for bilateral confounds or remove language related tasks (e.g.
translation). Indeed, the share of direct language-related tasks like translation
is less than 2% and the removal of these do not affect our results. Furthermore,
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we include a range of bilateral country measures and interact them with the
first hire country to account for observable bilateral heterogeneity. The results,
again, remain unchanged (Table C.7).
The results may also be driven by referrals networks. If employers are
more likely to hire referrals from the first hire country, the estimates would
recover same-country propensities in friendship and referral networks. While
we cannot definitely rule out unobserved referral networks, we argue that
this mechanism is unlikely to be important in our context:13 In the market
under study, referral hirings typically take place in private transactions, where
employers can invite selected workers to bid. We explicitly exclude these
private transactions throughout our analysis and focus only on public market
transactions that are competitive and open to all workers.
Another final concern is that employers “signal” their preference for certain
groups by providing a high rating in their first hire. If workers indeed sort
in response to the employer’s revealed taste for some countries, however, we
expect the sorting effect to be even stronger when the first worker appears
particularly unattractive along vertical traits, such as the individual rating or
experience. In Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, we allowed for the first hire effect
to vary along the first worker’s (ex-ante) individual rating and experience.
If employer’s signal their preference for workers from a certain country, we
expect the sorting response to increase when the first hire was particularly
low ranked in reputation and experience. At most we find the opposite:
Experienced workers are more likely to select in if the first hire was particularly
experienced.
3.6.2 Robustness
We conclude the results with a wide range of robustness checks. First, we show
that the main results are robust upon alternative measures of hiring intensity,
such as measures for wage payments above the 9th decile, or the ranking of
overall payment flows (Table C.3, Column 2-4). We split the sample by the
13Other markets, e.g. oDesk, explicitly allow for referrals by enabling workers to “affiliate”
with established intermediaries (Stanton and Thomas, 2012). This feature however does not
apply to the market under study.
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median year and confine the sample to only US employers (about half of the
sample) and employers who hire at least twice (Column 5-8). For transparency,
we report the simple OLS and the reduced form regressions (Table C.4). We
also report results using alternative definitions of high/low rating (Table C.5).
As another exercise, we experiment with alternative instruments and
characterize the complier population in order to facilitate the interpretation
of the LATE. Instead of using the order statistic (cheapest worker) to construct
the cheapest wage as an instrument, we re-estimate the regression using a
dummy for when at least one worker from the given country submitted a bid
below the average wage bid (Table C.8). We also create a continuous measure
that captures the number of workers from a country with bids below average.
The different instruments provide similar results. In terms of magnitude of
the first hire effect, the alternative wage instruments provide comparable point
estimates ranging between 3% to 5% points. These differences in estimates are
likely to reflect different complier groups: Compared to the first hire (treated)
and untreated populations, the size of the complier population varies across
the instruments (See Table C.9). Note that our preferred instrument constitutes
the lower bound of our range of estimates.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide causal evidence for collective reputation as a
coordination device. An employer’s first rating given to a worker with an
observable collective trait serves as a group-specific signal upon which later
workers coordinate. Depending on the first experience, good workers attract
more good workers from the same country and vice versa. The provision
of collective traits hence perpetuates initial group inequalities by creating an
(unintended) “herding effect”. As the provision of collective traits like country
of origin or gender is pervasive across online markets, our results are likely to
extend beyond the online labour market under study.
More broadly, our results trace out a channel through which collective traits
- even if uncorrelated to any economic fundamentals ex-ante - can persistently
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shape the way workers sort and apply to jobs. While the online labour market
setting limits the external validity of our findings, the sorting mechanism
documented is likely to also apply to physical labour markets. Our results,
for example, suggest that the requirement to disclose collective traits such
as gender, race or nationality in applications (e.g. on a CV) may create
inefficiencies as workers from some groups, anticipating discrimination, refrain
from applying to certain employers altogether.
159
3.8 Tables and Figures
Figure 3.1: Example of a typical applicant pool
Names are anonymized but typically are aliases that do not enable employers to
directly infer to underlying worker quality. The salient collective trait in this context
is the country of residence, as indicated by the flag and the country name.
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Figure 3.2: Average share of top rated jobs by worker country
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Figure 3.3: Residual within applicant pool distribution of wage bids
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Figure 3.4: Times hired: Persistence of the first hire effect
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Figure 3.5: Treatment heterogeneity: Probability of hiring again from the
country of first hire as a function of the first rating given
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Table 3.1: First applicant pool characteristics and descriptive statistics of later hiring patterns
Panel A: Employer level Applicant pool characteristics of the first job
All employers (N=25805) Non-exit (N=8219)
Mean SD 10% 50% 90% Mean SD 10% 50% 90%
Number of applicants 10.60 10.78 2 7 24 11.99 11.25 2 8 26
Number of countries 5.66 3.60 2 5 11 6.23 3.70 2 5 11
Wage bid ($) 323.24 5925.94 23.12 96.52 591.65 228.43 1154.68 21.10 81.87 466.93
- Chosen worker 171.01 469.45 12.75 68 424.15 132.09 327.07 10.2 51 296.65
Top rating 0.24 0.19 0 0.22 0.50 0.24 0.18 0 0.22 0.50
- Chosen worker 0.31 0.46 0 0 1 0.32 0.46 0 0 1
Number of completed jobs 36.34 51.86 2 18.54 90.13 33.78 49.36 2 17.03 84.06
- Chosen worker 59.44 134.82 0 14 156 55.56 132.58 0 13 142
Panel B: Employer-country level Employers hiring from countries of their first applicant pool, after the first hire
All employers (N=146273) Non-exit (N=51545)
Mean SD 10% 50% 90% Mean SD 10% 50% 90%
Hires from country after first job 0.100 0.301 0 0 1 0.286 0.452 0 0 1
- First hire country 0.141 0.348 0 0 1 0.440 0.496 0 0 1
Times hired 0.236 1.495 0 0 1 0.671 2.460 0 0 2
- First hire country 0.356 1.717 0 0 1 1.111 2.893 0 0 3
Total pay ($) 16.35 163.34 0 0 0 46.41 272.61 0 0 85
- First hire country 24.92 198.82 0 0 12.75 77.79 345.39 0 0 170
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the employer’s first applicant pool. Number of applicants is the number of
applicant workers in the employers’ first job applicant pool. Number of countries is the number of distinct countries from
which workers applied in the first applicant pool. Wage bid is the fixed wage bid for completing the job in USD ($). Top
rating is a dummy that is 1 if the worker has a top rating and 0 otherwise (workers with no previous rating are hence
coded 0). Number of completed jobs is the number of previous jobs completed on the platform. Chosen worker shows the
summary statistics for the hired workers among the applicants. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the employer’s
subsequent transactions with countries from the applicant pool of the first job. Hires from country after first job is a dummy
that is 1 if the employer ever hired from the country after the first hire. Times hired is the number of times the employer
hired from the country after the first job. Total pay is the cumulative payments an employer made to workers from the
given country, in USD ($). First hire country shows the summary statistics for the country the employer first hired from.
Reporting mean, standard deviation (SD), the 1st decile (10%), median (50%) and 9th decile (90%).
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Table 3.2: Reputational externalities: First country hire and later hiring
Panel A: OLS and IV (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dummy = 1 if employer ever hires Times Total pay
from country after the first job hired
Mean dep. var. 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.236 10.026
First hire country 0.037*** 0.011*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.081** 9.270**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (4.21)
Estimation OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
Panel B: First stage (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
First hire country
Mean dep. var. 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175
Cheapest 0.273*** 0.272*** 0.272*** 0.272***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Employer FEs X X X X X X
Worker country FEs X X X X X
Bilateral controls X X X
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 5250.67 5214.54 5214.54 5214.54
Observations 146273 146273 146273 146273 146273 146273
The unit of observation is the employer-worker country pair. The dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if the employer
ever hired from the country from which workers applied in the first applicant pool after the first hire. Times hired is
the number of times the employer hired from the country after the first hire. Total pay is the cumulative wages paid by
an employer to workers in the given country after the first hire. First hire country is a dummy that is 1 if the worker
hired for the first job came from the country. Cheapest is a dummy that is 1 if applicant workers from the country
submitted the cheapest (residual) wage bid. Bilateral controls include a dummy for the shared official country language,
the absolute time difference in hours, and (log) centroid distance between the employer and worker country. The test
for weak instruments is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic. Robust SEs, clustered at the employer level. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
166
Table 3.3: Treatment heterogeneity: Later hiring contingent on the first hire’s rating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dummy = 1 if employer ever hires Times Total pay
from country after the first job hired
Mean dep. var. 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.236 10.026
First hire country 0.031*** -0.006 0.026*** 0.036*** -0.005 -0.040 1.101
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (2.47)
First hire country × Top rating given 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.136** 4.229*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (2.44)
First hire country × Previous: Top rating 0.014 0.006 0.051 3.029
(0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (2.77)
First hire country × Previous: Experienced -0.013 -0.007 0.033 -1.875
(0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (2.73)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Employer FEs X X X X X X X
Worker country FEs X X X X X X X
Bilateral controls X X X X X X X
First-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 5214.54 1771.78 2105.11 903.50 419.57 419.57 419.57
Observations 146273 146273 146273 146273 146273 146273 146273
The unit of observation is the employer-worker country pair. The dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if the employer
ever hired from the country from which workers applied in the first applicant pool after the first hire. Times hired is the
number of times the employer hired from the country after the first hire. Total pay is the cumulative wages paid by an
employer to workers in the given country after the first hire. First hire country is a dummy that is 1 if the worker hired
for the first job came from the country. A Top rating is defined as a rating of 10/10. Previous: Top rating is a dummy that
is 1 if the applicant worker received a top rating in previous jobs. Previous: Experience is a dummy that is 1 if the worker
has completed more than a median amount (17) of jobs on the platform. Bilateral controls include a dummy for the
shared official country language, the absolute time difference in hours, and (log) centroid distance between the employer
and worker country. The test for weak instruments is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic. Robust SEs, clustered at the
employer level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.4: Mechanisms: Change in applicant pool composition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Applied No. applicants Top rating High exp.
Mean dep. var. 0.273 0.273 0.155 0.155 0.573 0.573 0.196 0.196
First hire country 0.030*** -0.006 0.301 -0.621 0.205* -0.409** 0.049 -0.245**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.22) (0.39) (0.12) (0.21) (0.06) (0.10)
First hire country × Top rating given 0.051*** 1.092*** 0.634*** 0.256**
(0.01) (0.41) (0.22) (0.12)
First hire country × Previous: Top rating 0.009 0.214 0.194 0.038
(0.01) (0.51) (0.26) (0.12)
First hire country × Previous: Experienced -0.003 0.291 0.312 0.278**
(0.01) (0.48) (0.25) (0.12)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Employer FEs X X X X X X X X
Worker country FEs X X X X X X X X
Bilateral controls X X X X X X X X
Observations 145281 145281 145281 145281 145281 145281 145281 145281
The unit of observation is the employer-country pair. Applied is a dummy that is 1 if workers from the country from
which workers applied in the first applicant pool applied after the first hire. No. of applicants is the number of applicant
workers from the country after the first hire. First hire country is a dummy that is 1 if the worker hired for the first job
came from the country. Top rating is the number of top rated applicant workers (10/10) from the country after the first
hire. High exp. is the number of applicants with more than a median amount (17) of completed jobs on the platform.
Bilateral controls include a dummy for the shared official country language, the absolute time difference in hours, and
(log) centroid distance between the employer and worker country. Robust SEs, clustered at the employer level. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.5: Mechanisms: Effect on later hiring outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Characteristics of hired worker
Top rating given (ln) Wage Top rating Experienced
Mean of dep. var. 0.900 0.900 3.677 3.677 0.772 0.772 0.314 0.314
First hire country 0.004 -0.072 0.037 0.132 -0.006 -0.136* 0.003 0.026
(0.02) (0.05) (0.07) (0.17) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07)
First hire country × Top rating given 0.111** -0.034 0.125* -0.057
(0.05) (0.18) (0.08) (0.08)
First hire country × Previous: Top rating 0.002 -0.148 0.045 -0.062
(0.04) (0.16) (0.08) (0.08)
First hire country × Previous: Experienced -0.030 -0.038 0.039 0.112
(0.04) (0.16) (0.08) (0.07)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Employer FEs X X X X X X X X
Worker country FEs X X X X X X X X
Bilateral controls X X X X X X X X
Observations 20761 20761 20761 20761 20761 20761 20761 20761
The unit of observation is the completed job. Top rating given is a dummy that is 1 if the employer provided the highest
rating (10/10) to the worker. ln(Wage bid) is the (log) wage paid to the hired worker. First hire country is a dummy that
is 1 if the worker hired for the first job came from the country. Top rating is a dummy that is 1 if the hired worker had a
top rating at time of application (before receiving the rating for the current job). Experienced is a dummy that is 1 if the
chosen worker completed more than a median amount (17) of completed jobs on the platform. Bilateral controls include a
dummy for the shared official country language, the absolute time difference in hours, and (log) centroid distance between
the employer and worker country. Robust SEs, clustered at the employer level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure A.1: Sample of comparative revenue statement for Fiji 1854 (Blue Book)
Notes: Sample of comparative revenue statement for Fiji 1854 from the Blue Book. Each row
records the revenue for a specific source (e.g. customs revenue). The two columns report the
revenue in the current (1854) and the previous year (1853).
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Figure A.2: Sample of trade tax exemption laws (Blue Book)
Notes: Sample of customs tax exemptions laws from the 1869 Ceylon Blue Book.
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Figure A.3: Number of openings and share available governors who are
connected
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Notes: Number of governorships that need to be filled (i.e. are beyond the statutory six year
term limit) and the share of available connected governors. The share of available connected
governors is defined as the proportion of serving governors who are connected and beyond
the statutory six year term limit.
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Figure A.4: Size of switcher sample and cut-off for shared ancestry
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connections as a function of the cut-off for connectedness
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Figure A.5: Retirement by connectedness - Survival estimates
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Notes: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates. Absorbing state is retirement from Colonial Office.
Reporting the p-value for test of equality of survivor functions.
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Figure A.6: Exit (governor-colony) by connectedness - Survival estimates
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Notes: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates. Absorbing state is exit from position. Reporting the
p-value for test of equality of survivor functions.
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Figure A.7: Connected years and expected number of appointments (First
stage)
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Table A.1: British colonies and territories (N = 70)
Colony Start End Modern territory (+ marks still dependent)
Antigua 1854 1871 Part of Antigua & Barbuda
Bahamas 1854 1964 Bahamas
Barbados 1854 1884 Barbados
Basutoland 1884 1946 Lesotho
Bechuanaland 1891 1941 Botswana
Bermuda 1854 1941 Bermuda+
British Columbia 1860 1866 Province of Canada
British Guiana 1854 1964 Guinea
British Honduras 1854 1942 Honduras
Cape of Good Hope 1854 1908 Part of South Africa
Cayman Islands 1919 1939 Cayman Islands+
Ceylon 1854 1944 Sri Lanka
Cyprus 1879 1955 Cyprus
Dominica 1856 1932 Dominica
Falkland Island 1854 1959 Falkland Island (Islas Malvinas)+
Fiji 1876 1940 Fiji
Gambia 1854 1945 Gambia
Gibraltar 1854 1947 Gibraltar+
Gold Coast 1850 1946 Ghana
Grenada 1854 1946 Grenada
Heligoland 1854 1889 Part of Germany
Hong Kong 1854 1959 Hong Kong (SAR, PR China)
Ionian Islands 1854 1863 Part of Greece
Jamaica 1854 1960 Jamaica
Kenya 1922 1962 Kenya
Labuan 1856 1887 Part of Malaysia
Lagos 1862 1904 Part of Nigeria
Leeward Islands 1885 1945 Dissolved into Antigua & Barbuda, British
Virgin Islands, Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis,
Anguilla and Dominica
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Malta 1854 1960 Malta
Mauritius 1854 1946 Mauritius
Montserrat 1858 1888 Montserrat+
Natal 1854 1907 Part of South Africa
Nevis 1854 1882 St. Kitts & Nevis
New Brunswick 1854 1865 Province of Canada
New South Wales 1854 1901 State of Australia
New Zealand 1854 1920 New Zealand
Newfoundland 1855 1932 Province of Canada
Nigeria 1914 1939 Nigeria
Northern Nigeria 1900 1913 Part of Nigeria
Northern Rhodesia 1924 1948 Zambia
Nova Scotia 1854 1866 Province of Canada
Nyasaland 1903 1938 Malawi
Palestine 1921 1944 Israel, State of Palestine
Prince Edward Island 1854 1871 Province of Canada
Queensland 1860 1901 State of Australia
Seychelles 1903 1939 Seychelles
Sierra Leone 1854 1943 Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands 1920 1941 Solomon Islands
Somaliland 1902 1938 Somalia
South Australia 1854 1902 State of Australia
Southern Nigeria 1900 1913 Part of Nigeria
Southern Rhodesia 1924 1932 Zimbabwe
St. Christopher 1854 1893 St. Kitts & Nevis
St. Helena 1854 1958 St. Helena, Ascension & Tristan da Cunha+
St. Lucia 1854 1959 St. Lucia
St. Vincent 1854 1986 St. Vincent & Grenadines
Straits Settlements 1865 1938 Malaysia
Swaziland 1906 1947 Swaziland
Tanganyika 1920 1961 Tanzania
Tasmania 1854 1909 State of Australia
Tobago 1854 1898 Part of Trinidad & Tobago
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Trinidad 1854 1899 Part of Trinidad & Tobago
Trinidad & Tobago 1899 1945 Trinidad & Tobago
Turks & Caicos 1851 1946 Turks & Caicos
Uganda 1901 1945 Uganda
Vancouver Island 1862 1863 Part of Canada
Victoria 1855 1899 State of Australia
Virgin Islands 1856 1932 British Virgin Islands+
Western Australia 1854 1913 State of Australia
Zululand 1887 1986 Part of South Africa
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Table A.2: Within-governor - switcher sample
(1) (2) (3)
Demeaned within governor p-value
Average for Connected Unconnected diff
Total years served 0.054 -0.072 0.764
mean: 7.379 (4.619) (4.290)
Duration in position 0.049 -0.066 0.357
mean: 2.369 (1.943) (1.823)
Transfer -0.008 0.011 0.191
mean: 0.108 (0.289) (0.322)
Retire -0.007 0.009 0.322
mean: 0.098 (0.282) (0.301)
Exit -0.015 0.021 0.065*
mean: 0.199 (0.381) (0.412)
Observations 559 418 977 (28%)
No. governors 96 (21%)
Notes: Average characteristics (demeaned within governor) for the same governor when
connected and unconnected. Showing mean and standard deviations (in parentheses). Total
years served is the total years served as a governor in the Colonial Office. Duration in position
is the years in the current governorship. Transfer is a dummy that is 1 if the governor was
transferred to another colony. Retire is a dummy that is 1 if the governor exited the Colonial
Office. Exit is a dummy that is 1 if the governor either retired or transferred. p-value for
mean comparison is computed with robust standard errors, clustered at the dyadic governor-
secretary of state level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.3: Within-appointment - switcher sample
(1) (2) (3)
Demeaned within position p-value
Average for Connected Unconnected diff
Total years served 0.012 -0.016 0.876
mean: 5.907 (1.898) (1.800)
Duration in position 0.010 -0.014 0.895
mean: 2.543 (1.877) (1.782)
Transfer -0.003 0.004 0.718
mean: 0.086 (0.252) (0.264)
Retire -0.015 0.021 0.142
mean: 0.104 (0.267) (0.309)
Exit -0.017 0.023 0.183
mean: 0.182 (0.360) (0.397)
Observations 333 248 581 (17%)
No. governors 89 (20%)
No. governor-colony 112 (15%)
Notes: Average characteristics (demeaned within governor-colony/appointment) for the same
governor in the same colony when connected and unconnected. Showing mean and standard
deviations (in parentheses). Total years served is the total years served as a governor in the
Colonial Office. Duration in term is the years in the current governorship. Transfer is a dummy
that is 1 if the governor was transferred to another colony. Retire is a dummy that is 1 if the
governor exited the Colonial Office. Exit is a dummy that is 1 if the governor either retired or
transferred. p-value for mean comparison is computed with robust standard errors, clustered
at the dyadic governor-secretary of state level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. p < 0.01.
191
Table A.4: Change in Secretary of State, political turnover and colony
performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
New Secretary of State
Mean of dep. var 0.366 0.366 0.361 0.361
New Party t− 1 0.462*** 0.485**
(0.11) (0.23)
New Prime Minister t− 1 0.336*** 0.007
(0.10) (0.21)
Revenue growth t− 1 0.462 0.702
(0.94) (0.96)
Decade FEs 11 11 11 11
Linear trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 109 109 108 108
Notes: Unit of observation is the year. Sample period 1854-1966. Dependent variable is a
dummy for whether a new Secretary of State was appointed in given year. New party (New
Prime Minister) is a dummy if the ruling party (prime minister). Revenue growth is the average
revenue growth in the colonies. All explanatory variables are lagged (contemporaneous effects
are all insignificant). Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table A.5: Connectedness between Secretary of State and governor:
Correlation matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Shared Both Both Both Connected
ancestry aristocrats Etonian Oxbridge
(1) Shared ancestry 1.000 0.424 0.135 0.048 0.818
(2) Both aristocrats 0.424 1.000 0.252 0.120 0.392
(3) Both Etonian 0.135 0.252 1.000 0.083 0.273
(4) Same Oxbridge 0.048 0.120 0.083 1.000 0.482
(5) Connected 0.818 0.392 0.273 0.482 1.000
Notes: Unit of observation is the Secretary of State-governor pair (N = 1, 518). Sample
period 1854-1966. Reporting the correlation coefficient between the different measures of
connectedness. Connected is the combined dummy that is 1 if the governor and Secretary
of State share either common ancestry, are both aristocrats, both went to Eton or studied at
Oxford or Cambridge.
192
Table A.6: Determinants of governor salaries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: log Governor salary in GBP
Mean of dep. var 7.929 7.922 8.262 7.929 8.250 8.250
log Revenue in GBP 0.355*** 0.279*** 0.276***
(0.022) (0.042) (0.043)
log Population 0.295*** 0.064* 0.082**
(0.041) (0.035) (0.037)
log Settler mortality -0.113*** -0.001 -0.054
(0.040) (0.036) (0.055)
log Distance to London 0.164 -0.083 -0.402
(0.183) (0.131) (0.337)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FEs - - - - - Yes
Observations 3,510 3,270 2,213 3,510 2,096 2,096
Within R2 0.768 0.531 0.106 0.0136 0.730 0.760
Notes: Unit of observation is the governor-year. Sample period 1854-1966. Dependent variable
is the (log) salary in GBP paid to a governorship in a given year. (log) Revenue is the total
annual revenue in the colony. (log) Population is the total population size in the colony. (log)
Settler mortality is the log settler mortality rate from Acemoglu et al. (2001). (log) d istance to
London is the log distance (in km) to London from the colony’s capital to London. Continent
fixed effects include dummy for Africa, Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia and
Oceania. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.7: Descriptive statistics between within-governor switchers and
always/never connected
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full governor Mean difference connection
sample N = 456 switching (N = 96) −
Standard Always Never
Mean deviation connected connected
Peerage 0.085 0.280 -0.422*** 0.024*
Civil servant 0.274 0.446 0.173** 0.198***
Military 0.360 0.480 0.275** -0.065
Politician 0.087 0.283 -0.186 0.058**
Eton 0.109 0.312 -0.126* 0.154***
Oxford 0.178 0.383 -0.038 0.250***
Cambridge 0.150 0.358 -0.001 0.138***
Age at entry 49.153 9.855 -0.219 -1.638
Age at retirement 56.697 9.054 3.902*** 1.663
Years served 7.697 5.410 3.537*** 3.036***
Colonies served 1.793 1.263 0.858*** 1.832***
Average salary 3655.38 2148.62 -709.848** 1213.911***
Highest salary 4085.20 2379.15 -495.494 1585.237***
Lowest salary 3205.70 2158.85 -1128.178*** 738.612***
Award received 0.020 0.058 -0.009 0.003
Years connected 2.317 4.368 -0.817 5.822***
Notes: Descriptive governor characteristics: mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and
mean comparison between switchers and always connected governors (Column 3) and never
connected governors (Column 4). Peerage is a dummy that is 1 if the governor is a Duke,
Marquess, Earl, Viscount or Baron. Civil servant/military/politician are dummies that are 1 if
the governor served as a civil servant/in the military/as a politician before assuming the first
governorship. Eton/Oxford/Cambridge are dummies that are 1 if the governor was educated
in the named institutions. Age at entry (retirement) is the age of the governor at time of first
(last) governorship. Years served is the total number of years served as governor. Colonies
served is the number of colonies served as governor. Average (highest/lowest) salary is the
mean (highest/lowest) salary earned throughout the governor career. Award received is the
share of governors who received the highest distinction of GCMG/GCB. Years connected is
the total number of years connected to the Secretary of State. Number in parentheses denotes
the minimum number of observations across all variables.
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Table A.8: Promotions, connectedness and revenue performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Promoted Retire Transfer
Mean of dep. var 0.0623 0.0623 0.0623 0.129 0.0702
Connected 0.023** 0.024** 0.024** -0.028** 0.029***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Average growth 0.028 0.028 0.359*** 0.000
(0.060) (0.065) (0.103) (0.069)
Average growth × Connected -0.001 0.026 0.065
(0.147) (0.204) (0.158)
Colony FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spell length dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,510 3,311 3,311 3,311 3,311
Notes: Replicating Jia et al. (2015). Unit of observation is the governor-year. Sample period
1854-1966. Dependent variable is the (log) salary in GBP paid to a governorship in a given
year. No. of colonies served is the number of colonies the governor has served in up to the
given year. Connected is a dummy that is 1 if the governor is connected to the Secretary of
State. Revenue growth is the growth in revenue in the colony of the serving governor up to the
given year. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the bilateral governor-secretary
of state level. Revenue growth is defined as the (log) change in revenue between last year and
the first year of appointment. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the dyadic
governor-secretary of state level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.9: Descriptive statistics: Modern outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Percentile
N Mean SD 25% 50% 75%
Connected years 1854-1930 48 12.979 12.767 1 9.5 19.5
Exp. # connected appointments 1854-1930 48 2.261 1.535 0.633 2.95 3.516
Connected years 1931-1966 49 2.959 4.082 0 0 5
Exp. # connected appointments 1931-1966 49 0.163 0.354 0 0 0.333
Tariff rate (weighted) in % (WITS) 48 7.060 5.795 1.9 7.205 10.38
Number of tariff lines in 1,000 (WITS) 44 73.716 73.323 24.362 41.226 107.812
Avg import-export reporting gap (WITS) 45 12.025 1.657 10.817 11.511 13.889
(log) Clearing customs 2015 (DB) 48 3.467 1.391 2.944 3.705 4.479
(log) Paying taxes 2015 (DB) 48 5.055 0.479 4.700 4.985 5.322
Trade as share of GDP 2010 (WB) 48 89.806 63.187 55.108 74.847 103.458
Tax/GDP 2010 (subnational) 48 19.760 8.604 13.635 18.725 24.148
Tax/GDP 2010 (country-level, ICTD) 49 20.331 7.306 13.531 22.572 26.195
Non-tax revenue/GDP 2010 (ICTD) 49 5.707 4.838 1.950 5.092 7.401
Direct tax revenue/GDP 2010 (ICTD) 49 9.755 5.940 5.454 7.819 15.581
Indirect tax revenue/GDP 2010 (ICTD) 49 10.499 4.777 7.576 9.231 13.109
Goods and sales tax revenue/GDP 2010 (ICTD) 48 7.348 2.958 5.150 7.187 9.009
Trade tax revenue/GDP 2010 (ICTD) 48 3.231 3.899 0.430 1.825 5.457
Notes: Unit of observation is the region/state. Descriptive statistics for the cross-section of
modern-day outcomes for the sample of independent states. Connected years is the number
of years under a connected governor in the colonial period 1854-1930. Expected # connected
appointments is the number predicted using the share of available governors. Tariff rate is
the weighted average tariff rate. Number of tariff lines is the total number of tariff lines in
1,000. Average import-export reporting gap proxies for the extent of customs misreporting,
calculated as: log(ΣNi N
−1|Xis − Zis|). WITS = World Integrated Trade Solutions database.
Clearing customs is the days needed to clear customs, defined as the average days to comply
with border regulation for both import and exports. Paying taxes (hours) is the hours needed
to comply with tax regulation. Trade as share of GDP is the total imports and exports divided
by GDP in 2010. DB = Doing Business Indicators. Subnational Tax/GDP (Rev/GDP) in 2010
is the tax (public revenue) over GDP ratio in 2010. The remaining tax sources come from the
ICTD = International Center for Tax and Development: country-level tax revenue over GDP,
the share of non-tax (including natural resources) revenue over GDP, the share of direct tax,
the share of indirect taxes and its breakdown by goods and services tax and trade taxes.
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Table A.10: Long-run impact of connectedness (First-stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total connected years
1854-1930 1931-1966
Mean of dep. var 12.98 12.98 2.875 2.875
Expected # connected 2.720*** 2.739*** -0.031
appointments 1854-1930 (0.539) (0.534) (0.272)
Expected # connected -0.857 3.734*** 3.743***
appointments 1931-1966 (3.977) (1.340) (1.342)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 48 48 48 48
Notes: Unit of observation is the region/state. The dependent variable is the total number of
years under connected governors between 1854-1930 (and after abolition of patronage 1931-
1966). Expected # connected appointments is the expected number of connected appointments
between 1854-1930 (1931-1966). Years of British colonization is the years under British rule.
Area tropics is the share of land area that lies in the tropics. Initial governor salary is the
(log) amount of the first governor salary fixed for the governorship. Continent fixed effects
include dummy for Africa, Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia and Oceania. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.11: Connected governors and fiscal capacity in 2010 - Reduced form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of tax revenue (% of GDP) - Subnational 2010
Mean of dep. var 19.76 19.76 19.76 19.76 19.76 19.76
Connected years -0.196 -0.201
1854-1930 (0.173) (0.170)
Connected years -0.177 -0.202
1930-1966 (0.322) (0.340)
Exp. connected years -1.963** -1.973**
1854-1930 (0.805) (0.824)
Exp. connected years -0.192 0.435
1930-1966 (2.457) (2.158)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 48 48 48 48 48 48
Notes: Unit of observation is the post-independence country or sub-national province
corresponding to the historical colony. Connected years is the number of connected years
the country/province was administered by connected governors between 1854-1930 (under
patronage) and 1930-1966 (post-patronage). The dependent variables is the regional tax/GDP
ratio in 2010 (Columns 1 to 4) as well as for a balanced sample for 1990, 2000 and 2010
(Columns 5 to 7). The expected number of connected appointments calculated based on the
cumulative share of available governors the year before the appointment, calculated separately
for 1854-1930/1931-1966. All specifications include continent fixed efects for Africa, Europe,
North America, Latin America, Asia and Oceania as well the years of British colonization, the
initial governor salary of the historical colony and the share of the region/state within the
tropics as controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.12: GDP per capita and measures of institutional quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
State capacity measures 2010
log GDP Days enforce Quality Days reg. Quality
pc 2010 contract judicial property land admin
Mean of dep. var 2.227 2.227 6.311 2.534 9.110
Connected years 0.022 0.013 0.013 -0.009 0.001
1854-1930 (0.037) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
Connected years -0.059 -0.023 -0.023 0.018 0.015
1931-1966 (0.101) (0.027) (0.027) (0.041) (0.058)
Estimation IV IV IV IV IV
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat 4.426 4.426 4.426 4.426 4.462
Data source PWT8.1 Doing Business
Observations 44 48 48 48 48
Notes: Unit of observation is the post-independence country or sub-national province
corresponding to the historical colony. Dependent variables are (log) GDP per capita
(PWT8.1, rgdpna series) and Doing Business Indicators (Columns 2-5) for the (log)
days needed to enforce contract, an index for the quality of judicial institutions, the
days to register property and an index for the quality of the land administration.
Connected years is the number of connected years in the colonial sample period 1854-
1930. Controls include the years of British colonization, the initial governor salary of
the historical colony and the share of the region/state within the tropics. Continent
FEs include dummy for Africa, Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia and
Oceania. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
199
Table A.13: Robustness: Governor salary and connectedness, dropping
connection types
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log Governor salary in GBP
Mean of dep. var 7.929 7.929 7.929 7.929 7.929
No. colonies served 0.223*** 0.225*** 0.224*** 0.222*** 0.222***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Connected 0.097***
(0.036)
Connected excl. Ancestry 0.122***
(0.040)
Connected excl. Aristocrats 0.114***
(0.036)
Connected excl. Eton 0.076*
(0.040)
Connected excl. Oxbridge 0.098**
(0.048)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Governor FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spell length FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,510 3,510 3,510 3,510 3,510
Notes: Unit of observation is the governor-year. Sample period 1854-1966. Dependent variable
is the (log) salary in GBP paid to a governorship in a given year. No. of colonies served
is the number of colonies the governor has served in up to the given year. Connected is a
dummy that is 1 if the governor and Secretary of State share either common ancestry, are both
aristocrats, both went to Eton or studied at Oxford or Cambridge. The remaining explanatory
variables drop one type of connections from the combined measure in turn. Spell length FEs
are dummies for each year of the term. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the
dyadic governor-secretary of state level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.14: Robustness: Salary, connectedness to PM and heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log Governor salary in GBP
Mean of dep. var 7.929 7.929 7.929 7.929
Connected 0.097*** 0.098*** 0.101*** 0.090**
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.040)
Connected to PM 0.076
(0.133)
Connected × Election -0.018
(0.021)
Connected × Tory party 0.013
(0.040)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Governor FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spell length FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,510 3,510 3,510 3,510
Notes: Unit of observation is the governor-year. Sample period 1854-1966. Dependent variable
is the (log) salary in GBP paid to a governorship in a given year. Connected is a dummy that
is 1 if the governor and Secretary of State share either common ancestry, are both aristocrats,
both went to Eton or studied at Oxford or Cambridge. Connected to PM is the same measure
for the governor and the Prime Minister in office. Election is a dummy that is 1 if there was a
general election in the given year. Tory is a dummy that is 1 if the government in power is the
Tory/Conservative party. The remaining explanatory variables drop one type of connections
from the combined measure in turn. Spell length FEs are dummies for each year of the term.
Controls are the no. of colonies served is the number of colonies the governor has served in
up to the given year. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the dyadic governor-
secretary of state level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.15: Robustness: Fiscal performance - Growth rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Revenue growth Expenditure growth
Mean of dep. var 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045
Connected -0.037** -0.042** -0.006 0.013
(0.017) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024)
Reform dummy 0.023 -0.080**
× Connected (0.032) (0.038)
Connected + Connected × - -0.019 - -0.066
Reform dummy (0.024) (0.030)
Governor-Colony FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spell length FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,412 3,412 3,407 3,407
Notes: Unit of observation is the governor-year. Sample period 1854-1966. Dependent
variable is the annual revenue growth (Columns 1-2) and expenditure growth (Columns 3-4).
Connected is a dummy that is 1 if the governor is connected to the Secretary of State. Reform
dummy is a dummy that is 1 after 1930. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
the dyadic governor-secretary of state level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.16: Robustness: Revenue performance - Subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log Revenue in GBP
Drop moved Drop Appointed Appointed
immediately first&last year connected unconnected
Mean of dep. var 12.31 12.29 13.26 13.00
No. colonies served 0.068 0.322*** 0.247** 0.137
(0.063) (0.052) (0.099) (0.089)
Connected -0.053*** -0.073*** -0.058* -0.064**
(0.020) (0.024) (0.031) (0.031)
Governor-Colony FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spell length FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,465 2,002 987 985
Notes: Unit of observation is the governor-year. Sample period 1854-1966. Dependent variable
is the (log) total revenue. Connected is a dummy that is 1 if the governor is connected to the
Secretary of State. Column 1 drops the switchers who move immediately after experiencing
a shock to connections. Column 2 drops the first and last year of the appointment in the
switcher sample. Column 3 is the sample of those who are appointed connected. Column 4 is
the sample of those who are appointed unconnected. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at the dyadic governor-secretary of state level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.17: Robustness: Revenue performance - Bounding selective exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log Revenue in GBP log Exp
Main Trend Trend+2% Trend+4% Trend+4%
Connected -0.040** -0.033* -0.038* -0.043** -0.033*
(0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
No. colonies served 0.068 0.066 0.065 0.064 0.082
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.059)
Governor-Colony FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spell length FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,510 3,622 3,622 3,622 3,622
Notes: Unit of observation is the governor-year. Sample period 1854-1966. Dependent variable
is the (log) total revenue in Columns 1-4. Connected is a dummy that is 1 if the governor
is connected to the Secretary of State. Column 2 assumes that revenue growth follows the
pre-trend after the governor has exited. Column 3 and 4 assume growth increases by 2% and
4% points above the trend. Column 5 uses (log) total expenditure as the dependent variable.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the dyadic governor-secretary of state level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.18: Robustness: Alternative clustering of standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log Salary log Revenue log Expenditure
Mean of dep. var 7.929 7.929 12.31 12.31 12.33 12.33
Connected 0.097*** 0.127*** -0.040** -0.055*** -0.029 -0.042*
Standard errors
Governor-Secretary of State (dyadic) (0.036) (0.043) (0.017) (0.021) (0.019) (0.023)
Governor & Secretary of State (2 way) (0.039) (0.044) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.026)
Dyadic & Year (2 way) (0.036) (0.044) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023)
Connected × Reform dummy -0.123** 0.061* 0.053
Standard errors
Governor-Secretary of State (dyadic) (0.043) (0.021) (0.023)
Governor & Secretary of State (2 way) (0.057) (0.039) (0.032)
Dyadic & Year (2 way) (0.056) (0.038) (0.041)
Governor FEs Yes Yes No No No No
Governor-Colony FEs No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spell length FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,510 3,510 3,510 3,510 3,510 3,510
Notes: Unit of observation is the governor-year. Sample period 1854-1966. Dependent variable
is the (log) total salary in GBP for the governorship (Columns 1-2), the (log) total revenue
(Columns 3-4) and the (log) total expenditure (Columns 5-6). Connected is a dummy that is 1
if the governor and Secretary of State share either common ancestry, are both aristocrats, both
went to Eton or studied at Oxford or Cambridge. The asterisks report the preferred (dyadic
governor-secretary clustered) standard errors * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Alternative
clustering specifications are reported in parentheses. These include two-way clustering on the
governor and secretary level, as well as two-way clustering on the dyadic and year level.
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Table A.19: Robustness: Placebo first-stage with leads and lags
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Connected appointment
Mean of dep. var 0.305 0.302 0.305 0.299
Prob. connected -0.072 -0.081
appointment t− 3 (0.066) (0.080)
Prob. connected 0.041 0.014
appointment t− 2 (0.108) (0.103)
Prob. connected 0.197** 0.225*** 0.160* 0.196**
appointment t− 1 (0.076) (0.084) (0.086) (0.091)
Prob. connected 0.072 0.057
appointment t (0.084) (0.083)
Prob. connected 0.060 0.037
appointment t + 1 (0.109) (0.115)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Colony FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spell length FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prev. spell FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 591 506 509 462
Notes: Unit of observation is the appointment. Sample period 1854-1966. Dependent variable
is a dummy that is 1 if the governor was appointed connected. The independent variable is
the share of connected governors who are available for reshuffle (i.e. have served beyond their
5th term) with different leads and lags. Controls include (log) salary of the governor and the
spell length. Previous spell FEs are dummies for the previous appointment’s length. Robust
standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the dyadic governor-secretary of state level. *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.20: Robustness: Strategic non-compliance with six year term limit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Duration of previous appointment
Less than 6 years 6 years More than 6 years
Mean of dep. var 0.596 0.596 0.320 0.320 0.085 0.085
log Salary in GBP -0.078 -0.040 0.001 -0.036 0.076 0.076
(0.074) (0.088) (0.076) (0.087) (0.052) (0.054)
Prob. connected appointment -0.047 1.042 0.105 -0.965 -0.058 -0.076
(0.142) (0.944) (0.141) (1.044) (0.041) (0.274)
log Salary in GBP × -0.135 0.133 0.002
Prob. connected appointment (0.118) (0.130) (0.035)
Colony FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spell length FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 591 591 591 591 591 591
Notes: Unit of observation is the appointment. Sample period 1854-1966. Dependent variables
are dummies for whether the previous appointment was terminated early (Columns 1-2), on
time (Columns 3-4) and late (Columns 5-6). Prob. of connected appointment is the share
of governors that are connected and beyond the six year term limit (and hence available
for reshuffle) the year prior to the appointment. Controls comprises the (log) salary for the
governorship and the spell length. Robust standard errors are clustered at the year and state
level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.21: Robustness: Tax/GDP and historical connectedness - controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Modern tax/GDP ratio
Mean of dep. var 19.76 19.76 19.42 20.07 20.07
Connected years -0.722*** -0.880** -0.940** -0.434* -0.439
(0.263) (0.347) (0.440) (0.225) (0.482)
Years of British colonization 0.081** 0.088** 0.108* 0.054* 0.045
(0.035) (0.039) (0.059) (0.032) (0.047)
Area tropics -0.225*** -0.250*** -0.271** -0.258*** -0.248**
(0.066) (0.070) (0.117) (0.071) (0.097)
log Initial governor salary 1.791 2.809 2.448 -0.216 0.392
(2.170) (2.765) (2.664) (2.172) (2.982)
Landlocked -5.787 -4.799
(5.634) (5.732)
Ethnic fractionalization 7.327 -5.256
(12.490) (7.913)
log Genetic distance -0.854 -0.141
(1.927) (2.270)
Estimation IV IV IV IV IV
Continent FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat 25.50 19.30 13.54 11.17 6.320
Observations 48 48 46 34 34
Notes: Unit of observation is the region/state. The dependent variable is the regional tax/GDP
ratio in 2010. Connected years is the number of years with a connected governor between 1854-
1930. Years of British colonization is the years under British rule. Area tropics is the share of
land area that lies in the tropics. Initial governor salary is the (log) amount of the first governor
salary fixed for the governorship. Ethnic fractionalization measures are from Alesina (2003).
Genetic distance to UK is from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009). Continent fixed effects include
dummy for Africa, Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia and Oceania. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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A.1 Model extensions
A.1.1 Colony-specific return to effort
In the basic model, the return to effort did not depend on the assigned colony.
Similar to the span-of-control argument, however, effort could also have a
greater impact in the large colony. I therefore extend the revenue generation
function to allow effort and colony size to be complements, ycs = κθcms +msecs.
The corresponding effort now varies by colony size, ecs = θcβVy(c)ms. This is
because the continuation value depends on revenue, and the same amount of
effort now generates a higher revenue return in the larger colony.
The allocation problem remains as before: the Secretary of State chooses
the allocation to maximize utility. The only difference is that effort does not
cancel out as its return depends on whether it is exerted in the large or small
colony.
The resulting condition now extends to following: the Secretary of State will
allocate the connected governor to the large colony if the extent of patronage
is high,
σ1
g
≥ − (m1 −m0)
(w1 − w0)
(
(θ1 − θ0)κ + β
(
Vy(1)−Vy(0)
)
(m1 + m0)
)
(A.1)
In the absence of patronage and ability differences, the connected governor is
only promoted if he exerts higher effort (Vy(1) > Vy(0)).
A.2 Data appendix
A.2.1 Historical fiscal data
The main source of historical colonial revenue and expenditure data are
the Colonial Blue Books, a set of standardized yearly reports providing
detailed information about public revenue and spending, trade and socio-
economic indicators for over 80 colonies covering the period 1821-1949 (Banton,
2008). This unique data source has remained largely untapped among
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economists (with the notable exception of Dippel et al. (2015)) but enables
the construction of long series of comparable measures on a wide range of
variables (such as sources of revenue income, spending patterns, salaries,
education, newspapers). The original set of Blue Books is stored at the
National Archives, with incomplete subsets stored at the University Library
in Cambridge and the University of London Commonwealth Library.
I digitized data on revenue and expenditures from the full set of 3,905 Blue
Books. The main part of interest was the Section “Comparative Statement of
Revenue and Expenditure” (Appendix Figure A.1). This section provides a
breakdown of both revenue and expenditures for two years: the current year
of the Blue Book, and the previous year. Since I collected data from all Blue
Books, this provided an additional redundancy to validate the quality of the
fiscal data across all the years. All monetary values are typically listed in
pounds. When needed, the local currency (e.g. Hong Kong Dollar, Sri Lankan
rupees) was converted at the historical exchange rate provided by the Blue
Book.
The breakdown broadly follows two patterns: it lists the ordinary expendi-
tures for the colonial bureaucracy (civil establishment) and the extra-ordinary
expenditures accruing to the various departments. Ordinary expenditures
comprise salaries, allowances and pensions paid to colonial civil servants
and are grouped by function (e.g. revenue collection, education, police and
gaols). These closely resemble the Ministries in later periods. Extra-ordinary
expenditures typically encompass unexpected expenditures (e.g. following
natural disasters) or investments in public works. As the Blue Books were
not compiled across the entire period of the colonies (with most discontinued
shortly after WWII), I extend these series using reported aggregates provided
by the Colonial Lists. This allows me to extend the series up to 1966. The
disadvantage, however, is that the Colonial Lists only provide aggregates
without the fine breakdowns from the Blue Books.
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Harmonizing revenue and spending breakdown
I also digitize and construct breakdowns of the aggregate revenue and
expenditure. The main challenge here lies in the changing definitions of the
subitems. For example, one Blue Book may list a detailed breakdown of each
department’s disbursed salaries, while the subsequent year may only report
the total. Similarly, police expenditures may have been grouped with the
spendings for prisons in one year but then reported separately in the other.
To construct consistent series, I digitized the section “Net Abstract of
Revenue and Expenditures” from all Blue Books. This is the section that
precedes the “Comparative statement”. Unlike the “comparative statements”,
this section only provides the breakdown of the current reporting year. The
advantage, however, lies in its finer granularity: positions that may have been
grouped in the “Comparative statement” are separately reported in the “Net
Abstract”.
In the second, step I harmonized the series, focusing on several broad
groups: On the revenue side, I distinguish between external and internal
revenue. External revenue comprise customs revenue and duties collected at
the entry points (typically ports). Internal revenue comprise revenue raised
within the colonies, such as income tax, hut taxes, poll taxes, land revenue,
fees and duties. On the expenditure side, I focus on two broad groups of
spending. First, I focus on expenditures in revenue collection. This comprises
expenditures made for the collection of customs, but also the raising of direct
taxes. I use this as a direct measure for investments in fiscal capacity. Second, I
harmonize expenditure series on public works and infrastructure investments.
This position includes public works, expenditures for roads, bridges, repairs
for public buildings, as well as spendings on civil engineers.
Despite all my efforts in providing harmonized breakdowns, data con-
straints and changing definitions still reduce the final sample size of these
breakdowns. In the paper, however, I provide evidence that the main results
are robust for the subsample. This alleviates concerns of sample selectivity.
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A.2.2 Identifying social connections
The main source of genealogical data is drawn from the database The Peerage
(thePeerage.com), obtained on the 20th June 2015. The data provides a
genealogical survey of the peerage of Britain as well as the royal families of
Europe, including the family trees of the British elite.
The dataset covers 664,265 individuals over more than 500 years including
their family relationships. The data contains the full names and date of birth,
as well as the details of the spouse, parents and children. I convert the
family trees into 1,271,854 undirected links. To avoid concerns of endogenous
network formation, I drop marriage links and focus only on blood-relatedness.
Dropping marriages reduces the number of undirected links to 1,008,986.
In the second step, I match each of the 456 governors and 39 Secretary of
States for the Colonies to the unique identifiers provided in the Peerage dataset.
A match is defined as an identical name and birthday. Ambiguous matches,
for example due to changing aristocrat titles, are resolved by consulting the
UK Who is Who or the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Only two
Colonial Secretaries cannot be matched (George Hall, Arthur Jones). Both
are politicians of the Labour party not from elite backgrounds. 34% of the
governors are reliably matched in the Peerage data. I assume that the missing
individuals are not connected. This is not a restrictive assumption as the family
trees of the Colonial Secretaries are fully mapped out. A governor not included
in the family tree, then, is unconnected.
For governors and Colonial Secretaries matched to the Peerage data, I
compute the shortest distance using Djikstra’s algorithm (Dijkstra, 1959),
implemented using Matlab’s graphshortestpath package. Two individuals are
connected if the degree of separation is less than 16. Finally, to verify
the data quality, I drew a random sample of 5 connected governors and
manually traced the connection from the governor to the superior Colonial
Secretary. In addition, I validated the genealogical data with data provided by
Ancestry.com.
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A.2.3 Computing additional performance measures
Sentiment analysis of parliamentary debates
I extracted the full set of parliamentary debates from the Hansard to compute
the number of times a colony has been mentioned in the parliamentary debates
and the associated sentiment of the mention. This allows me to compute
a dummy that is 1 if the colony has been mentioned in a given year. To
measure the sentiment, I then use the R’s qdap polarity tool to compute
sentiments associated with the mentions. Intuitively, the procedure assigns
a positive/negative sentiment to each word and then weights these words
depending on the context. For example, a negative word like “punishment” is
amplified if it is preceded by a magnifying adjective, like “severe”. Similarly,
the sign is reversed if the word is preceded by a negator, like “not”. See
http://trinker.github.io/qdap for a detailed description of the procedure. I
then compute the average sentiment based on all speeches in a given year that
mentioned a given colony.
Social unrest based on newspaper reports
To measure social unrest, I collected data from historical newspapers to
generate a dummy that proxies social unrest. The data is drawn from
all London-based newspapers found in the The British Newspaper Archive in
December 2015. For each year between 1854-1966, I count the frequency in
which a colony is mentioned in conjunction with following keywords: (i) riot
(ii) arrest (iii) killed (iv) murder. For example, the number of times Jamaica
was mentioned together with the keyword “killed” spiked at 1008 in 1866,
right after the Morant Bay rebellion. To alleviate concerns over measurement
errors (e.g. that colony and keywords are mentioned in distinct articles that are
mistakenly misclassified), I standardize the frequency of mentions within the
colony for each keyword and compute an average for each colony-year based
on all four keywords. In then focus on “extreme cases” by defining social
unrest to take a value of 1 if the average standardized unrest index exceeds the
95th decile.
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Appendix B
Appendices to Chapter 2: The Costs
of Bureaucratic Rigidity: Evidence
from the Indian Administrative
Service
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Table B.1: IAS Promotion Guidelines - Seniority based progression
Scale Level Years Description Grade
1. Junior time scale 0 Entry level Jr. Time Scale
2. Senior time scale 4 Committee of Chief
Secretary and two
supertime scale offi-
cers to evaluate and
decide suitability of
promotion - subject
to vacancies
Sr. Time Scale
3. Jr. Admin. Grade 9 Non-functional,
admissable without
any screening except
when disciplinary
proceedings are
pending against the
officer
Under Secy, Dy Secy
Level/JAG, Dy Secy
Equiv, Dy Secy, Un-
der Secy Equiv, Un-
der Secy Level
4. Selection Grade 13 Committee of Chief
Secretary and two su-
pertime scale officers
(or above) to screen -
subject to vacancies
Dir Level/SLJAG, Di-
rectory Equiv, Direc-
tor
5. Supertime scale 16 Committee of Chief
Secretary and two
principal secretaries
(if unavailable,
seniormost
supertime scale
officer) to screen -
subject to vacancies
JS Level/Level-I,
Joint Secy, Joint Secy
(Ex-Off), Joint Secy
Equiv, Addl Secy
Level, Addl Secy,
Addl Secy (Ex-Off)
6. Principal secretary 25 Committee of Chief
Secretary and one se-
nior most officer on
the Chief Secretary
level to screen. Sub-
ject to vacancies.
Secretary, Secy (Ex-
Off), Secy Equiv
7. Chief Secretary 30 Committee of Chief
Secretary, one offi-
cer in same grade
within state, one offi-
cer serving at Centre
Above Secy Level,
Cab Secy
Notes: IAS Promotion Guidelines (2000): No. 20011/4/92/AIS-II.
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Table B.2: 360 degree measures of effectiveness, by stakeholder group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Subjective ratings
Effective Probity Pressure Pro-Poor Overall
IAS Mean 3.921 3.918 3.835 3.882 3.879
SD 0.990 1.072 0.985 0.992 0.996
N 4,932 4,217 4,767 4,752 4,955
State Civil Service Mean 3.943 3.810 3.532 3.802 3.839
SD 0.988 1.116 1.108 1.089 1.061
N 2,571 2,041 2,422 2,468 2,611
Large firms Mean 3.748 3.704 3.553 3.530 3.724
SD 1.057 0.983 1.040 0.977 0.982
N 2,708 2,402 2,541 2,575 2,661
MLAs Mean 3.642 3.518 3.258 3.302 3.512
SD 1.138 1.185 1.183 1.313 1.036
N 2,595 2,164 2,367 2,473 2,580
NGOs Mean 3.535 3.528 3.307 3.283 3.455
SD 1.125 1.141 1.172 1.162 1.076
N 1,927 1,694 1,816 1,856 1,930
Media (Print & TV) Mean 3.421 3.350 3.322 3.060 3.258
SD 1.116 1.047 1.039 1.124 1.075
N 3,020 2,635 2,815 2,923 2,961
Pooled Mean 3.730 3.670 3.523 3.527 3.646
SD 1.077 1.105 1.094 1.141 1.057
N 17,753 15,153 16,728 17,047 17,698
Notes: Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation (SD) and sample size) of 360 degree
measures of effectiveness, broken down by the assessing stakeholder group. The abbreviation
MLAs stands for members of the legislative assembly. NGOs stands for non-governmental
organization.
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Table B.3: 360 degree measures of effectiveness, by source of information
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Subjective ratings
Effective Probity Pressure Pro-Poor Overall
Personal interaction Mean 3.928 3.772 3.665 3.671 3.786
SD 0.979 1.069 1.056 1.118 1.038
N 9,751 8,325 9,407 9,492 9,724
Friends & Networks Mean 3.179 3.546 3.328 3.306 3.461
SD 1.239 1.152 1.108 1.107 1.062
N 3,149 2,673 2,770 2,884 3,143
Media Mean 3.689 3.545 3.347 3.371 3.486
SD 1.022 1.124 1.119 1.165 1.052
N 4,853 4,155 4,551 4,671 4,831
Pooled Mean 3.730 3.670 3.523 3.527 3.646
SD 1.077 1.105 1.094 1.141 1.057
N 17,753 15,153 16,728 17,047 17,698
Notes: Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation (SD) and sample size) of 360 degree
measures of effectiveness, broken down by source of information. Personal interaction are
assessments provided by respondents who know the rated officer personally. Friends &
networks are those known through friends or social (work) networks, and media are those
known through television, radio or newspaper.
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Table B.4: 360 measures and age at entry - Full controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Effective Probity Pressure Pro-poor Overall
Mean of dep. var 3.730 3.671 3.524 3.528 3.647
Age at entry -0.009** -0.009** -0.015*** -0.007* -0.010**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Entry score 0.041*** 0.021 0.023** 0.021* 0.041***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
Training score 0.020** 0.011 0.017** 0.004 0.016*
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Improved 0.092*** 0.058** 0.032 0.045** 0.044**
(0.019) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Female 0.012 -0.022 -0.041* 0.042* -0.001
(0.020) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
Caste: OBC -0.027 -0.117*** -0.074** -0.033 -0.031
(0.031) (0.045) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Caste: SC 0.038 0.001 0.058** 0.020 0.058**
(0.024) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Caste: ST -0.102*** -0.142*** -0.065 -0.085** -0.067
(0.039) (0.047) (0.041) (0.039) (0.042)
Urban background -0.011 0.007 0.023 -0.002 -0.013
(0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Academic distinction 0.001 0.009 0.007 0.000 0.006
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
STEM or Economics 0.013 -0.024 -0.002 -0.007 0.000
(0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Previous: Education/Research 0.042** 0.013 0.052** 0.036* 0.015
(0.018) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Previous: Finance/Banking 0.023 -0.003 0.030 0.048 0.026
(0.029) (0.038) (0.031) (0.031) (0.034)
Previous: Private/SOE 0.054*** 0.020 0.062*** 0.033 0.039*
(0.020) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
Previous: Public 0.020 -0.004 0.031* 0.003 -0.007
(0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Previous: AIS -0.046 -0.011 0.038 -0.071* -0.070
(0.039) (0.051) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043)
State-specific respondent FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source of information FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interviewer FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,750 15,138 16,719 17,043 17,695
Notes: Unit of observation is the score for a given IAS officer in 2012-13 with at least 8
years of tenure. Relating the five performance measures to age at entry, cohort size and
their interaction, where cohort size is the size of the state cohort in which the officer was
allocated to, centered around the sample mean. State-specific respondent FEs are fixed effects
for each respondent. Tenure year FEs are dummies for each year since entering the IAS. Source
of information FEs are dummies for whether the respondent knows the officer personally,
through friends or only through media. Standard errors clustered at the respondent level. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table B.5: Test for (quasi-)random allocation across states
(1)
H0: Random allocation across states p-value
Age at entry 0.143
Female 0.903
Other backward caste (OBC) 0.413
Scheduled caste (SC) 0.173
Scheduled tribe (ST) 0.191
Urban background 0.495
Academic distinction 0.226
STEM and Economics degree 0.506
Previous job: Education/research 0.305
Previous job: Finance/banking 0.256
Previous job: Private/SOE 0.454
Previous job: Public sector 0.103
Previous job: Public AIS 0.660
Ranking in year of intake 0.515
UPSC score 0.215
Training score 0.309
Improved 0.669
Cohort size (centered around state mean) 0.620
Age at entry × Cohort size (centered around state mean) 0.636
Notes: Test for random allocation across states for each year of intake between 1972-2009. The
test is implemented by regressing the individual characteristics of the IAS officers on a set of
state fixed effects and cadre fixed effects, and then testing the equality of the estimated state
fixed effects. The total number of individuals in the sample is N = 1, 578. Robust standard
errors. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table B.6: 360 measures and suspensions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
360 ratings - 2012/13
Effective Probity Pressure Pro-Poor Overall
On suspension -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.008***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10)
Interviewer FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific respondent FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source of information FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,750 15,138 16,719 17,043 17,695
Notes: Unit of observation is the score for a given IAS officer in 2012-13 with at least 8 years
of tenure. On suspension is a dummy that is 1 if the IAS officer is suspended in 2012-13.
Interviewer FEs are dummies for each interviewer. State-specific respondent FEs are fixed
effects for each respondent. Tenure year FEs are dummies for each year since entering the
IAS. Source of information FEs are dummies for whether the respondent knows the officer
personally, through friends or only through media. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at the respondent level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Figure B.1: Statutory age at entry window of the IAS over time
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Notes: Statutory age at entry window for general candidates of the IAS over time. Solid line
marks beginning of the sample period for the state-level panel.
221
Figure B.2: Determination of vacancies: Example 2006
Notes: Illustrating the assignment of categories (caste and home preference) to vacancies
through the roster randomization for the year 2006. Vacancies are earmarked by caste status
(O.B.C. denotes other backward castes, S.C./S.T. scheduled castes/tribes and unreserved the
general castes) and home state (“I” denotes insider vacancies reserved for applicants from the
same state; “O” denotes outsider vacancies reserved for applicants from other states). The
assignment occurs through a number line.
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Figure B.3: Assignment of categories (caste and home preference) to vacancies
through roster randomization
Notes: The final distribution of vacancies by state and caste/home quota for the year 2006.
Vacancies are earmarked by caste status (O.B.C. denotes other backward castes, S.C./S.T.
scheduled castes/tribes and unreserved the general castes) and home state (insider vacancies
are reserved for applicants from the same state; outsider vacancies are reserved for applicants
from other states).
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Figure B.4: Merit-based (UPSC rank) allocation based on caste and home
preference match
Notes: Illustrating the ranking of candidates using the intake year of 2006. Candidates in a
given year of intake are ranked in descending order based on the UPSC entry exam score.
Home state denotes the state from which the candidate applied from. Category denotes the
caste of the candidate, where O.B.C. denotes other backward castes, S.C. scheduled castes, S.T.
scheduled tribes and General the unreserved castes. Whether home state opted denotes if the
applicant indicated a preference to be allocated to the home state.
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Figure B.5: Rotation of state groups over years
Notes: Division of state cadres into four groups and the rotation of groups in the order of IAS
officer allocation over time, as illustrated by the group order in 2006. The groups of states
rotate each year. In 2007, for example, the order changes to Group II, Group III, Group IV,
Group I.
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Figure B.6: Quasi-random allocation across states: UPSC (entry) score
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Notes: Average UPSC score of IAS officers (standardized relative to their year of intake)
allocated to states 1972-2009. The trend line is fitted as a non-parametric local polynomial.
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Figure B.7: Quasi-random allocation across states: Age at entry
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Graphs by State
Notes: Average age at entry of IAS officers (standardized relative to their year of intake)
allocated to states 1972-2009. The trend line is fitted as a non-parametric local polynomial.
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Figure B.8: Quasi-random allocation across states: Cohort size
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Graphs by State
Notes: Average number of officers, i.e. the cohort size (standardized relative to the state
average) allocated to states 1972-2009. The trend line is fitted as a non-parametric local
polynomial.
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B.1 Allocation rule
Key to our empirical analysis is the rigid rule that determines the allocation
of IAS officers and the cohort sizes of each state’s intake. Here, we briefly
summarize the allocation rule. A detailed documentation can be found in the
IAS guidelines.1 Coinciding with our sample period, we focus on the pre-2008
allocation rule, paying particular attention to the sources of variation that give
rise to the observed quasi-random allocation of IAS officers across cadres.
After entering the IAS following the UPSC exams, centrally recruited
IAS officers are allocated to 24 cadres. These cadres typically map directly
into the Indian states. Smaller states, however, are grouped into three
joint cadres, which are Assam-Meghalaya, Manipur-Tripura and AGMUT
(Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Mizoram and Union Territories (Delhi). We did
not survey states with pooled cadres due to logistical constraints. The cadres
we study therefore map directly onto the 14 major states which contain the
majority of India’s population.
The allocation process can be broadly divided into three steps: In the first
step, IAS applicants are asked to declare their preference to remain in their
home state (referred to as “insider” preference). In the second step, the overall
number of vacancies and the corresponding quotas for castes and “insiders”
are determined. In the final step, vacancies and officers are matched in the
actual allocation process where merit (as defined by the ranking in the UPSC
entry exam), caste status and locational preferences are all taken into account.
The interplay of idiosyncrasies in each of these steps gives rise to the observed
quasi-random allocation of IAS officers across cadres.
Step 1. IAS officers can declare their cadre preferences by first stating their
preference to remain in their state of residence. Nearly all IAS officers exercise
this option. The declared preferences however do not guarantee the actual
allocation: only 7.5% of all IAS officers are allocated to their home state. The
actual allocation depends on the availability of vacancies.
1For full details, refer to the original official notifications 13013/2/2010-AIS-I,
29062/1/2011-AIS-I and 13011/22/2005-AIS-I published by the Department of Personnel and
Training, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Government of India.
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Step 2. The total number of vacancies is determined by the state
government with the Department of Personnel and Training. Typically, the
overall number of vacancies in a given year depend on the shortfall from the
total number of IAS officers designated to a state (the cadre strength). This
cadre strength is defined by the “cadre strength fixation rules”, whereby larger
states are assigned more IAS officers. These rules are seldom revised so the
designated state cadre strength is fixed over longer periods. The vacancies are
then broken down by quotas on two dimensions: caste and home preference.
There are three categories for castes: General (unreserved) caste, Scheduled
Caste/Tribes (SC/ST) and Other Backward Castes (OBC). The designation of
vacancies to these caste categories are made based on predefined national
quotas. The actual assignment of each vacancy to a caste is randomized
using a rotating roster. In terms of preferences, vacancies are broken down
into “insider” and “outsider” vacancies. Insider vacancies are to be filled by
IAS officers from the same state who declared their home state preference
at time of application. The ratio of insider to outsider vacancies is 1:2, with
the assignment of vacancies to “insider” or “outsider” category following
the repeating sequence O-I-O. The determinantion of vacancies is illustrated
in Appendix Figure B.2. The result of this procedure is a list denoting the
number of vacancies for each state and the corresponding quotas by caste
status (SC/ST/OBC) and home state (insider/outsider) as shown in Appendix
Figure B.3.
Step 3. The final allocation process is based on merit as determined by the
ranking in the UPSC entry exam, the vacancies available and the preference
stated.
Before the officers are allocated, the candidates are ranked and assigned
a serial number in the order of merit, as determined by the UPSC exam.
Appendix Figure B.4 shows this ranking along with the officers’ caste and
home preference. The highest scoring candidate for the 2006 intake, for
example, was Mutyalaraju Revu who belongs to the OBC category and
indicated his preference to be assigned to Andhra Pradesh.
The allocation proceeds sequentially. First, the insider vacancies are
allocated as far as exact matches along caste and home state preference permit.
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If the number of matches exceed the vacancies, the higher ranking IAS officer is
given preference. Given the exact match along caste and home state required
for slotting, however, many insider vacancies typically remain unfilled. In
this case, the caste requirement is successively relaxed. In presence of open
unreserved insider vacancies, the unreserved insider vacancy can be allocated
to insider IAS officers from SC/ST and OBC (following the exact order) if
there is an SC/ST (or OBC) outsider vacancy to allow for the exchange: For
example, if Gujarat has received two unreserved insider vacancies but only
one Gujarati general caste to fill the first slot, the second slot is opened to
Gujarati SC/ST insiders, and if those are not available, to OBC insiders. The
reallocation, however, is only permitted when there is a corresponding outsider
vacancy that can be converted to an unreserved outsider vacancy to maintain
the quota among the caste vacancies. A Gujarati insider SC/ST then can only
fill the unreserved insider vacancy if a SC/ST outsider vacancy is available for
exchange. Similar rules apply for unfilled SC/ST or OBC insider vacancies.
Open SC/ST insider vacancies that could not be filled are first relaxed to
allow for OBC insider candidates and then to general candidates. Open OBC
vacancies, similarly, can first be filled by SC/ST insider candidates and then by
general candidates (in both cases provided there is a corresponding outsider
slot for exchange). Any remaining open insider vacancies that could not be
filled despite the relaxation of the quotas are converted to outsider vacancies
to ensure all vacancies are filled.
The allocation of the outsiders and those who failed to be allocated to their
preferred home state (and are consequently converted to outsiders) is done
according to a rotating roster system. The roster is created by arranging all 24
cadres in alphabetical order and dividing them into four groups. These groups
are devised on the basis of an average intake by each group, which over a
period of time is roughly equal:
1. Group I: Andhra Pradesh, Assam-Meghalaya, Bihar, Chhattisgarh and
Gujarat
2. Group II: Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Jharkhand,
Karnataka, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh
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3. Group III: Maharashtra, Manipur-Tripura, Nagaland, Orissa, Punjab,
Rajasthan and Sikkim
4. Group IV: Tamil Nadu, AGMUT (UT Cadre), Uttaranchal, Uttar Pradesh
and West Bengal
The outsider candidates are allocated in the order of merit across the four
groups for the outsider available vacancies (including those that have been
converted from insider vacancies). In the first cycle, all candidates are allocated
to their matching caste vacancy in the four states of Group I, starting with
Andhra Pradesh. In the second cycle, the remaining candidates are allocated to
their matching caste vacancies in Group II and so on. Since states who receive
officers earlier in the allocation process will receive higher ranked recruits, the
order of the groups shuffles each year to ensure that all states receive officers of
comparable quality. In Appendix Figure B.5, for example, Group III is the first
group in 2006, followed by Group IV, Group I and Group II. In the subsequent
year, the groups will rotate and the allocation of outsiders will commence with
Group II first, followed by Group III, Group IV and Group I.
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Appendix C
Appendices to Chapter 3: How Does
Collective Reputation Affect
Hiring? Selection and Sorting in an
Online Labour Market
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Table C.1: Testing the joint significance of Worker country FEs (Full sample
2001-12)
(1) (2) (3)
Top rating received for job
Mean dep. var. 0.804 0.804 0.804
Previous: Top rating 0.039***
(0.001)
Previous: Experienced 0.020***
(0.001)
Overall R2 0.008 0.691 0.692
Observations 144516 144516 144516
Worker country FEs F(21, 109319) 52.958*** 22.962*** 19.423***
Employer FEs F(35175, 109340) 6.921*** 6.729***
Individual background F(2, 144513) 223.59***
The unit of observation is the job. Reporting the F-test for the joint significance of
the collective trait, the worker’s country, in predicting job performance, as measured
by whether a top rating was received. Top rating is a dummy that is 1 if the job
was completed with a highest rating by the employer (10/10). Previous: Top rating
is a dummy that is 1 if the applicant worker received a top rating in previous jobs.
Previous: Experience is a dummy that is 1 if the worker has completed more than a
median amount (17) of jobs on the platform. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.2: Testing for changes in the employer’s job posting time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local time at job posting
9am-5pm 8am-8pm
Mean of dep. var. 0.345 0.345 0.495 0.495
First hire country -0.051 0.008 -0.026 0.073
(0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09)
First hire country × Top rating -0.053 -0.039
(0.08) (0.09)
First hire country × Previous: Top rating -0.018 -0.102
(0.08) (0.09)
First hire country × Previous: Experienced -0.027 -0.080
(0.08) (0.09)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Employer FEs X X X X
Worker country FEs X X X X
Bilateral controls X X X X
Observations 20676 20676 20676 20676
The unit of observation is the job. The dependent variable Local time at job posting is a
dummy that is 1 if the job was posted between 9am-5pm (8am-8pm) in the worker’s
local country time. First hire country is a dummy that is 1 if the worker hired for the
first job came from the country. A Top rating is defined as a rating of 10/10. Previous:
Top rating is a dummy that is 1 if the applicant worker received a top rating in previous
jobs. Previous: Experience is a dummy that is 1 if the worker has completed more than
a median amount (17) of jobs on the platform. Bilateral controls include a dummy for
the shared official country language, the absolute time difference in hours, and (log)
centroid distance between the employer and worker country. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
235
Table C.3: Robustness: Alternative dependent variables, time periods and samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: First Hire after Alt. dep. vars. Time period Employer sample
hire effect first job Highest ≥ 9th decile Rank Continue
Pre 2006 Post 2006 US employers > 1 hires
Mean dep. var. 0.100 0.715 0.010 4.477 0.125 0.078 0.099 0.286
First hire country 0.031*** 0.027*** 0.004* 0.130** 0.031*** 0.022** 0.024*** 0.073***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.008) (0.02)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Employer FEs X X X X X X X X
Worker country FEs X X X X X X X X
Observations 146273 146273 146273 146273 70989 75284 80474 51545
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Panel B: Contingent Base Alt. dep. vars. Time period Employer sample
on first outcome Continue Highest ≥ 9th decile Rank Continue
Pre 2006 Post 2006 US employers > 1 hires
Mean dep. var. 0.100 0.715 0.010 4.477 0.125 0.078 0.099 0.286
First hire country -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 0.099 -0.001 -0.018 -0.018 0.037
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
First hire country × Top rating 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.007 0.127 0.043** 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.073*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
First hire country × Previous: Top rating 0.006 0.000 0.008 0.015 0.010 -0.003 0.009 -0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
First hire country × Previous: Experienced -0.007 -0.008 0.002 -0.057 -0.006 0.004 -0.004 -0.044
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Employer FEs X X X X X X X X
Worker country FEs X X X X X X X X
Observations 146273 146273 146273 146273 70989 75284 80474 51545
The unit of observation is the employer-country pair. Panel A re-estimates the main result in Section 3.4.1 with different measures of
outcome (Column 2-4), time periods (5-6) and samples (7-8). Highest is a dummy that is 1 if an employer’s largest cumulative wage
payments went to the given country. ≥ 9th decile is a dummy that is 1 if the cumulative wage payments were above the 9th decile among
payments to all hired countries. Rank transforms the continuous payments into an ordinal ranking of flows. To facilitate comparison, the
measure has been inverted so higher ranks indicate a higher payments made. Column 5-6 splits the sample by the median year (2006).
Column 7 restricts the sample to US employers. Column 8 conditions only on employers who hire at least twice. First hire country is a
dummy that is 1 if the worker hired for the first job came from the country. A Top rating is defined as a rating of 10/10. Previous: Top rating
is a dummy that is 1 if the applicant worker received a top rating in previous jobs. Previous: Experience is a dummy that is 1 if the worker
has completed more than a median amount (17) of jobs on the platform. Bilateral controls include a dummy for the shared official country
language, the absolute time difference in hours, and (log) centroid distance between the employer and worker country. Panel B repeats the
same regressions for the secondary result in Section 3.4.2. Robust SEs, clustered at the employer level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.4: Robustness: OLS and reduced forms
Panel A: OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hire after first job Times hired Total pay
Mean dep. var. 0.100 0.100 0.236 0.236 10.026 10.026
First hire country 0.010*** 0.008 0.023** 0.025 1.399*** 2.074**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.43) (0.99)
First hire country × Top rating 0.011** 0.017 0.375
(0.00) (0.02) (0.91)
First hire country × Previous: Top rating -0.005 -0.014 -0.414
(0.01) (0.03) (1.00)
First hire country × Previous: Experienced -0.008* -0.019 -1.594*
(0.00) (0.02) (0.93)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Employer FEs X X X X X X
Worker country FEs X X X X X X
Bilateral controls X X X X X X
Observations 146273 146273 146273 146273 146273 146273
Panel B: Reduced form (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Continue Times Total pay
Mean dep. var. 0.100 0.100 0.236 0.236 10.026 10.026
Cheapest 0.009*** 0.001 0.023** -0.005 1.177*** 0.751
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.39) (0.91)
Cheapest × Top rating 0.015*** 0.037* 1.128
(0.00) (0.02) (0.80)
Cheapest × Previous: Top rating -0.000 0.011 0.644
(0.00) (0.02) (0.92)
Cheapest × Previous: Experienced -0.007 -0.003 -1.121
(0.00) (0.02) (0.85)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Employer FEs X X X X X X
Worker country FEs X X X X X X
Bilateral controls X X X X X X
Observations 146273 146273 146273 146273 146273 146273
The unit of observation is the employer-worker country pair. Panel A reports OLS estimates and Panel B reports reduced forms. The dependent
variable is a dummy that is 1 if the employer ever hired from the country from which workers applied in the first applicant pool after the first hire. Times
hired is the number of times the employer hired from the country after the first hire. Total pay is the cumulative wages paid by an employer to workers
in the given country after the first hire. First hire country is a dummy that is 1 if the worker hired for the first job came from the country. A Top rating is
defined as a rating of 10/10. Previous: Top rating is a dummy that is 1 if the applicant worker received a top rating in previous jobs. Previous: Experience
is a dummy that is 1 if the worker has completed more than a median amount (17) of jobs on the platform. Bilateral controls include a dummy for the
shared official country language, the absolute time difference in hours, and (log) centroid distance between the employer and worker country. Robust
SEs, clustered at the employer level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.5: Robustness: Using different definitions of job rating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Continue
Mean dep. var. 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
First hire country -0.106 -0.106** -0.048 -0.033 -0.013 -0.002 -0.181***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06)
First hire country × Rating ≥ 5 0.137*
(0.07)
First hire country × Rating ≥ 6 0.138**
(0.05)
First hire country × Rating ≥ 7 0.080*
(0.04)
First hire country × Rating ≥ 8 0.066**
(0.03)
First hire country × Rating ≥ 9 0.048**
(0.02)
First hire country × Rating ≥ 10 0.039**
(0.02)
First hire country × Rating [0,1] 0.224***
(0.07)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Employer FEs X X X X X X X
Worker country FEs X X X X X X X
Observations 146273 146273 146273 146273 146273 146273 146273
The unit of observation is the employer-worker country pair. The dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if the employer ever hired
from the country from which workers applied in the first applicant pool after the first hire. First hire country is a dummy that is 1 if the
worker hired for the first job came from the country. A Rating ≥ X is a dummy that is 1 if a rating is higher than X/10. Rating [0,1] is
the normalized rating that ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 is the absence of rating. Bilateral controls include a dummy for the shared official
country language, the absolute time difference in hours, and (log) centroid distance between the employer and worker country. Robust
SEs, clustered at the employer level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
238
Table C.6: Robustness: Final choice relative to applicant pool average
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Characteristics of hired worker compared to applicant pool
Highest rating Highest experience Cheapest Dominant bid
Mean of dep. var. 0.465 0.465 0.402 0.402 0.476 0.476 0.181 0.181
First hire country -0.019 -0.090 0.021 -0.124* -0.013 -0.042 0.015 -0.015
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06)
First hire country × Top rating given 0.097 0.052 0.046 0.017
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
First hire country × Previous: Top rating 0.050 0.115 -0.033 0.054
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
First hire country × Previous: Experienced -0.060 0.157** 0.011 -0.008
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Estimation IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Employer FEs X X X X X X X X
Country FEs X X X X X X X X
Bilateral controls X X X X X X X X
Observations 20761 20761 20761 20761 20761 20761 20761 20761
The unit of observation is the employer-worker country pair. The dependent variable captures the final choices of employer’s relative to
their applicant pools: In Column 1-2, the dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if the employer hired the worker with the highest rating.
In Column 3-4 (5-6), we capture whether the employer hired the most experienced (cheapest) worker. In Column 7-8, we summarize the
previous three measures using a dummy whether the worker hired the dominant worker, based on the vertical traits of rating, experience
and price. First hire country is a dummy that is 1 if the worker hired for the first job came from the country. A Top rating is defined as a
rating of 10/10. Previous: Top rating is a dummy that is 1 if the applicant worker received a top rating in previous jobs. Previous: Experience
is a dummy that is 1 if the worker has completed more than a median amount (17) of jobs on the platform. Bilateral controls include a
dummy for the shared official country language, the absolute time difference in hours, and (log) centroid distance between the employer
and worker country. Robust SEs, clustered at the employer level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.7: Robustness: Controlling for observable country-specific match heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employers Workers
Hire Times Total pay Applied Top rated High exp.
Mean of the dep. var. 0.100 0.236 16.357 0.273 0.573 0.196
First hire country -0.016 0.154 0.618 -0.032 -2.867* -1.819**
(0.10) (0.38) (17.99) (0.10) (1.56) (0.80)
First hire country × Top rating given 0.053*** 0.132** 4.347* 0.051*** 0.630*** 0.259**
(0.01) (0.06) (2.46) (0.01) (0.23) (0.12)
First hire country × Previous: Top rating 0.004 0.042 3.043 0.008 0.151 0.020
(0.01) (0.07) (2.80) (0.01) (0.26) (0.12)
First hire country × Previous: Experienced -0.006 0.042 -1.658 -0.002 0.338 0.289**
(0.01) (0.07) (2.74) (0.01) (0.25) (0.12)
First hire country × ln(Distance) 0.003 -0.014 0.334 0.005 0.368* 0.228**
(0.01) (0.05) (2.36) (0.01) (0.21) (0.11)
First hire country × Abs. time difference -0.000 -0.004 -0.533 -0.001 -0.076 -0.049
(0.00) (0.02) (0.57) (0.00) (0.06) (0.03)
First hire country × Common language -0.027* -0.111* 1.821 -0.023 -0.680*** -0.271**
(0.02) (0.06) (2.82) (0.01) (0.25) (0.12)
Estimation IV IV IV IV IV IV
Employer FEs X X X X X X
Country FEs X X X X X X
Bilateral controls X X X X X X
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 233.14 233.14 233.14 233.14 233.14 233.14
Observations 146273 146273 146273 145281 145281 145281
The unit of observation is the employer-worker country pair. The dependent variable hire is a dummy that is 1 if the employer ever hired
from the country from which workers applied in the first applicant pool after the first hire. Times hired is the number of times the employer
hired from the country after the first hire. Total pay is the cumulative wages paid by an employer to workers in the given country after
the first hire. Applied is a dummy that is 1 if workers from the country from which workers applied in the first applicant pool applied
after the first hire. No. of applicants is the number of applicant workers from the country after the first hire. Top rating is the number of
top rated applicant workers (10/10) from the country after the first hire. High exp. is the number of applicants with more than a median
amount (17) of completed jobs on the platform. First hire country is a dummy that is 1 if the worker hired for the first job came from
the country. A Top rating is defined as a rating of 10/10. Previous: Top rating is a dummy that is 1 if the applicant worker received a top
rating in previous jobs. Previous: Experience is a dummy that is 1 if the worker has completed more than a median amount (17) of jobs
on the platform. Bilateral controls include a dummy for the shared official country language, the absolute time difference in hours, and
(log) centroid distance between the employer and worker country. Robust SEs, clustered at the employer level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
240
Table C.8: Robustness: Alternative constructions of the wage IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dummy = 1 if employer ever hires from country after the first job
Mean of the dep. var. 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
First hire country 0.031*** -0.005 0.038*** -0.006 0.046*** 0.010
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
First hire country × Top rating 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.101***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
First hire country × Previous: Top rating 0.006 0.027* -0.003
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
First hire country × Previous: Experienced -0.007 -0.009 -0.061***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Instrument Cheapest Below average # Below average
Employer FEs X X X X X X
Country FEs X X X X X X
Bilateral controls X X X X X X
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 5214.54 419.57 9043.14 1007.02 1725.42 395.67
Observations 146273 146273 146273 146273 146273 146273
The unit of observation is the employer-worker country pair. The dependent variable hire is a dummy that is 1 if the employer ever hired
from the country from which workers applied in the first applicant pool after the first hire. Times hired is the number of times the employer
hired from the country after the first hire. Total pay is the cumulative wages paid by an employer to workers in the given country after the
first hire. First hire country is a dummy that is 1 if the worker hired for the first job came from the country. A Top rating is defined as a
rating of 10/10. Previous: Top rating is a dummy that is 1 if the applicant worker received a top rating in previous jobs. Previous: Experience
is a dummy that is 1 if the worker has completed more than a median amount (17) of jobs on the platform. Bilateral controls include a
dummy for the shared official country language, the absolute time difference in hours, and (log) centroid distance between the employer
and worker country. Cheapest is the preferred instrument when a worker from the given country submitted the lowest (residual) bid. Below
average wage is a dummy if at least one worker from the country submitted a wage bid that was below the applicant pool average. # Below
average wage is a continuous measure that captures the number of workers bidding below the applicant pool average wage. The test for
weak instruments is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic. Robust SEs, clustered at the employer level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.9: LATE and probabilities of compliance using different instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LATE First stage Compliance probability
βˆ1 P[D = 1] P[D1 > D0] P[z = 1] P[D1 > D0|D = 1] P[D1 > D0|D = 0]
Panel A: Wage bid instrument
Cheapest 0.031*** 0.176 0.333 0.184 0.348 0.149
(0.01)
Below average wages 0.038*** 0.176 0.200 0.541 0.614 0.525
(0.01)
The table summarizes estimates using different instruments (Column 1) and characterizes the population of compliers. Column 5 shows
the size of the complier population relative to the “treated” population (countries first chosen). Column 6 shows the size of the complier
population relative to the “untreated” population of countries that were not chosen from the first applicant pool.
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